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A basic function of the criminal justice system is to impose legal punishment through
deprivations of liberty. Because deprivations of liberty that flow from civil institutions are not
punitive, the distinction between civil and criminal institutional deprivations of liberty arguably
hinges on the concept of punishment. Punishment, in turn, may be distinguished from non-
punitive sanctions based on its unique expressive function; that is, punishment is defined in part
by the special feelings of resentment and judgments of disapproval that it expresses. These
feelings and judgments have been labeled “condemnation.”
This dissertation explores whether condemnation can be translated into an empirical
construct that may be assessed reliably and used to study judgments concerning an actor’s
suitability for punishment. A condemnation scale was designed, and in the first of two studies
the scale proved to be a reliable measure of condemnation expressed toward hypothetical
criminal defendants who raised the insanity defense. Condemnation scores differed significantly
depending on the mental impairments alleged by the defendants, such that higher average scores
were associated with diagnoses that do not seem to diminish the defendants’ criminal
responsibility. In addition, significantly higher condemnation scores were associated with
defendants who committed more severe crimes. Condemnation scores were also predictive of
mock jurors’ verdict decisions in some cases.
A revised version of the scale was also found to be a reliable measure of the
condemnationexpressed by legal professionals toward hypothetical juveniles facing either
delinquency adjudications or trials in criminal court. Although condemnation scores did not vary
significantly based on the severity of the juvenile’s offense or his premeditation, scores were
predictive of the participants’ charging decisions.
The findings suggest that juvenile court charging decisions and insanity case judgments
may be associated with the intensity of the condemnation that decision-makers direct toward the
accused. Although the findings do not (and cannot) confirm the normative argument that
condemnation is a defining characteristic of punishment, they suggest that judgments generally
track legal institutions’ conceptual and justificatory foundations.
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1INTRODUCTION
Althoughthe distinction between criminal and civil deprivations of liberty is of critical
importance in American jurisprudence, it is difficult to explain and define. Feinberg (1995a) has
argued that the condemnation expressed by just criminal punishment distinguishes criminal
punishment from civil sanctions. This dissertation describes an attempt to translate Feinberg’s
normative concept of condemnation into an empirical construct that can be used 1) to predict
decision-makers’ judgments about an actor’s eligibility for punishment through the criminal
justice system; 2) to assess whether those judgments are consistent with the basic normative
structure of a minimally-retributive criminal justice system, such as that of the United States; and
3) to identify indications of divergence between the actual functioning of legal institutions and
the normative framework on which those institutions are based.
The dissertation includes two major sections, which are organized as follows. Section I
opens with a basic discussion of the definition and justifications of legal punishment, with
emphasis on the concept of condemnation. Next, the manner in which condemnation arguably
serves to distinguish deprivations of liberty that flow from criminal and non-criminal institutions
will be explained in detail. To help illustrate condemnation’s discriminative function, two
species of hard cases that highlight the difficulties that inhere in distinguishing institutional
deprivations of liberty will be analyzed. More specifically, an analytical framework based on
condemnation will be used to examine whether the application of the insanity defense in criminal
trials and the jurisdiction decisions of juvenile courts cohere with the normative structure
underlying minimally-retributive criminal justice systems. Section I concludes with a review of
the psychological research literature addressing decision-making in insanity defense cases and
2juvenilecourt jurisdiction determinations. This review includes a detailed description of a
previous study wherein an empirical construct based on condemnation was used to analyze the
expressive function of insanity defense judgments and sexually violent predator commitments.
Section II presents two separate empirical studies that stem from the legal background,
normative framework, and empirical research described in Section I. In the first of these studies,
an empirical condemnation construct will be used to examine mock jurors’ decisions in criminal
trials involving the insanity defense. The study explores whether the condemnation construct has
predictive utility in cases that present 1) a wide range of psychological impairments, 2) crimes of
varying severity, and 3) different verdict options that purport to guide judgments about the
relationship between psychological impairment and criminal responsibility (i.e., “not guilty by
reason of insanity” and “guilty but mentally ill”). In the second study, the condemnation
construct will be applied to juvenile court jurisdiction decisions. This study examines the factors
that decision-makers may use when determining whether a particular youth’s case ought to
proceed in criminal or juvenile court and explores the relationship between these factors and
condemnation. Together, the studies suggest that condemnation can be translated into a
predictive empirical construct; that this construct yields useful insights about the decision-
making processes in insanity cases and juvenile court jurisdiction determinations; and that
experimental psychological research can be used to investigate whether legal institutions function
in a manner that is consistent with their justificatory foundations.
3I. A LEGAL, NORMATIVE, AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL INSTITUTIONAL
DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY
The empirical studies presented in this dissertation draw upon a broad base of
scholarship, law, and empirical research. More specifically, the studies are founded on
jurisprudential theories regarding the definition and justification of punishment; a normative
framework that arguably describes the manner in which institutions of social control function
coherently; a body of substantive law that includes the United States Supreme Court’s decisions
concerning the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions, the constitutional contours of
police power civil commitments, and the rights of young offenders; empirical studies that explore
decision-making in insanity cases and juvenile court jurisdiction determinations; and a prior
experiment that applies the aforementioned jurisprudential theories to advance understanding of
legal decision-making. The relevant legal scholarship, caselaw, and empirical research will be
reviewed in this section.
A. Defining and Justifying Punishment
Despite extensive study by scholars, a clear and complete description of the distinction
between civil and criminal sanctions remains elusive. Generally speaking, however, the criminal
law’s concern with punishment distinguishes it from civil law (Feinberg & Gross, 1995).
Therefore, an assessment of the features that distinguish criminal institutions from civil ones
should focus on the concept of punishment. An analysis of punishment should, in turn, entail a
study of both its definition and justifications (e.g., Singer & Gardner, 1989, pp. 46-132). To that
end, the following subparts propose a definition of punishment that incorporates condemnation,
4outlinetwo broad theories of the justification of punishment, and briefly describe the analysis
used by the United States Supreme Court to distinguish civil statutes from criminal statutes. This
will provide a foundation for the legal and normative framework that will be described thereafter,
which in turn forms the basis of the present studies.
1. Condemnation and the Definition of Punishment
“Legal punishment” has proven to be a difficult concept to define comprehensively. H. L.
A. Hart (1968) and others favor an influential definition that often serves as an effective starting
point for discussion (e.g., Feinberg & Gross, 1995; Singer & Gardner, 1989). This definition has
been paraphrased as follows:
One party’s treatment of another can properly be called legal punishment only if
(1) it is hard treatment (2) inflicted for a violation of legal rules (3) on the actual
or supposed violator (4) imposed and administered by human beings other than
the supposed violator himself (5) who have the authority to do so under the rules
of the governing legal system. (Feinberg & Gross, 1995, p. 585)
Though it has received broad recognition, this definition is certainly not beyond criticism (e.g.,
Singer & Gardner, 1989, pp. 48-58). For example, Feinberg (1995a) argues that this definition is
too broad because it includes sanctions that most people would not consider to be legal
punishment–such as penalties in a football game. He proposes that the definition could be
narrowed appropriately if a sixth element were added to account for the special “symbolic
significance” of legal punishment (Feinberg, 1995a, p. 593). This symbolic significance flows
from the expression of condemnation that, according to Feinberg, inheres in punishment.
The notion that punishment is defined partly by its “expressive function” is not new.
5Indeed,Feinberg (1995a) acknowledges H. M. Hart’s (1958) “eloquent” articulation of the point,
which merits quotation:
What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it
is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies . . .
its imposition. As Professor Gardner wrote not long ago, in a distinct but cognate
connection:
“The essence of punishment for moral delinquency lies in the criminal
conviction itself. One may lose more money on the stock market than in a
courtroom; a prisoner of war camp may well provide a harsher environment than a
state prison; death on the field of battle has the same physical characteristics as
death by sentence of law. It is the expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or
contempt for the convict which alone characterizes physical hardship as
punishment.”
If this is what a “criminal” penalty is, then we can say readily enough what
a “crime” is. . . . It is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur
a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community. . . . Indeed the condemnation plus the added [unpleasant physical]
consequences may well be considered, compendiously, as constituting the
punishment. (Feinberg, 1995a, p. 593; Hart, 1958, pp. 404-405)
Feinberg (1995a) argues, however, that condemnation and “unpleasant consequences” not only
are essential elements of punishment, but also are usually not the “distinct and separate” elements
of punishment that Hart describes (p. 593). Thus, in Feinberg’s view, if convicted prisoners are
6notformally condemned before their incarceration, it does not follow that condemnation is not
expressed toward them. On the contrary, Feinberg suggests that formal pronouncements of
condemnation are unnecessary because incarceration itself expresses condemnation. He states,
“The very walls of [the prisoner’s] cell condemn him and his record becomes a stigma” because
incarceration has–at least in this culture–“become the conventional symbol of public
reprobation” (Feinberg, 1995a, p. 594). In short, Feinberg argues that condemnation is a defining
characteristic of legal punishment that is expressed “automatically” in the United States
whenever the particular punishment of incarceration is imposed–even if the judge, jury, or any
other individual or group does not explicitly declare that the prisoner has been condemned by
them.
Feinberg (1995a) describes condemnation as an “expression of attitudes of resentment
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the
punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted” (p. 593).
“Resentment” refers to “the various vengeful attitudes” that “imprisonment is universally taken
to express,” while “reprobation” refers to a “stern judgment of disapproval” distinct from the
emotionally-rooted resentment (Feinberg, 1995a, p. 594).
An examination of the concepts of revenge and retribution may provide additional insight
into the specific nature of condemnation (e.g., Pearce 2007). Generally–and as Feinberg’s
definition implies–revenge is understood to be “emotionally rooted,” while retribution is
understood to be a non-emotional, calculated response. In addition, retribution is arguably
distinguishable from revenge because retribution occurs only in response to wrongs, whereas
revenge may be undertaken in response to harms which might or might not be wrongs (Nozick,
71995). The difference between a “harm” and a “wrong,” as those terms relate to the concepts of
revenge and retribution, may be illustrated by the following hypothetical: If a leader of a
criminal organization, or “boss,” decides to hurt an individual who testified against him in a
criminal trial, it might be said that the boss is seeking revenge for the harm caused by the
witness’s testimony. Because, however, the witness’s act of testifying was not a wrong, one
would not say that the boss is seeking retribution.
Retribution is also said to be distinguishable from revenge in that the extent of a
retributive response to a wrong is limited by the seriousness of the wrong, while the limits of
revenge are not intrinsically bounded (Nozick, 1995). Put differently, a retributive response is
proportional to the wrong, while a revenger faces no such limits as he responds to a harm against
him.
A third basis for distinguishing retribution from revenge stems from the idea that a
special attachment must exist between a revenger and the victim of a harm. Arguably, vengeance
requires a special and often personal connection between the revenger and the victim of a harm,
while retribution may be carried out by an agent who lacks a special tie to the victim (Nozick,
1995).
Retribution and revenge may be distinguished on still other grounds (e.g., Nozick, 1995,
p. 676). For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that a retributive response may be
defined as a response that is triggered by a wrong, is proportional to that wrong, and may or may
not involve a special connection between the retributive agent and the victim of the wrong. In
contrast, a vengeful response may be defined as a response that is triggered by a harm that may or
may not be a wrong, need not be proportional to the wrong, and involves a special connection
81Itshould be noted that even if one rejects Feinberg’s conceptual analysis of the core
definition of punishment, it does not follow that the empirical questions explored in this
dissertation (i.e., whether decision-makers’ determinations that a hypothetical actor ought to be
between the revenger and the victim of the harm. Note that a response may be characterized as
retributive and vengeful if it is proportional to a wrong and a connection exists between the
responder and the victim–and, presumably, the emotions underlying revenge are consistent with
the non-emotionally driven judgments underlying retribution.
As explained above, condemnation has been defined as a “fusing of resentment and
reprobation” (Feinberg, 1995a, p. 594). If, as Feinberg proposes, “resentment” is the emotional
force that motivates revenge, and “reprobation” is the “disapproving judgment” that limits
vengeful passions and legitimizes retributive responses, it could be said that condemnation is an
expression of “retributive revenge,” which consists of those responses that share some of the
characteristics of both retribution and revenge. This suggests that, according to Feinberg, an
expression of vengefulness flows from criminal punishment (or, more specifically, from the act
of criminal incarceration)–but only to the extent that this vengefulness is consistent with the
limits of retribution.
In summary, Feinberg (1995a) and others (e.g., Hart, 1958) have argued that criminal
punishments, and punitive deprivations of liberty in particular, are defined in part by the
condemnation that they express. Feinberg describes this condemnation as an “expression of
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation” (p.
593). If one accepts the premise that condemnation is a defining characteristic of punishment, as
Feinberg (1995a) and Hart (1958) suggest, it follows that condemnation can be used to analyze
the distinction between deprivations of liberty that flow from criminal and civil institutions.1
9subjectedto a criminal institutional deprivation of liberty are associated with feelings of
resentment and judgments of disapproval toward the actor) are unfounded. Indeed, the
psychological research literature reviewed below suggests that the feelings and judgments that
comprise condemnation are associated with decisions to punish. Nevertheless, the implications
of the current research depend, in no small part, upon the soundness of Feinberg’s conceptual
analysis. For this reason, the conceptual analysis and its relationship to the justificatory
framework underlying the criminal justice system will be discussed in detail.
In practice, however, courts typically consider two general justifications of punishment,
as opposed to a definition of punishment, when distinguishing civil statutes from criminal ones
(e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 1986; Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997). A brief discussion of the two primary
justifications of punishment is therefore in order.
2. Two Primary Justifications of Punishment: Retribution and Social Utility
“Because it entails the purposeful infliction of suffering, the imposition of punishment
raises serious ethical problems. To be morally tolerable, punishment must be administered only
for good reason” (Singer & Gardner, 1989, p. 82). There are two general categories of “good
reasons,” or justifications, for imposing punishment. One category of justifications is based on a
utilitarian theory, while the other is based on retributivism. Each of these theories will be
summarized briefly below.
Broadly speaking, the utilitarian theory of punishment holds that punishment, though an
evil, is necessary in some instances “in order to achieve desirable consequences, specifically to
minimize criminal conduct” (Singer & Gardner, 1989, p. 82). The elements of a “pure”
utilitarian theory of punishment may be described as follows:
1. Social utility (correction [or reform], prevention, deterrence, et cetera) is a
necessary condition for justified punishment.
2. Social utility is a sufficient condition for justified punishment.
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3. Theproper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the offender is that
amount which will do the most good or the least harm to all those who
will be affected by it. (Feinberg, 1995b, p. 616)
Each of these three elements is susceptible to criticism, however. For example, element 2 is
controversial because it suggests that the punishment of a legally innocent person would be
justified if the punishment would maximize social utility (Feinberg, 1995b). Similarly, the
calculus of social utility required under element 3 could lead to punishments that “seem” to be
excessive or insufficient in some cases (Feinberg, 1995b).
Retributivism, in contrast, is based upon the idea that “punishment is imposed to do
justice, whether or not beneficial consequences are obtained” (Singer & Gardner, 1989, p. 82).
There are several distinct varieties of retributivism. For example, “moralistic” retributivism
holds that punishment is justifiably imposed for “wrongdoing,” while “legalistic” retributivism
holds that “punishment is for lawbreaking, not (necessarily) for wrongdoing” (Feinberg, 1995b,
p. 613). Although a comprehensive review of each variety of retributivism will not be presented
here, a brief examination of one of the most popular versions–which Feinberg (1995b) labels
“pure moralistic retributivism”–may help to illustrate some of the basic tenets of the retributive
theory of punishment. The pure moralistic retributive theory of punishment is consistent with the
following propositions:
1. Moral guilt is a necessary condition for justified punishment.
2. Moral guilt is a sufficient condition (“irrespective of consequences”) for
justified punishment.
3. The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty
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offenderis that amount which fits, matches, or is proportionate to the
moral gravity of the offense. (Feinberg, 1995b, p. 614)
Once again, however, each of these elements is challengeable. Indeed, one might expect a
utilitarian theorist to protest element 2 because it provides that “the infliction of suffering on a
person (albeit a guilty person) [would be justified] even when no good to the offender, the
victim, or society at large is likely to result” (Feinberg, 1995b, p. 614). In addition, strong
practical objections can be raised against element 3 because it “would require the abandonment
of fixed penalties for various crimes and the substitution of individuated penalties in each case . .
. to fit the offender’s uniquely personal guilt and vulnerability” (Feinberg, 1995b, p. 615).
The foregoing discussion of utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment is basic, but
a more detailed review of the theories is unnecessary here. For present purposes, it is most
important to note the following points. First, the utilitarian theory of punishment is based on a
calculus of social utility that tends to focus on “advantages” that might be gained from
punishment (Feinberg, 1995b, p. 613). Punishment is justified only when called for under this
calculus. Second, retributive theories of punishment are based on the notion that guilt, which
may be moral or legal depending upon the variety of retributivism one favors, is sufficient to
justify punishment. Third, points one and two suggest that the utilitarian theory tends to be
forward-looking, while retributive theories tend to “look backward in time to guilt” (Feinberg,
1995b, p. 613). Finally, “pure” versions of either theory are quite susceptible to criticism.
Feinberg (1995b) argues that a “mixed” theory can address the criticisms that weaken
pure utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment–especially those criticisms directed at
element 2 under each theory (as they are summarized above). Under the mixed theory, “(1)
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moralguilt is necessary, but not alone sufficient [to justify punishment]; (2) social utility is
necessary, but not alone sufficient [to justify punishment]; and (3) moral guilt and social utility
are severally necessary and jointly sufficient [to justify punishment]” (Feinberg & Gross, 1995, p.
586). Put more simply (and shifting from moralistic retributivism to legalistic retributivism), the
mixed theory holds that punishment is justified only when the person to be punished is “legally
guilty” and “there is probably social utility in it” (Feinberg, 1995b, p. 616). Note that the mixed
theory is not susceptible to the criticism that persons who are not legally guilty may, on occasion,
be justifiably punished (which pure utilitarians must explain or defend); nor is it susceptible to
the criticism that punishment must be imposed even when the punishment would result in no
social utility whatsoever (which pure retributivists must explain or defend).
The mixed theory is not without flaws, however. Indeed, because “[u]tilitarian interests
in deterrence or rehabilitation may pull towards one or several punitive dispositions, while the
retributive demands of justice may pull towards still others,” tension inheres in the theory (Singer
& Gardner, 1989, p. 82). Nevertheless, as Singer and Gardner (1989) note, “most actual systems
of punishment are grounded in both types of justifications” (p. 82). For example, Revised
Statutes of Nebraska section 28-102, which closely tracks the language of Model Penal Code
section 1.02(1) (American Law Institute, 1962), states,
The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are:
(1) To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably
inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests;
(2) To subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they
are disposed to commit crimes;
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(3)To safeguard conduct that is without fault and which is essentially
victimless in its effect from condemnation as criminal;
(4) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute
an offense; and
(5) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses.
The first two “purposes” listed in this statute cite advantages that would factor into a utilitarian
calculus of social utility–specifically, deterrence and incapacitation. The third and fifth seem to
incorporate retributive concepts of justice and fairness (and it is interesting to note that item three
specifies that one of the purposes of the criminal code is to ensure that expressions of
condemnation are appropriately limited), while the fourth seems to embody both retributive and
utilitarian concepts. Thus, it is clear that the Nebraska statute describes a criminal justice system
predicated on a mixed theory of the justification of punishment.
Utilitarian and retributive concepts are jointly incorporated into sentencing schemes as
well. For example, federal courts are to impose sentences that “provide just punishment for the
offense,” “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant,” and “provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional treatment in
the most effective manner” (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). In other words, when imposing a sentence,
a federal court must consider not only the retributive function that the sentence would serve, but
also the utilitarian functions–specifically, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation–that the
sentence would serve.
It may be said that any criminal justice system that “condition[s] conviction and
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punishmenton retributive requirements of guilt, culpability, responsibility, or desert”–which
would include systems based on a retributive or mixed theory of the justification of
punishment–is minimally-retributive (Schopp, 1993, p. 1263). This term will be used throughout
this dissertation to refer to systems that “establish criteria of accountability as necessary
conditions for conviction and punishment” (Schopp, 1993, p. 1263), and as the foregoing
discussion of the mixed theory suggests, the term applies to the criminal justice systems of
much–if not all–of the world, including the United States (Arenella, 1992; Singer & Gardner,
1989).
In summary, theories of the justification of punishment may be classified into two general
categories. The pure utilitarian theory of punishment holds that punishment is justified by social
utility (e.g., deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). In contrast, pure retributive theories
hold that punishment is justly imposed upon the guilty even if the punishment lacks social utility.
A “mixed” theory of punishment has emerged, and although this theory addresses some of the
criticisms that have been leveled against pure utilitarian and pure retributive theories, it does not
account for the tension that may arise between the competing values of social utility and “just
deserts.” Despite these tensions, the American criminal justice system is founded upon, and
expressly incorporates, both utilitarian and retributive principles (Arenella, 1992; Singer &
Gardner, 1989). Its incorporation of the “retributive requirements of guilt, culpability,
responsibility, or desert” renders it minimally-retributive (Schopp, 1993, p. 1263). Note that to
the extent that condemnation is defined as a subset of retributive responses that overlap with
emotionally-rooted resentment, it seems that condemnation not only defines punishment (at least,
according to Feinberg and others), but also bears a relationship with the justificatory foundation
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ofpunishment.
Utilitarian and retributive theories have been used not only to justify punishment, but also
to distinguish punitive statutes from nonpunitive statutes. Indeed, the fundamental holding of the
mixed theory of the justification of punishment–specifically, the idea that guilt and social utility
combine to form a strong justification for punishment–is incorporated into the analytical
framework used by the Supreme Court to distinguish civil and criminal statutes (United States v.
Ward, 1980). This framework will be outlined below.
3. The Supreme Court’s Test for Distinguishing Civil Sanctions from Criminal Sanctions
In United States v. Ward (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that a proceeding
for the assessment of a “civil penalty” under section 311(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act is not a “criminal case” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against compulsory self-incrimination. In reaching its decision, the Court noted first that “[t]he
distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is some constitutional import” because
certain constitutional protections (such as the Fifth Amendment privilege) are available only in
criminal cases (Ward, 1980, p. 248). The Court then outlined a two-level inquiry that should be
undertaken to determine “whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal” (p.
248). First, courts must consider whether the language of the statute and its legislative history
indicate a preference for a civil or criminal label. If it appears that the legislature “has indicated
an intention to establish a civil penalty,” courts must inquire further to determine “whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention” (pp. 248-
249). To resolve this second inquiry, courts may consider the seven factors previously specified
by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963). These factors are 1) “whether
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thesanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; 2) “whether it has historically been
regarded as punishment”; 3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; 4)
“whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence”; 5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; 6) “whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and 7) “whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned” (Mendoza-Martinez, 1963,
pp. 168-169).
Applying this analytical framework to the case before it, the Supreme Court found first
that “Congress [clearly] intended to impose a civil penalty” under section 311(b)(6) (Ward, 1980,
p. 249). The Court then proceeded to the second inquiry and concluded that only one
factor–specifically, “whether the behavior to which [the sanction] applies is already a
crime”–weighed in favor of a determination that the statute was so punitive in purpose or effect
as to negate Congress’s intention to impose a civil penalty. The Court held that on balance, the
Mendoza-Martinez factors were not “sufficient to render unconstitutional the congressional
classification of the penalty established in § 311(b)(6) as civil” (Ward, 1980, pp. 250-251).
Note that in Ward, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a monetary
penalty amounted to a civil or a criminal sanction. More recently, however, the Ward analysis
has been used to determine whether a deprivation of liberty is civil or criminal in nature (e.g.,
Allen v. Illinois, 1986; Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997). The Court’s opinion in Hendricks will be
discussed in greater detail below. For present purposes, it is noteworthy that the fourth Mendoza-
Martinez factor–“whether [the sanction’s] operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment”–was central to the Court’s analysis in Hendricks. Therefore, this factor merits
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closerexamination.
The fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor is based upon the premise that the “traditional aims
of punishment” are retribution and deterrence (Mendoza-Martinez, 1963, p. 168). These
“traditional aims of punishment” seem to correspond closely with the primary justifications of
punishment discussed above–i.e., retribution and social utility. Under the utilitarian and mixed
theories of punishment, deterrence is one social benefit that may justify (or help justify)
punishment. As noted previously, incapacitation and rehabilitation are other social benefits cited
by utilitarian theorists (e.g., Feinberg, 1995b; Singer & Gardner, 1989). Incapacitation and
rehabilitation cannot be used effectively to distinguish criminal deprivations of liberty from civil
deprivations of liberty, however, because incapacitation and rehabilitation (or treatment) are
legitimate aims of both civil and criminal deprivations of liberty (e.g., Hendricks, 1997
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Jones v. United States, 1983). The Supreme Court seems to suggest,
however, that deterrence–unlike incapacitation and rehabilitation–is “reserved for the criminal
system” (Hendricks, 1997, p. 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bell v. Wolfish, 1979, p. 539 n.20).
If this is true, then it is logical that deterrence may serve to distinguish criminal statutes from
civil statutes, as the Mendoza-Martinez analysis presupposes. It is certainly not obvious,
however, that “deterrence”–as the term is commonly understood in the law–can in fact perform
this discriminating function.
Suppose, for example, that a person suffering from severe mental retardation and
psychosis has been civilly committed on the ground that he has a mental disorder that makes him
a danger to society. Assume that this person is confined in a psychiatric treatment facility, that
he is placed in a therapeutic program that employs incentives and “punishments” to modify
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behavior,and that this program is successful (i.e., it renders him no longer dangerous to the
community). It appears, then, that this person is not only capable of being deterred, but that he
has, in fact, been deterred from engaging in certain conduct through the treatment that he
received during his civil commitment. In other words, the civil deprivation of liberty seems to
have served a function akin to special deterrence, which has been defined as “discouraging
individual convicted criminals from committing subsequent offenses by inflicting them with
punishment” (Singer & Gardner, 1989, p. 85). It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would find
that this sort of “therapeutic” deterrence renders the civil commitment “criminal” in nature,
Mendoza-Martinez factor four notwithstanding. More to the point, if “deterrence” is to serve as a
basis for distinguishing criminal deprivations of liberty from civil ones, the term must refer to
something other than the sort of special deterrence that might legitimately flow through certain
civil commitments.
In his concurring opinion in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy implies that the term
“deterrence,” as it is used by the majority and in Mendoza-Martinez factor four, should be
understood to mean general deterrence (Hendricks, 1997, (Kennedy, J., concurring)). General
deterrence refers to the notion that “would-be criminals [are dissuaded] through the threat of
punishment for criminal acts” (Singer & Gardner, 1989, p. 85). It might seem, at first blush, that
to the extent general deterrence represents a disincentive to act resulting not from the actual
suffering of adverse consequences (as in a therapeutic program of classical conditioning), but
from the threat of adverse consequences, general deterrence may indeed be a benefit that flows
only from the criminal justice system. If this were so, deterrence would serve to distinguish civil
deprivations of liberty from criminal deprivations of liberty. However, the deterrent effects that
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flowfrom the civil law of negligence, and especially products liability law, cast doubt upon the
notion that only the criminal law can perform general deterrence (e.g., Gavin, 2008, p. 437). In
short, the concept of general deterrence does not seem capable of distinguishing criminal statutes
(or institutions) from civil ones.
The foregoing examples illustrate that deterrence functions in a variety of ways, and that
it is difficult to argue that either special deterrence or general deterrence is “reserved for the
criminal system” alone (Hendricks, 1997, p. 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Therefore, if there
is a sense in which deterrence is unique to the criminal law, “deterrence” must be understood to
mean something narrower and more limited than either special deterrence or general deterrence.
One might argue that if “deterrence” is taken to refer only to the sort of deterrence that occurs
when actors with the capacity for criminal responsibility are dissuaded from acting in violation
of institutional proscriptions, deterrence is unique to the criminal law. In other words, to the
extent that culpability is necessary to promote general deterrence through punishment, deterrence
arguably flows only from the criminal law, and it may therefore serve to distinguish criminal
deprivations of liberty from civil ones. To afford due credit to the Supreme Court’s clear
pronouncement that deterrence is “not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective[],”
(Bell, 1979, p. 539 n.20), it will be assumed for the purposes of the following analysis that
deterrence can be used to distinguish civil deprivations of liberty from criminal ones. It is
important to note, however, that 1) the term “deterrence” should be understood to refer to a
narrowed definition of general deterrence such as the one suggested immediately above, and 2)
the concept of retribution serves to distinguish civil and criminal sanctions much more
effectively–at least from a theoretical perspective–than deterrence.
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 In summary, when courts are called upon to distinguish a civil deprivation of liberty from
a criminal one, they employ an analysis that depends, in part, on an assessment of whether the
deprivation of liberty serves retributive and deterrent aims. This analytical factor has roots in the
traditional justifications of punishment–retribution and social utility–that have been incorporated
(often expressly) into the American system of criminal justice. Thus, the use of the factor
appears to be defensible–though “deterrence” must be understood to refer only to the deterrence
of criminally responsible actors.
Interestingly, courts have neither developed nor employed a specific definition of
punishment to aid their analyses of the nature of statutes. Nor have they expressly applied the
concept of condemnation to distinguish civil deprivations of liberty from criminal ones (though,
as noted above, the relationship between retribution and condemnation suggests that
condemnation does factor into the Ward analysis, albeit in an unstated way). It is proposed
below that condemnation can, in fact, be used to distinguish civil and criminal institutions that
impose deprivations of liberty on persons. Moreover, is argued that a theory based upon
condemnation can provide a valuable framework for analyzing whether some of the most
difficult cases that currently confront the law are more appropriately addressed through the
criminal justice system as opposed to a noncriminal institution, such as civil commitment or the
juvenile justice system.
B. Condemnation as a Means of Distinguishing Civil and Criminal Institutional
Deprivations of Liberty
Legal institutions in the United States strive to ensure that punishment is imposed only in
appropriate cases. Nevertheless, these institutions sometimes struggle to resolve cases that raise
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difficultquestions about the appropriateness of punishment. Indeed, at times it is difficult to
determine whether a given case is more appropriately addressed through a criminal or
noncriminal institution. A framework based upon condemnation can be used to analyze these
hard cases and evaluate the legal mechanisms that are currently used to address them. This
framework will be outlined below. It will then be applied to analyze the difficult questions that
arise in criminal trials involving the insanity defense and juvenile court jurisdiction
determinations.
1. Condemnation, Criminal Responsibility, and the Expressive Function of the Criminal
Justice System
The criminal justice system, which is administered by a state pursuant to its police
powers, serves “as the primary legal institution of coercive social control over adult citizens who
engage in culpable conduct that harms the legitimate interest of others” (Schopp, 2001, p, 17). In
other words, the criminal justice system is the conventional institution for imposing legal
punishment in the United States (Schopp, 1993). If punishment expresses condemnation, then it
follows that the criminal justice system provides the institutional structure that determines
whether condemnation will be expressed in most cases. Indeed, Schopp (1993) argues
persuasively that, in fact, condemnation is expressed at four distinct stages within the
institutional structure established by the criminal justice system.
First, condemnation is expressed when a social institution proscribes a certain category of
conduct (Schopp, 1993). This commonly occurs when a legislature defines a particular crime
and sets its punishment. For example, if a legislature criminalizes the act of sexual intercourse
between unmarried persons, or “fornication,” a degree of condemnation is thereby expressed
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towardthe category of conduct that satisfies the statutory definition of fornication (Pearce, 2007).
This sort of condemnation will be labeled “institutional condemnation.”
A second expression of condemnation, which will be labeled “general act condemnation,”
occurs when an institutional proscription is affirmed (Schopp, 1993). Typically, this sort of
affirmation occurs whenever institutional proscriptions are enforced. For example, if
“fornication” has been criminalized but the state’s fornication statute is never enforced by the
police, there has been an expression of institutional condemnation–but not general act
condemnation–toward the category of conduct that the legislature has defined as “fornication”
(Pearce, 2007).
A third expression of condemnation, which will be labeled “specific act condemnation,”
occurs when the proscription of an institutionally proscribed act is affirmed upon the
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the act’s commission in a specific case (Schopp,
1993). As its label suggests, this sort of condemnation is fact-specific and indicates that the
commission of a proscribed act was not justified in a particular case. If, for example, conduct
defined as “the intentional killing of another person” has been criminalized, and if this criminal
prohibition is generally enforced, then the category of conduct that falls within this definition is
the subject of institutional condemnation and general act condemnation. If an intentional killing
has been committed, and if this killing is determined to have been justified (perhaps on the
ground that it occurred as a result of self defense), specific act condemnation would not be
expressed toward this particular killing–even though institutional and general act condemnation
are expressed toward intentional killings generally.
A fourth expression of condemnation, which will be labeled “actor condemnation,” is
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directedtoward fully accountable agents who have committed institutionally proscribed acts
(Schopp, 1993). To illustrate, suppose that a category of conduct defined as “the intentional
killing of another person” is institutionally proscribed, and that this proscription is enforced when
intentional killings occur. In addition, suppose that an intentional killing has occurred, and that
the killing was found to be unjustified. Under these circumstances, institutional condemnation
and general act condemnation are expressed toward “intentional killings” generally, and specific
act condemnation is expressed toward the specific intentional killing that has been committed by
the accused. Actor condemnation will be expressed toward the accused if it is determined that
the accused was a morally accountable actor at the time of the killing. If, however, it is
determined that the accused lacked accountability for the act–perhaps due to a psychological
impairment that rendered him legally insane–then actor condemnation will not be expressed
toward him. Note that “institutional,” “general act,” and “specific act” condemnation are
expressed toward a category of conduct or a specific act that falls within the relevant category of
conduct, while actor condemnation extends, as its label indicates, to the actor himself.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, each of the four expressions of condemnation
corresponds to a key point in the framework established by the criminal justice system.
Ordinarily, when a person commits a proscribed act and is apprehended by the authorities,
charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced, all four types of condemnation are expressed. It should
be noted, however, that general act condemnation and specific act condemnation are not
necessarily expressed in every case where criminal punishment is imposed (Schopp, 1993). If,
for example, a portion of the criminal code diverges from conventional notions of morality to
such a degree that law enforcement officers or jurors do not wish to affirm the institutional
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proscriptionof a category of conduct, but they nevertheless enforce the proscription for no other
reason than to fulfill their respective oaths, a criminal conviction may follow even though there
has been no expression of general act condemnation. Similarly, there would be no expression of
specific act condemnation in cases where jurors affirm the general proscription of a category of
conduct, deny that the proscription ought to be affirmed in the specific case before them, but
convict the defendant to satisfy their oath to faithfully apply the law.
In contrast, in a minimally-retributive criminal justice system, Schopp’s (1993)
framework holds that institutional condemnation and actor condemnation are necessarily
expressed in every case in which criminal punishment is justly imposed. First, institutional
condemnation is expressed in all such cases because the principle of legality–that is, the notion
that there can be no punishment without law–ensures that there can be no just punishment in the
absence of an institutional proscription (e.g., Singer & Gardner, 1989). This principle is also
reflected in Nebraska Revised Statute § 28-102(4), which has been quoted above. Second, actor
condemnation is expressed whenever criminal punishment is justly imposed because in
minimally-retributive criminal justice systems, actors who lack the capacity for criminal
responsibility simply may not be justly punished (Morse 1997; Schopp, 1993; Arenella, 1992;
Singer & Gardner, 1989). The “capacity for criminal responsibility,” as the term is used here,
refers to the set of psychological capacities that are relevant to the determination that a given
actor was “competent” to commit a crime (Schopp, 1998). Others refer to this concept as
“accountability” or “moral agency,” and, generally speaking, all but the “very young” and the
legally insane possess these capacities (e.g., Arenella, 1992, p. 1521; Morse, 1997). In other
words, the threshold for criminal responsibility is quite low. Nevertheless, a determination that
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thedefendant was a morally accountable agent must precede the imposition of punishment in any
minimally-retributive criminal justice system (Schopp, 1993, p. 1263). Therefore, if one accepts
the notion that actor condemnation is expressed when actors are found to be morally accountable
agents, it follows that actor condemnation is expressed whenever punishment is imposed.
Parenthetically, it may be interesting to note that in a purely utilitarian criminal justice system,
punishment could be imposed without an expression of actor condemnation if, in order to
maximize social utility, it would be acceptable to punish a person who was not responsible for a
given criminal act–a possibility that underlies one of the most potent criticisms of the pure
utilitarian theory of punishment (and which would not be tolerated in a minimally-retributive
system).
In summary, the criminal justice system is the conventional institution for the imposition
of punishment, and Schopp (1993) argues that condemnation is expressed by the criminal justice
system generally and through its application in specific cases. However, the criminal justice
system imposes punishment upon, and expresses condemnation toward, only those persons who
are found to have performed institutionally proscribed acts while acting as criminally
responsible, accountable actors. Conversely, without a determination that a person is an
accountable agent, criminal punishment cannot follow, no retributive or deterrent aims would be
legitimately served if the person were institutionally incapacitated (though it should be noted that
for the reasons explained above, the term “deterrence,” here and hereinafter, is used in a narrow,
specific sense), and no condemnation would be expressed toward him by such an incapacitation.
It is important to take note of the following point: Although Schopp’s theory suggests that
actor condemnation is justly, ordinarily, and automatically expressed toward a person who has
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beenfound to have committed an institutionally proscribed act while acting as a morally
accountable agent, it is a separate, empirical question whether vengeful feelings and disapproving
judgments (i.e., the components of condemnation) are actually expressed toward defendants who
are found guilty of committing a crime. The experiments described below attempt to explore this
empirical question. Although the empirical inquiry does not depend directly upon the validity of
the condemnation framework (indeed, it can neither prove or refute the normative framework),
the implications of the empirical findings for legal policymakers are more potent to the extent
that the condemnation framework coheres with legal institutions. The foregoing discussion
illustrates the convergence between the condemnation framework and the criminal justice
system. In the following subparts, the condemnation framework will be applied first to the
institution of civil commitment, and subsequently to the institution of juvenile justice, in order to
explore whether the framework serves to illustrate the noncriminal nature of those institutions.
2. The Expressive Function of Police Power Civil Commitments
States may subject their citizens to non-punitive deprivations of liberty through their civil
commitment procedures. Civil commitments stem from two general sources of state authority:
parens patriae powers and police powers. Generally, parens patriae civil commitments are
imposed to provide care for persons who lack the capacity to care for themselves (e.g., Schopp,
1998; Addington v. Texas, 1979). Police power civil commitments, in contrast, are imposed
upon persons who suffer from psychological impairments that render them dangerous (Schopp,
1998, p. 332; see also, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997; Addington, 1979). The uses and legal
contours of parens patriae civil commitments are beyond the scope of the present analysis, and
the term “civil commitment,” as it is used hereinafter, should be understood to refer only to
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policepower civil commitments.
As noted above, a state also exercises its police powers, or its “authority to wield coercive
force in order to protect the community from harm,” when it punishes criminals (Schopp, 1998,
p. 332). Thus, because criminal incarceration and civil commitment can be based on a state’s
police powers, it follows that there is some overlap in the functions that these deprivations of
liberty perform. For example, and as noted previously, criminal incarceration and civil
commitment both may legitimately serve to incapacitate and rehabilitate (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2); Jones v. United States, 1983). This overlap makes distinguishing between these
types of deprivations of liberty somewhat difficult.
Recall that courts apply the two-level analysis set forth in United States v. Ward (1980) to
determine whether a civil commitment procedure is truly criminal in nature. The Ward analysis
is deferential to the state’s legislature, but the legislature’s intent to create a civil procedure may
be disregarded if “the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate
that intention” (pp. 248-249). Several factors may be used to assess the “purpose or effect” of a
statute, but one factor seems to receive special emphasis when civil commitment statutes are
reviewed. Specifically, the Supreme Court has suggested that if a civil commitment procedure
serves retributive and deterrent purposes, it may be deemed criminal in nature (e.g., Kansas v.
Hendricks, 1997). The Court, however, has not clearly articulated the reasons why civil
commitments do not serve retributive or deterrent purposes. Arguably, the condemnation
framework set forth above can, when considered along with the traditional justifications for
police power civil commitments, clarify the noncriminal nature of these commitments.
Although civil commitments may be based on a state’s police powers, they are typically
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imposedthrough institutions separate and distinct from the criminal justice system. These civil
commitment institutions vary in their particulars from state to state, and it is not necessary to
summarize, or even categorize, them here. It is important to note, however, that these institutions
may differ from the criminal justice system in several key respects. First, certain rights that must
be afforded in criminal proceedings–such as the protections offered by the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause and Double Jeopardy Clause–need not be afforded when commitments
stem from a state’s conventional civil commitment institution (e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 1986; see
also Ward, 1980, p 248). In addition, civil commitment institutions may employ rules and
procedures that are quite different from those that apply in criminal proceedings. For example,
civil commitments under Nebraska’s Mental Health Commitment Act are based upon “clear and
convincing” evidence (as opposed to proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”), and commitment
decisions are reached by mental health boards rather than juries (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-925).
Although the differences between criminal proceedings and civil commitment proceedings may
be significant, they are not problematic because states’ civil commitment statutes are not meant
to result in the imposition of criminal punishment (Addington v. Texas, 1979). Instead, the
purpose of a civil commitment “is to treat [an] individual’s mental illness and protect him and
society from his potential dangerousness” (Jones v. United States, 1983; see also Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 71-902). To achieve this purpose while also protecting individuals’ core substantive due
process interests in freedom from bodily restraint, civil commitments imposed under a state’s
ordinary civil commitment statutes are generally held to be constitutionally valid when there has
been an institutional determination—based upon at least clear and convincing evidence—that a
person is both mentally ill and dangerous (Kansas v. Crane, 2002; Foucha v. Louisiana, 1992).
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InNebraska, this “mental illness” is defined as “a psychiatric disorder that involves a severe or
substantial impairment of a person’s thought processes, sensory input, mood balance, memory, or
ability to reason which substantially interferes with such person’s ability to meet the ordinary
demands of living or interferes with the safety or well being of others,” and the “dangerousness”
criterion is satisfied when a mental illness causes a person to present “a substantial risk of serious
harm to another person or persons within the near future” (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-907, 71-908).
If these criteria are satisfied and a civil commitment is ordered, it may be said that the
commitment bears a “reasonable relation” to the goals of treating psychological impairments
while protecting society from danger (Foucha v. Louisiana, 1992, p. 79). In other words, the
involuntary civil commitment is justified by 1) the presence of a qualifying psychological
impairment, and 2) evidence of dangerousness. If either criterion ceases to apply, however, the
justification for the commitment dissolves, and the person can no longer be held justly against his
or her will.
It should be noted that the justification for civil commitments does not depend upon the
commission of an institutionally proscribed act by an accountable agent. In other words, unlike
criminal punishment, civil commitments may occur in the absence of institutional condemnation
and actor condemnation. This is consistent with civil commitment’s nonpunitive purpose of
protecting the public from the dangerous mentally ill; indeed, the absence of institutional and
actor condemnation requires that civil commitments are not punitive, and it therefore follows
that they do not, and cannot, serve retributive and uniquely “criminal” deterrent purposes.
Although civil commitments do not depend upon the commission of institutionally
proscribed acts, it does not follow that civil commitments cannot occur when the subject of the
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commitmenthas committed an institutionally proscribed act. On the contrary, civil commitments
based on determinations that defendants are incompetent to proceed or are legally insane may
flow from the criminal justice system; that is, they may be imposed in criminal proceedings as
opposed to proceedings under a state’s standard civil commitment statute (Jones v. United States,
1983; Jackson v. Indiana, 1972). Although these commitments have been held to be consistent
with the “reasonable relationship” principle cited in Foucha–and they are therefore consistent
with the principles of due process (e.g., Jones, 1983; Jackson, 1972)–their civil nature is also
illustrated effectively by the four-level condemnation framework (e.g., Pearce, 2007).
For example, suppose that a person committed a sexual assault, but a court has
determined that the person lacks competence to proceed to trial. Suppose also that, as a direct
result of his incompetence to proceed, the person is civilly committed. This commitment would
be constitutional, provided that its duration is limited to “the reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that [the person] will attain [the] capacity
[to proceed] in the foreseeable future” (Jackson, 1972, p. 738). If it is determined that there is no
substantial probability that the person will obtain this capacity in the foreseeable future, the
person’s confinement can continue only if he is committed pursuant to “the customary civil
commitment statute” (Jackson, 1972, p. 738). If, on the other hand, it is determined that the
person soon may be competent to proceed to trial, “his continued confinement must be justified
by progress toward that goal” (Jackson, 1973, p. 738; see also, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
1823(1)). If one were to question whether this sort of commitment were truly criminal, as
opposed to civil, in nature, one might focus on the function performed by the commitment (i.e.,
to determine whether the person is, or may soon be, competent to proceed to trial) and conclude
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thatit is indeed “civil” (Jackson, 1973). Alternately, however, one might apply the
condemnation framework, which illustrates that the commitment must be civil. In this example,
an expression of institutional condemnation is associated with the general proscription of sexual
assaults. Also, it may be assumed that the decision to prosecute the person reflects an
affirmation of the institutional proscription of sexual assaults, which would result in an
expression of general act condemnation. Due to the person’s incompetence to proceed in the
criminal justice system, however, the procedures established by criminal justice system cannot be
used to evaluate his particular sexual assault to determine whether it merits specific act
condemnation. For the same reason, there can be no determination that the person committed his
sexual assault as an accountable agent, which is prerequisite to an expression of actor
condemnation towards the person himself. Thus, even though the person may have committed
an institutionally proscribed act, and even though his commitment was imposed via the criminal
justice system rather than the state’s ordinary civil commitment institution, the person’s
commitment cannot express condemnation–and it therefore cannot be deemed “criminal” in
nature (in accordance with the condemnation theory)–because there has not been a determination
that the person committed an act of an institutionally proscribed type while acting as an
accountable agent.
Similarly, suppose that a person committed a sexual assault, but he successfully raised an
insanity defense during his criminal prosecution. Suppose also that the state has civilly
committed him based solely on his legal insanity (see Jones v. United States, 1983). In this case,
as in the example outlined above, there has been an expression of institutional condemnation
and, it may be assumed, an expression of general act condemnation toward the category of
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conductdefined as “sexual assault.” In addition, given the affirmative nature of the insanity
defense, an insanity acquittal arguably results in at least an implicit determination that the
specific sexual assault committed by the defendant merits specific act condemnation (e.g., Jones,
1983, p. 363). Nevertheless, the post-insanity acquittal commitment does not express
condemnation toward the person because the commitment is not based on a determination that he
committed the proscribed act while acting as an accountable agent. Instead, the commitment is
based upon “the purposes of treatment and the protection of society,” as are ordinary civil
commitments (Jones v. United States, 1983, p. 366). Indeed, the successful insanity defense
precluded a determination that actor condemnation is appropriately expressed toward the person,
even though the proscription of the defendant’s specific act may have been affirmed during the
criminal proceedings.
In addition, it should be noted that a person may be convicted of a crime, punished, and
subsequently civilly committed–with no distortion of the separate functions that the institutions
of criminal justice and civil commitment perform–provided that the criteria set forth in the
standard civil commitment statutes are satisfied at the time of the commitment (e.g., Baxstrom v.
Herold, 1966). The condemnation framework can be used to illustrate that this result coheres
with the criminal justice system’s justificatory foundation. Suppose, for example, that a person
has been convicted of a sexual assault, that he was sentenced to a term of incarceration based
upon that conviction, and that during his incarceration he developed a psychological impairment
that satisfies the “mental illness” prong of the state’s civil commitment statute and renders him
“dangerous” within the meaning of that statute. Suppose further that he is civilly committed at
the expiration of his term of incarceration. This commitment would not express condemnation
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towardthe person, even though condemnation was appropriately expressed toward him through
the criminal justice system previously. This is so because the civil commitment stemmed from a
determination that the statutory commitment criteria were satisfied; the commitment was not
based upon the fact that the person was found to be criminally responsible for a sexual assault.
If, however, the standard civil commitment criteria were not satisfied, and the person were
nevertheless civilly committed upon the expiration of his sentence, the commitment would be
subject to challenge on the ground that the person was treated differently from those who are
civilly committed pursuant to the statute. Moreover, the person’s conviction would not provide a
reasonable basis for such differential treatment (Baxstrom, 1966).
The examples used above to illustrate the relationship between condemnation, criminal
punishment, and civil commitment do not account for all of the variations in state civil
commitment law. In Nebraska, for example, insanity acquittals do not automatically result in
civil commitments (Tulloch v. State, 1991; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3701 to 3704). Nevertheless,
the foregoing analysis is consistent with current Supreme Court caselaw concerning criminal
procedure and civil commitment, and it is therefore generally consistent with the laws of the
States.
In summary, although civil commitments may be based upon a state’s police powers, they
are not designed to impose punishment, and therefore they do not serve retributive or “deterrent”
functions. Instead, states’ civil commitment statutes establish institutions that are designed to
confine dangerous persons with statutorily-defined psychological impairments (e.g., Foucha,
1992). Principles of due process “require[] that the nature and duration of [a] commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed,” (Jackson v.
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Indiana,1972, p. 738), and these principles are satisfied in cases where individuals are
committed following determinations that they are incompetent to proceed to trial or are not guilty
by reason of insanity–even if proceedings under the standard civil commitment statute do not
occur (e.g., Jackson, 1973; Jones, 1983). When the basic institution of civil commitment is
examined using the condemnation framework, the framework illustrates that civil commitments
are not punitive because they do not express actor condemnation. Moreover, the condemnation
framework arguably clarifies the relationship between the institutions of criminal justice and civil
commitment in the United States by demonstrating that civil commitments that flow directly
from the criminal justice system are not punitive, because even though the proceedings may
express condemnation toward a category of conduct (or even the defendant’s specific conduct),
they do not express condemnation toward the actor himself.
The foregoing analysis illustrates that the condemnation framework can be used to show
that criminal incarcerations can be distinguished from involuntary civil commitments of various
types because the sort of condemnation that is unique to criminal punishment is expressed only
toward actors who possess the capacity for criminal responsibility. It will be shown next that the
four-level condemnation framework can also be used to explore the distinction between the
criminal and juvenile justice systems and highlight the importance of juvenile court jurisdiction
decisions.
3. The Expressive Function of Juvenile Court Proceedings
Juvenile courts were originally formed to provide a rehabilitation-focused alternative to
the “punitive” adult criminal justice system–though jurisdiction waiver procedures allowed
young offenders to be transferred to the adult system in certain cases (e.g., Feld, 1997; Tomkins
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etal., 1996). Although juvenile court dispositions, like criminal convictions, could result in
deprivations of liberty, these deprivations of liberty were predicated on the states’ parens patriae
powers, as opposed to their police powers (e.g., Fondacaro, Slobogin, & Cross, 2006). During
the past forty years, however, the effectiveness of juvenile courts has been challenged, their
rehabilitative ideals have been questioned, and their parens patriae foundations have been
shaken. A series of Supreme Court decisions “criminalized” juvenile court procedure, and some
states went so far as to establish institutions of juvenile justice that purport to hold juvenile
offenders accountable for their violations of the law. In view of these trends, it is arguable that
certain juvenile court dispositions are now punitive.
In this subsection, the four-level condemnation framework will be used to illustrate that
juvenile court institutions based on the traditional “rehabilitative” model of juvenile justice are
not punitive, but that contemporary “accountability-based” juvenile courts are punitive. It will
also be shown that, given the wide varieties in the design and application of juvenile justice
systems, one cannot reasonably expect that all institutions of juvenile justice will consistently
reflect the traditional conceptual and justificatory distinctions between juvenile and criminal
justice–including differences in the expression of condemnation. Nevertheless, it will be argued
that the decision to transfer jurisdiction of a juvenile offender’s case from the juvenile justice
system to the criminal justice system can be framed as an assessment of whether a particular
offender might be an appropriate subject of the “actor condemnation” that typically flows only
from the criminal justice system.
First, a brief historical overview of youths’ criminal liability at common law and the
development of the modern juvenile court system will be presented. Next, judicial decisions and
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legislativeinnovations that have arguably “criminalized” the formerly “rehabilitative” juvenile
court system will be reviewed. Finally, the condemnation framework will be used to attempt to
illustrate the “criminalization” of juvenile courts and the significance of juvenile court
jurisdiction decisions.
a. The Early History of Juvenile Justice
Juvenile courts did not exist at common law, and all offenders, regardless of age, were
subject to the same system of criminal courts (e.g., Walkover, 1984). This does not mean,
however, that the common law system of juvenile justice was based on an assumption that even
the most youthful offenders possessed the capacities associated with criminal responsibility (e.g.,
Morse, 1997; Arenella, 1992). On the contrary, youths were assumed to have different capacities
for moral reasoning and “understanding wrongfulness” than adults, and the common law infancy
defense accounted for these differences by incorporating a set of age-based presumptions
(Walkover, 1984, p. 510). Persons fourteen years and older were presumed to be morally
responsible for their actions and were therefore subject to the same criminal procedures and
punishments as adults (Gardner, 1997). Persons age seven and younger were conclusively
presumed to lack the capacity for moral responsibility, and hence they could not be criminally
punished. Persons between the ages of seven and fourteen were also presumed to lack the
capacity for moral responsibility, but this presumption could be rebutted if the state could show
that a particular youth knew the wrongfulness of his or her act. Non-punitive dispositions were
not considered among the sentencing options for either excused or morally responsible youths,
regardless of their ages (Gardner, 1997, pp. 181-182).
During the nineteenth century, an alternative to the common law model of juvenile justice
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beganto emerge. In 1825, the efforts of Quaker reformers led to the creation of New York’s
“House of Refuge,” which not only separated young offenders from adult criminals, but also
provided the youth with some educational instruction (Gardner, 1997, p. 182). In 1899, Illinois
created the first modern juvenile court system, and by 1945 every state and federal jurisdiction in
the United States had implemented some form of “juvenile justice alternative” for young
offenders (p. 182). Nevertheless, procedures soon evolved to permit the criminal punishment of
certain juvenile offenders. Indeed, “In 1903, only four years after its establishment, the Chicago
juvenile court transferred fourteen children to the adult criminal system” (p. 182 n.18). Gardner
(1997) notes that by the end of the 1970s, every jurisdiction had some means of criminally
prosecuting juveniles in certain cases.
These changes ushered in the era of parens patriae juvenile justice, which, as noted
above, was founded on the ideal of rehabilitating young offenders (Feld, 1997). As Gardner
(1997) explains, adversarial hearings governed by the rules of criminal procedure were not held
in parens patriae juvenile justice systems. Instead, juvenile proceedings were considered civil,
and alternate terminology was employed so that juveniles could avoid the stigma associated with
“criminal” labels: crimes became “acts of delinquency”; indictments were replaced by
“petitions”; trials became “adjudications”; sentences were called “dispositions” and were
sometimes derived from the recommendations of social scientists and physicians; and juveniles
were confined in “schools” rather than jails or prisons (Gardner, 1997, pp. 183-184).
Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, a series of Supreme Court cases began to alter the
original “non-punitive” form of juvenile justice, and the Court began to acknowledge the
mounting frustration with the rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile courts. In addition, states
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beganto experiment with models of juvenile justice that specifically incorporated notions of
criminal accountability. These developments, and the “criminalization” of juvenile justice that
followed them, will be discussed next.
b. The “Criminalization” of Juvenile Courts
The criminalization of the parens patriae juvenile court system arguably began with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kent v. United States (1966). Morris Kent, then age sixteen and
already on probation with the juvenile court, was arrested and charged with housebreaking,
robbery and rape. Kent was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court unless that court, after “full investigation,” decided to waive jurisdiction over him
and transfer him to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for trial as an
adult. The juvenile court denied Kent’s requests for a hearing on the question of waiver and for
access to the court’s “Social Service file” on Kent (p. 546). Instead, the juvenile court entered an
order stating only that the required “full investigation” had been conducted and that jurisdiction
had been waived. Thereafter, Kent was tried in the district court and convicted on six counts of
housebreaking and robbery–though he was acquitted on two rape counts by reason of insanity.
He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty to ninety years.
Ultimately, however, Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded
the case for a waiver hearing. In reaching this decision, the Court held not only that the
statutorily-required “full investigation” did not occur, but also that the juvenile court’s waiver of
jurisdiction failed to comport with “the basic requirements of due process and fairness” (Kent v.
United States, 1966, p. 553). The Court explained that although the juvenile court is afforded
broad discretion to determine whether to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile, the governing statute
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“doesnot confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure” (p. 553). The Court
held that in order for the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction to be valid, juveniles must be
granted a hearing, along with access to counsel and the social service reports, and “a statement of
reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision” (p. 557).
The Court also criticized the parens patriae foundation of the juvenile court, noting that
Kent’s case presented concerns about “the justifiability of affording a juvenile less protection
than is accorded to adults suspected of criminal offenses” (Kent v. United States, 1966, p. 551-
52). Though it did not have occasion to expand upon these concerns in its opinion, the Court
commented that the rehabilitative ideals embodied in the District’s Juvenile Court Act may be
unrealized in practice, and that juveniles may well “receive[] the worst of both worlds . . .
[because the juvenile] gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children” (p. 556).
Because the Court’s holding in Kent was based, at least in part, on the juvenile court’s
failure to satisfy the terms of the Juvenile Court Act governing the District of Columbia, its
applicability to state juvenile courts was unclear (Gardner, 1997). In In re Gault (1967),
however, the Supreme Court extended constitutional protections to the states’ juvenile justice
systems. Gerald Gault, who was fifteen years old at the time of his adjudication, was committed
to the custody of the Arizona State Industrial School for a maximum term of approximately six
years (when he would reach the age of twenty-one). Gault’s offense was to place an “obscene”
phone call while “subject to a six months’ probation order . . . as a result of his having been in
the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady’s purse” (In re Gault, 1976, p.
4). Incidentally, the criminal punishment specified for such an offense, had Gault been an adult,
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wouldhave been a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment for not more than two months. More
importantly, the petition which initiated Gault’s adjudication was never served on him or his
parents; Gault was not represented by counsel at either of the two hearings that preceded his
commitment to the state school; the person complaining of the obscene call did not attend either
of the hearings; and no record was made of the substance of the hearings.
The Supreme Court held that, in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the following rights must be afforded when juvenile delinquency
proceedings “may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is
curtailed”: 1) juveniles and their parents must be given written notice of the charges; 2) juveniles
and their parents must be given notice of their right to the assistance of counsel at the
adjudication hearing; 3) juveniles are entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses at their
adjudication hearings; and 4) juveniles are entitled to the protections of the privilege against self
incrimination (In re Gault, 1967, pp. 31-57). As in Kent, the Court criticized the parens patriae
underpinnings of the juvenile court system, stating,
[T]he highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for
juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is–to say the least–debatable. And in
practice, as we remarked in the Kent case . . . the results have not been entirely
satisfactory. (In re Gault, 1967, pp. 17-18)
Nevertheless, the Court opined that its holding would not eliminate the “unique benefits” cited
by proponents of the juvenile justice system (In re Gault, 1967, p. 22). Moreover, the Court
based much of its holding on procedural fairness considerations with roots in the Due Process
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Clause(as opposed to the Sixth Amendment, for example), and thereby avoided the complete
criminalization of juvenile courts (Gardner, 1997). As Gardner (1997) notes, however, the
Court’s direct reliance on the Fifth Amendment in its analysis of the self-incrimination issue
suggests that juvenile adjudications are “criminal” proceedings at least for the purposes of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On this point, it should be recalled that in
United States v. Ward (1980), the Supreme Court stated specifically that the “Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . is expressly limited to ‘any criminal case’” (p. 248).
Generally speaking, though, the Court managed–or at least attempted to manage–the
“constitutional domestication” of juvenile adjudications (In re Gault, 1967, p. 22), without
holding that deprivations of liberty stemming from juvenile court adjudications amount to
criminal punishment (Gardner, 1997).
In In re Winship (1970), the Supreme Court extended another important constitutional
protection to persons adjudicated in the juvenile courts. Specifically, the Court held that
juveniles charged with committing acts of delinquency are entitled to a reasonable doubt standard
of proof (Gardner, 1997). Once again, however, the Court stopped short of fully criminalizing
the juvenile justice system; indeed, the Court opined that the reasonable doubt standard of proof
would not destroy the beneficial informality, flexibility, and speed of the system.
Following In re Winship, the Supreme Court announced an opinion which seemed to call
to a halt the importation of criminal rights and procedures into the juvenile justice system. In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), a plurality of the Court determined that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial is inapplicable in juvenile adjudication hearings. The plurality dismissed
arguments that juries would aid in accurate factfinding and that judges serving as factfinders
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wouldbe influenced by exposure to prejudicial material. Instead, it concluded that replacing the
factfinding judge with a jury would end the informal intimacy, sympathy, and paternalism
underlying the juvenile court process, and possibly replace that process with a public trial. In
addition, the plurality perceived the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals to be less futile
than had been suggested in Kent and In re Gault:
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that,
despite disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and
we are particularly reluctant to say . . . that the system cannot accomplish its
rehabilitative goals. So much depends on the availability of resources, on the
interest and commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on
understanding as to cause and effect and cure. In this field, as in so many others,
one perhaps learns best by doing. We are reluctant to disallow the States to
experiment further and seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the
problems of the young, and we feel that we would be impeding that
experimentation by imposing the jury trial. (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 1971, p.
547)
The Court returned to its “criminalization” of the juvenile justice system, however, in
Breed v. Jones (1975). Jones, then age 17, committed acts of delinquency analogous to the
“adult” crime of robbery. A petition was filed in juvenile court, and following an adjudicatory
hearing, the juvenile court found that Jones had indeed committed the robbery. At the ensuing
dispositional hearing, however, the juvenile court decided that Jones was unfit for treatment as a
juvenile and ordered that he be prosecuted as an adult. Jones was then tried and convicted of
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robbery. On review, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy clause
prohibited the state from subjecting Jones to a criminal trial after he had already been adjudicated
delinquent in the juvenile justice system. According to the Court:
[I]n terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an
adjudicatory hearing such as was held in this case from a traditional criminal
prosecution. For that reason, it engenders elements of “anxiety and insecurity” in
a juvenile, and imposes a “heavy personal strain.” And we can expect that, since
our decisions implementing fundamental fairness in the juvenile court system,
hearings have been prolonged, and some of the burdens incident to a juvenile’s
defense increased, as the system has assimilated the process thereby imposed.
We deal here, not with the “formalities of the criminal adjudicative
process,” but with an analysis of an aspect of the juvenile-court system in terms of
the kind of risk to which jeopardy refers. Under our decisions we can find no
persuasive distinction in that regard between the proceeding conducted in this case
. . . and a criminal prosecution, each of which is designed “to vindicate [the] very
vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.” (p. 530-31)
In other words, because of the consequences that may follow adjudicatory hearings–and at least
partly because of the Court’s prior decisions “criminalizing” the juvenile justice system–the
Court has determined that juvenile delinquency proceedings are equivalent to criminal
prosecutions for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis (Gardner, 1997).
Through these decisions, the Supreme Court ushered in the “modern era” of juvenile
justice, wherein many of the rights that must be afforded to defendants in the criminal justice
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systemhave been extended to juveniles. In addition, in most of these decisions the Court
criticized the juvenile justice system’s inability to achieve its rehabilitative ideals. Nevertheless,
the Court avoided criminalizing the juvenile justice system completely, and in McKiever it
encouraged states to experiment with different strategies for achieving rehabilitative goals.
Some states, however, have decided to experiment with “accountability-based” models of
juvenile justice. For example, Washington has incorporated notions of accountability and
punishment directly into its juvenile justice system. The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, as
amended, provides, in part, as follows:
(2) It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary
responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful
offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established. It is the further intent of the
legislature that youth, in turn, be held accountable for their offenses [italics
added] and that communities, families, and the juvenile courts carry out their
functions consistent with this intent. To effectuate these policies, the legislature
declares the following to be equally important purposes of this chapter:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
. . . .
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior [italics added];
(d) Provide for punishment [italics added] commensurate with the age,
crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender;
. . . .
(j) Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders shall
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receivepunishment, [italics added] treatment, or both, and to determine the
jurisdictional limitations of the courts, institutions, and community
services . . . . Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.010 (West 2006)
In addition, juvenile dispositions in Washington are based on a statutory schedule that resembles
sentencing guidelines, and acceptable dispositions include “sentences” to confinement and fines
of up to $500 (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 13.40.020(2)(a), 13.40.0357). In other words, the
Washington statutes establish a sentencing procedure for juveniles comparable to that of the
adult criminal justice system. Although the rehabilitative ideals of the traditional model of
juvenile justice are not completely eschewed in Washington, the Act states on its face that
juveniles are to be held accountable for their criminal behavior and punished. Furthermore, to
the extent that the sentencing schedule is afforded weight, it would seem to restrict the state’s
ability to individually tailor therapeutic, rehabilitative dispositions.
The Supreme Court’s “criminalization” of the juvenile justice system and the adoption of
“accountability” models in states such as Washington raise doubts about the civil nature of
juvenile justice. In the following section, the condemnation framework will be used to analyze
whether modern juvenile courts impose punishment.
c. Condemnation and Juvenile Justice
The four-level condemnation framework can provide useful insights into the relationship
between criminal and juvenile justice systems. The framework will be applied to traditional and
evolving models of juvenile justice to assess whether these various models represent civil or
criminal institutions. In addition, it will be argued that in states that have not yet adopted
accountability-based models of juvenile justice, the jurisdiction determination process (i.e., the
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chargingor waiver decision) serves a “gatekeeper” function insofar as expressions of actor
condemnation are concerned, and that many of the criteria used to inform jurisdiction decisions
are coherent with the criminal justice system’s normative structure only to the extent that those
criteria are understood to relate to a juvenile’s capacity for criminal responsibility.
i. The Expressive Function of Evolving Models of Juvenile Justice
This subsection will demonstrate that the condemnation framework can be used to
analyze whether the common law, parens patriae, “modern era,” and accountability-based models
of juvenile justice are truly criminal in nature.
First, when the condemnation framework is applied to the common law model of juvenile
justice–which, as noted above, is based on the infancy defense–it reveals that there may be
inconsistencies between the infancy defense and the normative structure underlying the criminal
justice system. Recall that under the infancy defense, children younger than age seven would not
be subject to criminal punishment–or, in the language of the framework, actor
condemnation–because the defense created an irrebuttable presumption that these children lacked
the capacity for criminal responsibility. Suppose, for example, that a six-year-old child stole her
neighbor’s bicycle. If theft is proscribed in the state’s criminal code, and if this proscription is
enforced, institutional condemnation and general act condemnation would be expressed toward
“theft” as a category of conduct. Depending on the procedures used to invoke the infancy
defense, there may or may not be an expression of specific act condemnation toward the
particular bicycle theft that was perpetrated by the child. In any case, however, it is clear that
there would be no expression of actor condemnation toward the child herself because the infancy
defense forecloses the possibility of an institutional determination that the child stole the bicycle
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whileacting as a criminally responsible agent. Assuming that no children under age seven
possess the capacity for criminal responsibility, this result would cohere with the normative
framework underlying the criminal justice system. If some of these youths do possess the
capacity for criminal responsibility, however, the infancy defense would seem to interfere with
the basic function of the criminal justice system. In essence, the common law model of juvenile
justice would provide these criminally responsible youths with a complete defense to criminal
liability based on an erroneous and uncorrectable assumption about their eligibility to participate
in the criminal justice system.
Conversely, at common law persons over the age of fourteen were presumed to possess
an adult’s capacity for criminal responsibility. Because these youths were considered proper
subjects for criminal punishment, all four types of condemnation might be expressed following
the trial, conviction, and sentencing of a fourteen-year-old bicycle thief. If age fourteen is indeed
the age at which most persons attain the maturity necessary to afford them the capacity for
criminal responsibility, the defense functions in a manner consistent with minimally-retributive
criminal justice systems’ normative framework. On the other hand, if most persons do not
acquire the basic capacity for criminal responsibility by this age, the defense’s presumption is
inconsistent with that framework and ought to be questioned. It should be noted, however, that
despite his ineligibility for the infancy defense, a fourteen-year-old might be able to raise his
diminished capacity as an affirmative defense to criminal liability in the “adult” criminal justice
system.
The common law infancy defense also provided that a criminal actor between the ages of
seven and fourteen might be punished if the state could show that the youth possessed the
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capacityfor criminal responsibility. In the language of the condemnation framework, one might
say that in order to prosecute a youth between the ages of seven and fourteen, the state was
required to show that the youth was eligible to be the subject of actor condemnation. If this
showing is made, the youth may be tried as an adult and punished; moreover, his punishment
would not offend the principle of accountability that inheres in a minimally-retributive criminal
justice system. Conversely, if it cannot be shown that the youth possesses the capacity for
criminal responsibility, the infancy defense would require that he not be punished–an outcome
that is consistent with the criminal justice system’s normative framework.
In short, the common law infancy defense arguably functions in a manner consistent with
the basic normative structure of the criminal justice system–but only to the extent that its
conclusive presumptions about youths’ capacities for criminal responsibility are accurate.
The condemnation framework can also be used to analyze the parens patriae juvenile
court structure that replaced the common law system. This analysis suggests that the parens
patriae system of juvenile justice did not express condemnation toward juveniles, even though
juveniles were sometimes subjected to terms of confinement substantially greater than they
would face in the “adult” criminal justice system. Recall, for example, that Gerald Gault faced a
deprivation of liberty of up to six years under the juvenile justice system, even though he would
have faced a maximum of two months’ imprisonment had be been tried as an adult. One might
suppose that, based on the relative severity of Gault’s juvenile court disposition, the juvenile
court system then in effect was a punitive institution, despite its parens patriae foundation. The
condemnation framework suggests, however, that this is not the case.
Assume that the act of placing an obscene phone call is an institutionally proscribed act
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2Thisanalysis depends on an assumption that traditional, parens patriae juvenile justice
systems were designed or applied based on the premise that youths are less responsible than
adults, and therefore merit no punishment–or at least less punishment than adults (e.g., Gardner,
1997, p. 183). If this premise provides the conceptual and justificatory basis for treating
juveniles differently than adult criminals, it follows that processing a criminally responsible
and that the institutional proscription of this act is enforced. Thus, there has been an expression
of institutional condemnation and general act condemnation. Assume also that a juvenile places
an obscene phone call, that he is adjudicated in a traditional, pre-Gault parens patriae juvenile
court, that he is found to be delinquent, and that he is remanded to the custody of a juvenile
detention facility for rehabilitation. It would seem that the delinquency finding entails a
determination that the act committed by the juvenile fell within the prohibited category and was
not justified; if so, there has been an expression of specific act condemnation. However, the
juvenile’s disposition is not punitive unless there has been an expression of actor condemnation,
which occurs only when there has been a determination that the actor committed the proscribed
act as a criminally responsible agent. If the juvenile’s commitment to the detention facility was
truly based on the state’s parens patriae authority and not based on a determination that the
juvenile committed the act as a criminally responsible agent, there would be no expression of
actor condemnation. This remains true even if the juvenile is deprived of his liberty for much
longer than the criminal justice system might have allowed–just as a civil commitment does not
become punitive merely because it results in a lengthy deprivation of liberty, and civil damages
awards do not amount to criminal punishment merely because they exceed any applicable
criminal fine. In short, the condemnation framework suggests that traditional parens patriae
juvenile court systems were not punitive, despite the fact that they might lead to relatively hard
treatment.2
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youththrough the juvenile justice system would raise significant conceptual and justificatory
questions. It is possible, however, that juvenile justice systems can incorporate different
premises. For example, a juvenile justice system might operate on the premise that juveniles are
more likely to benefit from rehabilitation than adults, whether or not the juveniles possess the
same capacity for criminal responsibility as adults. Indeed, the traditional parens patriae model
of juvenile justice seems to have incorporated this premise (e.g., Gardner, 1997, p. 183). Thus,
the traditional parens patriae juvenile justice system’s conceptual and justificatory foundation
for treating juveniles differently than adults may include non-retributive considerations, and the
system’s jurisdiction over criminally responsible youths no longer seems so offensive to the
relationship between the institutions of juvenile and criminal justice. This note is intended to
illustrate that the application of the condemnation framework to institutions of juvenile justice
(of all eras) presented here is not meant to represent an all-encompassing, universal
pronouncement about the proper functioning of juvenile justice institutions; however, to the
extent that retributive considerations are relevant to the purposes and justifications of a given
institution of juvenile justice, the condemnation framework is effective at highlighting
discrepancies between the purposes and justifications of the institution and its functioning. This
point should be borne in mind throughout the discussion presented in this subsection, as the
discussion emphasizes retributive considerations.
As discussed previously, during the “modern era” of juvenile justice, the Supreme Court
afforded to juveniles many of the rights and procedural protections that apply in criminal
proceedings while expressing doubts about the juvenile courts’ parens patriae foundation. These
developments alter the foregoing analysis of the expressive function of parens patriae juvenile
courts in two significant ways.
First, to the extent that the Court relied upon principles of due process and fundamental
fairness when extending “criminal” rights and procedural protections to juveniles, the parens
patriae foundation of the system is not eroded, and the foregoing analysis of parens patriae
juvenile adjudications applies with equal force. In other words, the addition of procedural
protections in the interest of “fairness” does not necessarily imply that the purpose of the
proceeding has shifted to an assessment of whether the juvenile committed an institutionally
proscribed act as a criminally responsible actor–just as it does not necessarily follow that civil
51
commitmentproceedings are rendered “criminal” in nature simply because a reasonable doubt
standard of proof is applied. To the extent that the Court truly “criminalized” the juvenile justice
system, however, the system’s parens patriae foundation has been undermined. As explained
above, the Supreme Court has arguably criminalized juvenile court proceedings for the purposes
of the privilege against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, though it relied on principles of
due process and fairness when extending to juveniles the right to notice, counsel, and cross-
examination. These holdings complicate the assessment of the expressive function of modern
juvenile court systems. Second, and relatedly, the Court’s direct criticism of the parens patriae
foundation of the juvenile courts casts doubt upon the courts’ civil nature. If the parens patriae
underpinnings of the juvenile justice system are rejected, the juvenile courts arguably perform a
function more akin to that of the criminal justice system. Despite these complications, it is at
least arguable that enough of the parens patriae foundation of the juvenile justice system remains
that the system has retained is traditional, “non-punitive” nature (Gardner, 1997, p. 183).
Any argument that modern era juvenile courts remain “civil” dissipates, however, in
jurisdictions (such as Washington) that purport to hold juveniles accountable for their criminal
acts. In these jurisdictions, the parens patriae foundation that was partly whittled away by the
Supreme Court is replaced by a police power foundation that explicitly incorporates notions of
criminal responsibility and accountability. If a juvenile commits an institutionally proscribed act
and is adjudicated delinquent in such a jurisdiction, his disposition undoubtedly expresses both
institutional and actor condemnation. Thus, the condemnation framework indicates that his
disposition performs the expressive function of punishment–that is, the disposition is punitive,
just as the accountability model intends. Parenthetically, it should be noted that even if the state
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hopesto achieve rehabilitative goals through its juvenile court dispositions, this would not undo
the disposition’s expression of actor condemnation–just as rehabilitation efforts undertaken in a
prison setting do not suffice to render inmates’ convictions “civil” in nature. It should also be
noted that unless a juvenile is afforded all of the rights and procedural protections normally
afforded to criminal defendants–including the right to a trial by jury–a strong argument could be
made that accountability-based juvenile justice systems are constitutionally infirm (see In re
L.M., 2008).
The foregoing discussion indicates that the condemnation framework provides a helpful
tool for assessing the civil or criminal nature of various models of juvenile justice. It will be
suggested next that the framework also illustrates that the mechanisms used to determine juvenile
court jurisdiction perform a critical function that relates directly to the normative structure
underlying the criminal justice system.
ii. Condemnation and Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Decisions
Recall that at common law, a criminal actor between the ages of seven and fourteen could
be punished if the state could establish that the youth possessed the capacity for criminal
responsibility. As suggested above, the state’s burden might be reframed as follows: if the state
shows that a youth is eligible to be the subject of actor condemnation, the youth may be tried as
an adult and punished without offense to the principle of accountability inherent in minimally-
retributive criminal justice systems. In “modern era” juvenile justice systems, decisions to try
youths in criminal courts as opposed to juvenile courts can be reframed in a similar
way–assuming that modern era juvenile justice systems retain some aspect of their traditional,
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3Ofcourse, if a juvenile justice system embraces the premise the youths are fully
accountable moral agents indistinguishable from adults, the condemnation framework will not
serve to distinguish effectively such a system from the criminal justice system. However, if
juvenile justice systems–even accountability-based ones–operate on the premise that youths are
in some sense less culpable than adults, condemnation serves as one factor (perhaps among
many) that distinguishes the criminal justice system from juvenile systems.
noncriminal nature.3
States use one of three mechanisms to determine whether a youth ought to be tried in
criminal court or adjudicated as a juvenile: judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, and
legislative waiver (Gardner, 1997). Most common is the judicial waiver model, “wherein a
juvenile court judge decides whether a particular youngster should remain in the juvenile system
or be sent to adult court” (Gardner, 1997, p. 207). In these jurisdictions, hearings on the issue of
transfer, or the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, might be viewed as preliminary evaluations
of whether a juvenile is a suitable subject for condemnation. To the extent that waiver decisions
are based on this determination, they cohere with the normative framework underlying the
criminal justice system. This is so because under such circumstances, only those persons who
might possess the capacity for criminal responsibility will be transferred to the criminal justice
system for a final, institutional determination as to whether they performed an institutionally
proscribed act as a criminally responsible actor. In practice, however, waiver decisions do not
focus exclusively on a juvenile’s capacity for criminal responsibility.
At the time of the juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction over Morris Kent, a
policy memorandum then in effect outlined the “criteria to govern disposition of waiver requests”
(Kent v. United States, 1966, p. 546 n.5). The factors listed in this memorandum were as
follows:
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1.The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence
upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be
determined by consultation with the United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern
of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile
courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior
commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
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allegedoffense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court. (p. 566-67)
The sixth factor appears to be directly relevant to the assessment of the juvenile’s capacity for
criminal responsibility, but others may be indirectly relevant. Consider factor one: “The
seriousness of the alleged offense.” On its face, this factor does not appear to relate directly to an
assessment of the actor’s capacity for criminal responsibility. One might argue, however, that the
seriousness of an offense can provide some insight into the actor’s accountability. For example,
a youth’s stealing of a piece of candy from a store might not call into doubt his understanding of
moral accountability in the same way that his committing rape and murder would. Nevertheless,
the consideration of factors that largely seem separate and distinct from the assessment of the
juvenile’s capacity for criminal responsibility can create confusion about the conceptual
distinction between the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
Gardner noted, for example, that “[w]aiver is generally reserved for those youths whose
highly visible, serious, or repetitive criminality raises legitimate concern for . . . community
outrage” (1997, p. 182 n.18). This principle seems to be reflected in factors one, two, three, and
seven of the memorandum, which reaffirms Gardner’s observation that it may be of central
importance to waiver decisions. A number of noteworthy implications flow from the centrality
of this principle, however. Initially, one must question whether the community outrage is truly
“legitimate” if it is expressed without regard to the culpability of the actor. Note that the
principle articulated by Gardner implies that some acts, by their nature, may outweigh the youth
of the offender, his rehabilitative potential, and, most importantly, his capacity for criminal
responsibility (or, more precisely, his lack thereof), and justify findings that juvenile court
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jurisdictionought to be waived. But if juveniles who clearly lack the capacity for criminal
responsibility are transferred to the criminal justice system for trial due to the seriousness,
visibility, and repetitive nature of their acts, the waiver decision may conflict with the conceptual
and justificatory foundations of both the criminal and juvenile institutions in at least two ways.
First, though it is true that the waiver decision is not a final determination that the juvenile
committed proscribed acts while acting as an accountable moral agent–indeed, the juvenile will
be allowed to argue during his criminal trial that he lacks the capacity for criminal responsibility
(perhaps by invoking the insanity defense, as Morris Kent did)–his youth and immaturity might
not be appropriately accounted for during the “liability phase” of his criminal trial. Second–and
perhaps more interestingly–the emphasis placed upon the “seriousness” of a juvenile’s act
implies that general or specific act condemnation may be easily confused with actor
condemnation during waiver decisions. In other words, the decision-maker may base her
determination that juvenile court jurisdiction ought to be waived by focusing on judgments of
disapproval and feelings of vengefulness toward the act, as opposed to assessing whether such
feelings and judgments are appropriately expressed toward the actor under the circumstances. If
this in fact occurs, a number of juveniles who lack the capacity for criminal responsibility may be
transferred to the criminal justice system. Because it is the not the primary function of the
criminal courts to handle cases involving such persons, these transfers seem to interfere with the
proper functioning of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Moreover, if the transfers lead to
the punishment of individuals who lack the capacity for criminal responsibility, the transfers (and
the ensuing criminal convictions) are inconsistent with the basic normative structure of the
criminal justice system.
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Asnoted previously, the judicial waiver model is only one of three mechanisms that
jurisdictions use to transfer juveniles to adult court. A second model of juvenile transfer, known
as “legislative waiver,” is used in states with statutes that place “certain cases involving serious
offenses within the exclusive jurisdiction of the criminal courts” (Gardner, 1997, p. 208). In
these jurisdictions, if a youth commits an offense that places his case in the criminal justice
system, he cannot be tried as a juvenile even if he lacks the capacity for criminal responsibility
due to his developmental immaturity–unless a procedure for the “decertification” or “reverse
transfer” of the youth back to juvenile court exists in the jurisdiction (e.g., Salekin, Rogers, &
Ustad, 2001). In the absence of a “reverse transfer” procedure–and according to Salekin et al.
(2001), less than half of the states have enacted such a procedure–it seems that the juvenile court
system would be unable to function in a manner consistent with the normative framework
underlying the criminal justice system whenever youths lacking the capacity for criminal
responsibility are required by statute to be tried as adults. In such instances, the criminal justice
system would take on a function traditionally performed by the juvenile justice system.
The third model of juvenile transfer is known as “concurrent jurisdiction.” In states that
employ this model, “prosecutors have the authority to commence certain cases in either juvenile
or criminal court” because the juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
those cases (Gardner, 1997, p. 207; e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247). In Nebraska, for example,
the prosecutor has discretion to charge certain offenders in criminal court or juvenile court, and
his or her discretion will not be disturbed unless the charging decision was based on race,
religion, or some other “arbitrary classification” (State v. Grayer, 1974, p. 860). Thus, in states
such as Nebraska, prosecutors are not obligated to consider youths’ capacities for criminal
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responsibilitywhen making charging decisions. Moreover, although prosecutors might decide to
charge youths in criminal court if they perceive the youths as possessing the capacity for criminal
responsibility, the prosecutors would have no obligation to conduct a hearing or make any effort
to gather evidence on this point to guide their decisions. In other words, although it is possible
that a youthful offender’s capacity for criminal responsibility will factor into the decision to try
the youth in juvenile or criminal court, the prosecutor can, to a large extent, make whatever
charging decision he or she prefers based on any facts he or she deems relevant. Without an
empirical investigation of the factors that prosecutors use to make these charging decisions, it is
impossible to say whether the charging decisions cohere with the normative framework
underlying the criminal justice system. Nor can it be determined whether the charging decisions
are consistent with the conceptual and justificatory foundations of the juvenile justice system, no
matter what those foundations might be. An empirical investigation designed to explore these
issues is presented in Section II below.
In summary, the condemnation framework can be used to analyze the expressive function
of juvenile justice systems of various “eras.” Specifically, it appears that the common law
infancy defense functions in a manner consistent with the normative framework underlying the
criminal justice system to the extent that its age-based presumptions accurately reflect juvenile’s
rate of moral development. Also, it appears that the traditional, parens patriae juvenile justice
systems are nonpunitive–assuming that they are truly based on a State’s parens patriae authority.
The Supreme Court’s “criminalization” of the traditional juvenile court structure complicates the
assessment of the expressive function of modern era juvenile court dispositions. Nevertheless,
because the Court did not fully criminalize the juvenile justice system, and because it was
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unwillingto “disallow” the states’ efforts to experiment with parens patriae models of juvenile
justice, juvenile adjudications in states that retain the parens patriae model arguably remain civil
in nature. Some jurisdictions have jettisoned the traditional parens patriae model, however, in
favor of “accountability-based” systems of juvenile justice. In these states, the dispositions of
juvenile courts express actor condemnation toward young offenders; thus, the condemnation
framework suggests that those dispositions are criminal in nature. These systems may not be
functionally equivalent to the criminal justice system, however, if they are based on a premise
that youths are less accountable than adults.
The condemnation framework can also be used to illustrate the importance of the juvenile
court jurisdiction decision–not just for the juveniles involved, but for the effective functioning of
the juvenile and criminal justice systems. The decision to try a youth in criminal court is, in a
way, a preliminary determination that the youth is eligible to participate in the criminal justice
system–that is, there is at least some chance that the youth may be found to be a fully accountable
actor. If the jurisdiction decision focuses on the youth’s capacity for criminal responsibility, it
can promote the effective functioning of both the criminal justice system and the juvenile justice
system. To the extent that the decision is based on factors wholly unrelated to the youth’s
capacity for criminal responsibility, however, close examination of the relationship between the
decision criteria and the conceptual and justificatory foundations of the juvenile and criminal
justice systems is in order.
The foregoing subsections illustrate that Feinberg’s (1995a) and Schopp’s (1993)
conceptualization of condemnation not only forms a key component of a defensible definition of
punishment, but also serves as a useful tool for 1) distinguishing deprivations of liberty that flow
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fromcivil and criminal institutions, and 2) assessing whether institutions of civil commitment
and juvenile justice function in a manner consistent with the normative framework that arguably
underlies minimally-retributive criminal justice systems. It remains to be shown, however, that
the concept of condemnation can be translated into a construct that can be used to study
empirically questions about the civil/criminal distinction and the functioning of legal institutions.
The following subsection will illustrate that condemnation can play an important role in
the empirical study of decision-making in insanity cases and juvenile court jurisdiction
determinations. First, key empirical studies of decision-making in criminal trials involving the
insanity defense and in juvenile court jurisdiction waiver proceedings will be reviewed in order
to 1) establish the context for the present experiments, and 2) demonstrate that a program of
research based on condemnation might contribute significantly to the literature. Thereafter, an
empirical study that used a measure of condemnation to investigate decision-making in insanity
defense cases and sexually violent predator commitment hearings will be described. It will be
shown that condemnation can, in fact, provide the foundation for meaningful empirical research.
C. Psychological Research: Insanity Defense Verdict Decisions, Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction Determinations, and the Empirical Study of Condemnation
In criminal trials and civil commitment proceedings, legal decision-makers (often judges
or jurors) are called upon to decide whether or not a state may justly exercise its police powers to
deprive a person of his or her liberty. Generally, however, the decision-makers need not
determine whether this deprivation of liberty is “civil” or “criminal” because the nature of the
deprivation is usually established by the institutional framework surrounding the proceedings. In
other words, it is usually clear that criminal trials can result in criminal deprivations of liberty
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andthat civil commitment hearings can result in civil–but not criminal–deprivations of liberty.
When the insanity defense is raised during a criminal trial, however, decision-makers have at
least three options: they may convict, and thereby authorize the state’s punishment of the
defendant; they may acquit, which spares the defendant from any deprivation of liberty; or they
may find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, which, according to the Supreme Court
of the United States, can justify a civil commitment (Jones v. United States, 1983). Thus, the
decision-maker may be confronted rather squarely with the question of whether a particular
person ought to be subjected to a civil or criminal deprivation of liberty (or none at all). A
similar question faces decision-makers in the juvenile justice system as well. Specifically,
juvenile court judges–or prosecutors in certain jurisdictions–may be asked to determine whether
a youthful offender ought to be tried in the “adult” criminal justice system, which might result in
a prison sentence, or whether he ought to be adjudicated as a juvenile, which might result in a
non-criminal deprivation of liberty. Thus, because verdicts in criminal cases involving the
insanity defense and juvenile court jurisdiction decisions may lead to civil or criminal
deprivations of liberty, these contexts provide fertile ground for empirical researchers seeking to
study the factors that influence decisions about actors’ eligibility, or suitability, for civil or
criminal deprivations of liberty.
The psychological research literature that addresses decision-making in insanity defense
cases and juvenile court jurisdiction determinations will be reviewed below. This review will
identify and summarize the valuable insights provided by the research, but it will also illustrate
that the research conducted to date does not focus clearly upon the distinction between civil and
criminal institutional deprivations of liberty. It will also be shown that the existing literature 1)
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4Attitudesare favorable or unfavorable evaluative reactions toward an object, person, or
event which may manifest themselves affectively, behaviorally, and cognitively (e.g., Lounden &
Skeem, 2007; Myers, 1993).
does not attempt to assess whether the decision-making processes employed in insanity cases and
juvenile jurisdiction determinations are consistent with the criminal justice system’s normative
framework, and 2) does not attempt to identify a construct that might predict decisions in both
contexts.
Following this review of the research literature, a study that applied an empirical measure
of condemnation to analyze decisions in civil commitment proceedings–with an emphasis on
sexually violent predator commitment proceedings–will be discussed. It will be shown that the
normative concept of condemnation can be translated into an empirical construct, and that this
construct may be used to study judgments that relate to the distinction between civil and criminal
deprivations of liberty.
1. Decision-Making in Insanity Defense Cases
Social scientists have long studied legal decision-making in cases involving the insanity
defense (hereinafter “insanity cases”). Their research has identified a number of factors that
influence jurors’ decisions in these cases–along with a number of factors that, sometimes
surprisingly, do not influence decisions. These findings will be summarized below.
Studies have shown consistently that jurors’ attitudes4 toward the insanity defense can
influence their verdict decisions (e.g., Louden & Skeem, 2007; Poulson, Braithwaite, Brondino,
& Wuensch, 1997). In a seminal study, Hans (1986) conducted a survey to assess insanity
defense attitudes approximately one year after John W. Hinckley, Jr., successfully used the
defense following his attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. In Hans’ study, three
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hundredand thirty respondents residing in New Castle County, Delaware, were contacted via
telephone using random digit dialing. After agreeing to participate, each respondent heard the
following statements: “As you probably know, the insanity defense can be used by defendants in
criminal trials. They can plead Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, arguing that because of their
mental condition, they should not be held responsible for what they’ve done” (p. 398). The
respondents then indicated whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed
with 20 statements about legal insanity, such as “The insanity defense needs a lot of reform,”
“The insanity defense is sometimes justified,” and “Even if people are insane, we should punish
them if they break the law” (p. 414). They also answered five questions designed to assess their
opinions about the frequency of the use of the insanity defense and their understanding of the
consequences of a successful invocation of the defense.
Hans (1986) found that 94.7% of the respondents agreed with the notion that “the insanity
defense needs a lot of reform” (pp. 400, 414). After analyzing the “overall pattern” of the
respondents’ answers to the survey questions, she concluded “that people dislike the insanity
defense for both retributive and utilitarian reasons” (p. 407). “Retributive” reasons, according to
Hans, are reasons for dissatisfaction with the insanity defense that stem from 1) a respondent’s
desire to see “insane lawbreakers punished just like other criminals” and 2) and his or her
disagreement with the notion that “punishing the insane is morally wrong,” while “utilitarian”
reasons are based on respondents’ beliefs “that procedures now in place are largely ineffective in
protecting them from insane criminals” (p. 407).
It should be noted that the labels “retributive” and “utilitarian,” as used by Hans, do not
correspond to the retributive and utilitarian justifications of punishment defined above. Indeed,
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asexplained previously, minimally-retributive criminal justice systems reject the premise that the
legally insane can be justifiably punished, while Hans used the term “retributive” to refer to
persons who accept that premise. This is not to say that Hans’ labels are invalid, but it is
important to recognize that they refer to categories of actual opinions and judgments about the
insanity defense as opposed to facets of the normative structure of the criminal justice system.
It should also be noted that there is no indication that Hans’ respondents understood the
manner in which the insanity defense functions, the relationship between the defense and actors’
capacities for criminal responsibility, or even the legal definition of insanity. Indeed, there is
evidence suggesting that the respondents were confused about the purpose of the defense. For
example, although half of the respondents opined that the insanity defense should be abolished,
76.5% of them “maintain[ed] that the insanity defense is sometimes justified” (p. 400). Thus, at
least a quarter of the respondents believed that the insanity defense should be abolished despite
the fact that it is sometimes justified. It is unclear why these respondents held this view, but
since there is no indication that they understood what the “insanity defense” was at the time that
they offered these opinions, once should hesitate to interpret their opinions (including their
“retributive” reasons for disliking the insanity defense) as evidence that they would reject the
retributive requirement of accountability as a prerequisite to just punishment, especially if it were
explained to them.
Hans (1986) suggested that the respondent’s general dissatisfaction with the insanity
defense might “explain why juries are notoriously reluctant to grant insanity pleas” (p.410), but
she acknowledged that her survey did not establish a link between attitudes and decision-making
in insanity cases. In the years since Hans’ survey, however, a number of experimental studies
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havebeen conducted to determine whether such a link exists. In one such study, Roberts and
Golding (1991) presented participants with one of eight written vignettes describing the killing of
a political figure and the ensuing criminal trial of the assassin. These vignettes “included facts
about the circumstances of the killing, summary descriptions of expert testimony, legal
arguments regarding responsibility articulated from the perspectives of the prosecution and
defense, and judicial instructions about the insanity standard and burden of proof” (p. 354). In
each vignette, the defendant was described as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia as defined
in the DSM-III-R. However, the researchers manipulated the “delusional framework” of the
defendant: In the first set of vignettes, the defendant suffered a delusion that the political figure
(who was a mayor) intended to kill him and that he was in immediate danger. In the second set
of vignettes, the defendant suffered a delusion that the mayor was “seriously interfering with his
life,” but he was not concerned for his safety (p. 355). In other words, the presence of a “self-
defense delusional belief” was manipulated. In addition, the researchers manipulated
“planfulness” by introducing facts that indicated that the defendant committed the killing “in
either a planful or non-planful fashion” (p. 356).
Roberts and Golding (1991) also varied the jury instructions that were presented to
participants. All participants received an instruction based on the Model Penal Code definition
of insanity, which stated,
A person is insane and not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (Roberts & Golding, 1991, p.
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5Morseand Hoffman (2007) describe the GBMI option in rather blunt, if not scathing,
terms:
GBMI has nothing to do with responsibility. In fact, the convicted GBMI
defendant is found fully culpable and there is no reduction in sentence. A GBMI
capital murderer can be executed. Moreover, GBMI is not a treatment tool, since
mental health evaluations and treatment are routine parts of health care in every
prison system. Besides, when a GBMI convict is hospitalized and successfully
treated, he is then returned to prison to complete his sentence, just like any other
convict.
In short, GBMI is a politically expedient “third-way” fraud. It has nothing
to do with responsibility and nothing to do with treatment. It is the equivalent of a
verdict of “guilty with herpes,” with no guarantee that the herpes will be treated or
even noticed once the defendant leaves the courtroom. Its only purpose is to give
legislatures political cover and to lull jurors into mistakenly believing their GBMI
verdicts might mean that defendants with mental disorder who receive this verdict
357)
In addition, however, one group of participants received an “alternative GBMI [guilty but
mentally ill] instruction” based on Illinois law, which stated,
A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane
but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility
for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill. (p. 357)
This verdict option, which was developed as a response to the Model Penal Code’s
relatively broad definition of insanity, represents an “attempt to create a middle ground between
guilty verdicts and insanity acquittals by recognizing the role mental illness played in the offense,
yet insisting that the defendant is nonetheless criminally responsible for the offense and therefore
subject to punishment” (Blume & Johnson, 2003, p. 100). From the perspective of a criminal
defendant, there is little (if any) practical difference between a guilty verdict and a GBMI verdict
(Morse & Hoffman, 2007, p. 1122).5
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willbe given special treatment and attention, or otherwise dealt with more
mercifully at sentencing or in prison. (pp. 1122-1123)
After reading their assigned instructions, participants provided their “predeliberation
verdicts” and completed a number of dependent measures (Roberts & Golding, 1991, p. 357).
The first of these dependent measures consisted of a set of “case construal” items. These items
measured the extent to which the participants perceived the defendant 1) to be mentally
disordered, 2) to evidence planful behavior, 3) to demonstrate “appreciation of the wrongfulness
of his act,” 4) to be “capable of acting differently,” 5) to have “the capacity for logical
reasoning,” 6) to have “the capacity to consider alternative courses of action,” 7) to have “the
capacity for rational behavior,” 8) to have control over his beliefs, and 9) to merit blame and
punishment. In addition, participants responded to twenty questions designed to assess their
attitudes toward the insanity defense, which were modeled on Hans’ (1986) Insanity Defense
Attitudes Scale and a thirteen-item scale developed by Roberts, Golding, & Fincham (1987). In
contrast to Hans’ scale, however, Roberts’ and Golding’s (1991) scale included a number of
items that focused on the blameworthiness of persons who raise the insanity defense, such as “I
believe that persons are responsible for their actions no matter what the extenuating
circumstances,” “People with mental illness, regardless of its severity, are equally blameworthy
as non-mentally-ill persons as far as socially deviant behavior is concerned,” and “The issue of
insanity is not relevant to the criminal responsibility of a person but it should be considered at the
time of sentencing” (pp. 362-364). Participants were also asked to express their level of
agreement or disagreement with the following statement: “I believe the phrase ‘guilty but
mentally ill’ captures the relationship between mental illness and criminal responsibility that is
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fairand moral” (p. 364). It is unclear, however, whether participants were meant to interpret this
question as applying to the “relationship between mental illness and criminal responsibility” in
all cases, in some subset of cases, or in the hypothetical case that the participant read. It should
also be noted that some participants received an instruction that defined “guilty but mentally ill”
before they answered this question, while others did not.
After collecting and analyzing their data, Roberts and Golding (1991) concluded that the
participants’ attitudes towards the insanity defense and “case construals” were highly predictive
of verdicts. To reach this conclusion, the researchers performed a principal components factor
analysis, which yielded an interpretable five-component solution. One of these components,
which was labeled the “Perceived Criminal Responsibility component,” included all of the “case
construal” items and, according to the researchers, seemed to represent “variability among
subjects regarding [their] perceptions” of the defendant’s capacities for criminal responsibility,
blameworthiness, and “deservingness of punishment” (p. 367). It appears that the items
assessing insanity defense attitudes loaded onto three of the remaining components, which the
researchers labeled “Strict Liability Orientation,” “Detention Concerns,” and “Insanity Irrelevant
to Guilt” (p. 367). It is noteworthy that the “Strict Liability Orientation component” concerned
“attitudes and opinions regarding the relevance of mental state to the attribution of blame and the
imposition of punishment,” and the component labeled “Insanity Irrelevant to Guilt” seemed “to
involve degrees of belief regarding whether the concept of guilt is appropriately applied to
severely mentally ill and/or ‘insane’ persons” (p. 367). The fifth component, which the
researchers labeled “Death Penalty Attitude,” included “3 items concerning the death penalty”
that were included among the dependent measures (p. 367). Roberts and Golding (1991) then
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enteredthe independent variables and the five component scores into a stepwise discriminant
analysis, which yielded the following final solution: Component scores on Perceived Criminal
Responsibility accounted for 28% of the between-groups variance, with additional incremental
variance accounted for by the Strict Liability component (16%), Insanity Irrelevant to Guilt
component (7%), the jury instruction manipulation (5%), the Detention Concerns component
(5%), and the Death Penalty Attitudes component (1%). Neither the planfulness nor “delusional
content” manipulations accounted for any additional variance in verdicts. Note, however, that
the three components that stemmed from items that purported to measure attitudes toward the
insanity defense accounted for 28% of the variance. Thus, Roberts’ and Golding’s (1991)
findings seem to confirm Hans’ (1986) hypothesis that insanity defense attitudes might relate to
verdict decisions.
Bailis, Darley, Waxman, and Robinson (1995) also found evidence of a relationship
between attitudes towards the insanity defense and verdicts. In the first of two reported
experiments, twenty-one undergraduates read nine scenarios and answered fourteen questions
designed to assess their judgments in insanity cases and the extent to which the Model Penal
Code definition of insanity was satisfied in those cases (Bailis et al., 1995). Participants also
completed Hans’ (1986) Insanity Defense Attitude Scale. Based on correlations between items
on the scale and the frequency of participants’ guilty verdicts across the nine scenarios, the
researchers concluded that participants’ willingness to impose criminal incarceration reflected, at
least to some degree, their pre-existing beliefs regarding the insanity defense. For example, “the
more frequently respondents chose criminal incarceration” in each of the nine scenarios, “the
more strongly they endorsed each of the following claims: that the insanity defense should be
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abolished(r = .52) or greatly reformed (r = .50); that it serves as a loophole allowing guilty
people to go free (r = .50); and that punishment is appropriate for even an insane defendant who
has broken the law (r = .43)” (p. 434). Conversely, these same respondents “were less likely to
endorse claims that the insanity defense is sometimes justified (r = -.59), that the insanity defense
affects the crime rate (r = -.50), or that the insane should be treated rather than punished (r = -
.52)” (p. 435).
Noting that only two multi-item measures of attitudes towards the insanity defense
existed–specifically, those developed by Hans (1986) and Roberts and Golding (1991)–and that
the psychometric properties of these scales “have not been systematically studied,” Skeem,
Louden, and Evans (2004) conducted a series of three studies to develop a more precise measure
of insanity defense attitudes. In the first study, 178 jury eligible citizens of Utah were presented
with the researchers’ initial version of an insanity defense attitudes scale, which included a total
of 38 items. Three of the items were “general opinion items,” such as “the insanity defense
needs a lot of reform” (p. 628). The remaining 35 items were selected from a large pool of items
that were gleaned from the news media, prior studies measuring insanity defense attitudes (e.g.,
Hans, 1986; Roberts & Golding, 1991), and “subjective factors cited by mock jurors” in previous
studies (e.g., Finkel & Handel, 1989) (Skeem et al., 2004, p. 628). These 35 items were designed
to assess four broad categories of attitudes: 1) “opinions that mental disorder implies reduced
capacity or that defendants are responsible for their crimes regardless of whether they are
mentally disordered”; 2) “concerns about the detention and dangerousness of insanity
acquittees”; 3) “perceptions that the insanity defense is unjust”; and 4) opinions that defendants
should be held accountable for their crimes if responsible for their compromised mental state at
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thetime of the offense” (p. 628). Using the data obtained from the study participants, the
researchers generated a modified version of the scale consisting of 26 items that appeared to
organize into two dimensions: 1) “strict liability,” which, according to the researchers, “reflects
the extent to which individuals believe that mental illness is associated with reduced capacity for
rational decision making and control . . . and that reduced capacity is relevant to the issue of
criminal responsibility,” and 2) “injustice and danger,” which “reflects the extent to which
individuals perceive that the insanity defense is misused” (pp. 629, 630).
In their second study, Skeem et al. (2004) recruited a new set of jury-eligible participants
and presented them with the revised insanity defense attitude scale (which was labeled the IDA-
R), along with a set of measures to assess the scale’s convergent and divergent validity. Also, to
test the scale’s predictive utility, participants read a case vignette, indicated the likelihood (as a
percentage) that they would find the defendant insane, rated the nine case construal items
employed by Roberts and Golding (1991), and rendered verdicts–though it should be noted that
the participants were not given any instructions defining legal insanity. The researchers screened
the data obtained from the participants and eliminated seven items before conducting a principal
component analysis. Two factors, accounting for 55% of the total variance, were extracted, and
the component structure was similar to that identified in study one. More specifically, the first
component (“strict liability”) and the second component (“injustice and danger”) corresponded to
the components identified in the first study, though this correspondence was not formally tested.
Also, the researchers found that, as expected, the revised scale correlated “more highly with the
convergent measure,” which was Hans’ (1986) Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale, than the
“divergent measures,” which were a truncated version of the Community Attitudes Toward
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“Aprototype is an ideal member of a category (e.g., ‘insane defendant’) that bears the
most resemblance to the other members of the category, and least resemblance to members of
neighboring categories (e.g., ‘guilty defendant’)” (Louden & Skeem, 2007, pp. 450-451).
Mental Illness Scale developed by Taylor and Dear (1981) and the Revised Legal Attitudes
Questionnaire-23 (e.g., Kravitz, Cutler, & Brock, 1993). To assess the predictive utility of the
scale, Skeem et al. (2004) calculated correlations between the attitude measures, the case
construal components, and the “insanity likelihood” ratings. It was found that the “strict
liability” component of the insanity defense attitudes scale was “highly correlated” (r = -.47) with
insanity likelihood ratings (pp. 636-637).
The third study conducted by Skeem et al. (2004) was similar to the second, except that
participants were drawn from a different jurisdiction (i.e., Nevada), each participant received four
case vignettes instead of one, and additional “case construal” items were used to assess
participants’ perceptions of the specific “symptoms” presented by the defendants in the
additional vignettes (p. 639). The researchers found that although the two-factor structure
identified in the second study did not precisely fit the data collected for study three, the
component structure extracted from the new data was “consistent with that of” study two (p.
640). Also, once again the “strict liability” component of the insanity defense attitudes scale
(which, as noted previously, measures “views of the extent to which mental illness is relevant to
criminal responsibility and punishment”) was “strongly predictive of venirepersons’ case
judgments” across all of the vignettes, with correlations ranging from -.45 to -.60 (p. 642).
More recently, Louden and Skeem (2007) sought to determine whether jurors’ prototypes6
of insanity predict their verdicts in insanity cases more accurately than do their attitudes toward
the insanity defense. Prior research indicated that juror’s prototypes of insanity–i.e., their
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conceptualizationsof a typical persons who are not criminally responsible due to their
psychological impairments–clustered into three types: 1) the “Severe Mental Disability”
prototype, which is based on a defendant who is extremely mentally ill and developmentally
disabled; 2) the “Moral Insanity” prototype, which is based on a defendant who is violent,
manipulative, and lacking in conscience; and 3) the “Mental State Centered” prototype, which is
based on a defendant who could not understand the consequences of his or her actions or
distinguish right from wrong (Skeem & Golding, 2001). In addition, Skeem and Golding (2001)
found that jurors who held various prototypes differed in their attitudes toward the insanity
defense and in their judgments about a vignette involving a defendant who raised the insanity
defense. More specifically, persons with Mental State Centered prototypes were more likely to
find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity than jurors with the other prototypes–even after
differences in attitudes were controlled.
Hoping to inform jury selection efforts in insanity cases, Louden and Skeem (2007)
sought to build on Skeem’s and Golding’s (2001) findings by 1) assessing the relative influence
of insanity prototypes and attitudes on verdict decisions, and 2) determining whether the three
prototypes identified by Skeem and Golding (2001) generalize to a sample of jury-eligible
participants from a different state. First, participants completed Skeem and Golding’s (2001)
Feature Elicitation Instrument (FEI) and Conception Checklist (CC). The FEI instructed
participants “to (a) form a mental image of the prototypical person who is not responsible for his
or her crimes because of mental illness and then (b) provide a detailed written description of their
prototype, perhaps including the person’s appearance, personality, thoughts, feelings, and
actions” (Louden & Skeem, 2007, p. 455). The CC, which measures individual differences in
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prototypesof insanity, asked participants “to rate 57 features (e.g., ‘Unable to discern right from
wrong,’ ‘Suffers from schizophrenia or psychosis’) with regard to their relevancy to their
personal prototype using a five-point Likert scale, where 1 is ‘not at all relevant’ and 5 is
‘extremely relevant’” (p. 456). Thereafter, participants completed the IDA-R developed by
Skeem et al. (2004), read four vignettes based on those used by Skeem and Golding (2001),
rendered judgments, and rated on a scale of 0-100 “how likely they were to find the defendant
NGRI,” or not guilty by reason of insanity (p. 457). Participants did not receive any instructions
regarding the legal definition of insanity, however.
Louden and Skeem (2007) found that the three prototypes identified by Skeem and
Golding (2001) (i.e., “Moral Insanity,” “Mental State Centered,” and “Severe Mental Disability”)
did not re-emerge in their new sample of participants. Indeed, Louden and Skeem (2007)
concluded that “no distinct groups of jurors with different prototypes of insanity could be
identified” (p. 459). However, the participants did fall into three distinct groups (based on a
cluster analysis of their CC scores), and although these groups did not seem to represent groups
of participants with distinct prototypes of insanity, they did differ significantly in their case
judgments. The researchers hypothesized that this unexpected result came about because either
“(a) the CC inadequately represented the universe of prototype features for this new sample or (b)
participants approached the CC as a measure of insanity defense attitudes” (p. 460). Hypothesis
(a) was ruled out following a three-step analysis that, in essence, compared the participants
responses to the FEI with the “features of insanity” covered in the CC (p. 460). To test
hypothesis (b), the researchers performed hierarchical multiple regressions to assess whether “CC
factor scores added incremental utility above the Insanity Defense Attitudes-Revised (IDA-R) in
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predictingcase judgments on the case vignettes” (pp 461-462). When IDA-R scores were
entered first, it was found that although the addition of the participants’ CC factor scores
significantly increased the explained variance, “the increase was so small as to have little
practical utility” (p. 462). Conversely, when the CC scores were entered at the first step, the
addition of the IDA-R scores resulted in large increases in explained variance. This led Louden
and Skeem (2007) to conclude “that the CC’s predictive utility for jurors’ case judgments is
largely, but not fully redundant, with that of the IDA-R, but the IDA-R has predictive utility
above and beyond that of the CC” (p. 462). In other words, “it seems that prototypes of insanity
add little incremental utility to insanity defense attitudes in predicting case judgments” (p. 462).
The foregoing findings indicate that mock jurors’ preexisting attitudes toward the insanity
defense ought to be assessed in any study of decision-making in insanity cases. These
preexisting attitudes, however, are not the only factor that seems to have an effect on decision-
making. For example, studies suggest that the type of mental illness afflicting a hypothetical
defendant influences juror’s judgments. Roberts, Golding, & Fincham (1987) presented 181
undergraduate students with one of sixteen vignettes that manipulated the mental disorder of a
hypothetical defendant raising the insanity defense (antisocial personality disorder, schizotypal
personality disorder, paranoid schizophrenia with delusions untied to the crime, and paranoid
schizophrenia with delusions tied to the crime); the “bizarreness” of the defendant’s crime; and
the “planfulness” of the defendant’s crime. The mental disorder manipulation was achieved
through the use of a descriptive paragraph with limited psychiatric jargon in an effort to ensure
that the participants would grasp the effects of the illness presented in the assigned hypothetical.
Participants were then asked whether they would find the hypothetical defendant guilty or NGRI
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accordingto the Model Penal Code definition of insanity and whether, if the GBMI option were
available, they would find the hypothetical defendant guilty, NGRI, or GBMI. It was found that
the defendant’s mental disorder was the primary determinant of verdicts under either a two-
verdict-option scheme (NGRI vs. guilty) or three-verdict-option scheme (NGRI vs. guilty vs.
GBMI). Greater frequencies of NGRI verdicts were found in cases involving defendants with
schizophrenia as opposed to personality disorders.
Bailis et al. (1995) also found a relationship between a defendant’s diagnosis and insanity
decisions. The researchers presented fifty undergraduates with hypothetical cases that varied in
terms of the charged offense (shoplifting or murder) and mental disorder (schizophrenia, multiple
personality disorder, agoraphobia with panic attacks, chronic alcoholism, and post-traumatic
stress disorder), and discovered that in the hypothetical cases involving murder, the descriptions
of the defendant’s “diagnostic categories and symptoms” had small but reliable effects on
judgments “about whether an NGRI verdict is appropriate” (p. 440). Interestingly, Bailis et al.
(1995) also found that “murderers” successfully invoked the insanity defense “much less often
than did shoplifters who displayed identical symptoms,” which suggests that in addition to the
defendant’s diagnosis, the severity of the charged offense may influence judgments in insanity
cases (p. 440).
Finkel and Handel (1989) found evidence of still other factors that, in their view, may
influence verdicts in insanity cases. In their study, 263 participants (122 students and 141
“nonstudent-adults”) were asked to list and explain the reasons for their decisions in each of four
hypothetical insanity cases that were “loosely modeled after actual cases” (p. 46). The cases
involved defendants suffering from either epilepsy, chronic alcoholism, paranoid schizophrenia,
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ora stress-induced disorder. The participants were not given instructions concerning the legal
definition of insanity, but were instead asked to use their own best judgment in each case. Raters
then categorized the reasons provided by the mock jurors using a seven-factor schema that had
been developed in pilot research. Finkel and Handel (1989) explained,
Each rater received a categorizing schema that contained instructions for
categorizing, a sheet labeled “Guilty Factors,” and a sheet labeled “Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity (NGRI) Factors.” The Factor sheets listed the factors by
number, named them, gave a general explanation and an example or two for each.
The guilty factors were as follows: capacity, unimpaired awareness and
perceptions, clear thinking, could control her impulses and actions, culpable
actions, premeditation or malice, and others not responsible. The NGRI factors
were as follows: incapacity, impaired awareness and perceptions, distorted
thinking, could not control her impulses and actions, nonculpable actions, no evil
motive, and others at fault. The factors for the Guilty and NGRI categories
[together] represent seven construct dimensions. (p. 47)
Although it is somewhat difficult to determine the particular nature of each of the seven construct
dimensions, it appears that the “clear/distorted thinking” dimension is meant to correspond to the
“cognitive element” of the Model Penal Code definition of insanity; the “could/could not control
impulses and actions” dimension is meant to correspond to the volitional element of the same
definition of insanity; the “unimpaired/impaired awareness and perceptions” dimension is meant
to correspond to the “mens rea” concept that, according to the researchers, lies in the “wild beast”
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7Theorigin of the “wild beast” definition of insanity has been attributed to Rex v. Arnold
(1723): “[A] man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know
what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute or a wild beast,” would be found not guilty
by reason of insanity under this test. The foregoing language suggests that with this definition, a
quite severe mental impairment is required to excuse criminal conduct.
definition7 of insanity; and the “capacity/incapacity” dimension is meant to correspond to a
definition of insanity that was developed for research purposes by Fingarette and Hasse (1979).
Finkel and Handel (1989) found that 88% of the reasons provided by respondents fit
withing the seven-factor schema, though it should be noted that the overall interrater reliability
was a relatively modest 70.9% (p. 48). On average, participants who reached a verdict of NGRI
invoked 2.5 schema factors in each case–a finding that the researchers interpreted as evidence
that jurors do not take simplistic views of insanity cases. Moreover, results indicated that
participants used different constructs to support their decisions in different cases:
For Case A (epilepsy), “nonculpable actions” (72.4%), “could not control
impulses and actions” (48.1%), and no evil motive (45.5%) were the three most
frequently cited factors. For Case B (chronic alcoholic), “incapacity” (68.1%),
“impaired awareness and perceptions” (42.6%), and “could not control impulses
and actions” (40.4%) were the three most frequently cited factors. For Case D
(paranoid schizophrenic), it was “incapacity” (75.5%), “distorted thinking”
(54.3%), and “impaired awareness and perceptions” (43.6%), and for Case E
(stress-induced), it was “impaired awareness and perceptions” (53.9%),
“nonculpable actions” (50.0%), and “distorted thinking” (45.6%). (p. 49-51)
Based on this variability, the researchers concluded that none of the legal definitions of insanity
“alone is centrally relevant and determinative across these cases of insanity, according to the
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8TheM’Naughten test, which was established after Daniel M’Naughten’s attempted
assassination of the British Prime Minister in 1843, defines legal insanity as follows: “To
establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
mock jurors” (Finkel & Handel, 1989, p. 51). They also observed that when participants decided
a given case differently from one another, the participants often used different constructs to
evaluate the sanity of the actor. More specifically, participants who found the hypothetical
defendants NGRI cited most often the “incapacity” construct when explaining the reason for their
decision, while participants who found the defendant guilty cited most often the “culpable
actions” construct (p. 53). This led the researchers to conclude that the participants’ verdicts
were influenced by the constructs that they elected to employ when considering cases.
Note that in a number of the studies discussed above, participants were not provided with
jury instructions–or any other definition of insanity–when asked to provide verdicts (e.g., Finkel
& Handel, 1989; Louden & Skeem, 2007; Skeem et al., 2004). In fact, research suggests that the
version of the insanity defense available to defendants has very little effect on mock jurors’
judgments in insanity cases. For example, Finkel and Handel (1988) presented 263 participants
with the same four hypothetical cases used by Finkel and Handel (1989)–which, as noted above,
involved defendants suffering from either epilepsy, chronic alcoholism, paranoid schizophrenia,
or a “stress-induced” impairment–and asked them to provide their verdict decisions without the
benefit of any instruction on the meaning of legal insanity. Their “commonsense” verdicts were
then compared to those returned by participants in an earlier study by Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw, and
Koch (1985), wherein participants received the identical hypothetical cases along with
instructions on one of six definitions of insanity: 1) the “wild beast” test; 2) the M’Naughten
test8; 3) the M’Naughten test with an added “irresistible impulse” component9; 4) the Durham (or
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committingthe act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong” (Finkel, 1988, p. 21).
9The “irresistible impulse” component was meant to account for the idea that “an actor
may be conscious of the nature of his act and able to distinguish right from wrong . . . yet his
will, [that is,] the governing power of his mind, has been otherwise than voluntarily so
completely destroyed that his actions are not subject to it, but are beyond his control” (Davis v.
United States, 1897, p. 378). In other words, the “irresistible impulse” component expanded the
definition of insanity to encompass those who can know the nature and quality of their acts, but
are nevertheless unable to control themselves due to the destruction of “the governing power of
their minds” (Finkel, 1988, p. 32). Note that the M’Naughten-plus-irresistible impulse test is
similar to the two-pronged definition of insanity set forth in the Model Penal Code.
10The Durham or “product” test comes from Judge Bazelon’s opinion in Durham v.
United States (1954). A “Durham” instruction might state as follows: “Unless you believe
beyond a reasonable doubt either that [the defendant] was not suffering from a diseased or
defective mental condition, or that the act was not a product of such mental abnormality, you
must find the accused not guilty by reason of insanity” (Finkel, 1988, p. 35).
11The Model Penal Code test, which has been defined above, provides that a “person is
insane and not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of
mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” (e.g., Roberts & Golding,
1991, p. 357).
12The “disability of mind” test is not a “legal” test per se; rather, it is taken from the work
of Fingarette and Hasse (1979), which was alluded to above. This test asks the jury first to
determine whether the defendant suffers from full, partial, or no “disability of mind,” and then to
determine whether the defendant is culpable.
“product”) test10; 5) the Model Penal Code test11; and 6) the “disability of mind” test12 (p. 81).
Finkel and Handel (1988) found no significant differences between the verdict decisions of
participants who were given instructions based on any of the foregoing insanity tests and those
who received no instructions. This finding, coupled with the finding by Finkel et al. (1985) that
the six instructions led to no significant differences in verdict decisions, led the researchers to
conclude that insanity defense instructions do not influence verdicts–though it should be noted
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thatnegative findings such as this might also be attributed to a lack of statistical power or
experimental design limitations. For example, the experimental design involved only four
vignettes (which certainly did not cover the universe of possible case scenarios), decisions were
not the product of deliberations, and it is unclear whether the participants in the Finkel et al.
(1985) study understood the insanity defense instruction that was provided to them.
Although altering the formulation of the insanity defense may have no effect on jurors’
decisions in insanity cases, there is evidence that their decisions are affected significantly when
additional verdict options are made available to them. The potential influence of alternate
verdict options was recognized by Hans (1986), who, as noted above, discovered that her survey
respondents’ understanding of the basic function of the insanity defense seemed confused. Hans
(1986) found that 96.1% of the survey respondents believed that “insane defendants are entitled
to treatment,” and 65.8% of them agreed “that the insane should be treated rather than punished
if they commit crimes” (p. 402). At the same time, however, 55.4% of the respondents stated
“that the insane should be punished just like everyone else when they break the law,” and only
36.2% felt “that it is actually wrong to punish insane people who break the law” (p. 402). Hans
commented that “a preference for treatment and punishment is . . . at odds with the premise of
the legal system that defendants should either be treated if legally insane or punished if legally
guilty,” and she surmised that “the dual desire to treat and punish may explain the rising
popularity of the Guilty But Mentally Ill verdict option in insanity cases” (p. 409). More
specifically, she noted that because the GBMI option “provides for a combination of psychiatric
treatment and incarceration,” and because “there appears to be a public preference for both
treatment and punishment,” it may be that “juries will select Guilty But Mentally Ill as a
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compromiseverdict even when the facts of the case would support a Not Guilty By Reason of
Insanity or Guilty verdict” (p. 409).
Hans’ (1986) comment that the “legal system” is based on a premise that defendants
cannot be treated and punished is imprecise: as explained above, treatment and rehabilitation are
legitimate purposes of both the criminal justice system and the institution of civil commitment
(though it is true that legal punishment is a legitimate purpose only of the criminal justice
system). In other words, if a person who suffers from a mental illness is convicted, she can be
both punished and treated even if she was not found to be “guilty but mentally ill” by a jury.
That aside, Hans’ (1986) observation that the GBMI option might be used as a “compromise
verdict” may have been prescient (e.g., Roberts et al., 1987). McGraw, Farthing-Capowich, &
Keilitz (1985) analyzed statistics obtained from the State of Michigan and found no clear
evidence that the introduction of the GBMI option resulted in a reduction in successful
invocations of the insanity defense (McGraw et al., 1985). However, Savitsky and Lindblom
(1986) conducted a mock jury decision-making study and found that the availability of the GBMI
option might not only reduce the number of NGRI verdicts, but also might “encourage jurors to
convict innocent defendants” (p. 699). In Savitzky’s and Lindblom’s (1986) study, one-hundred
and forty-five undergraduate students were assigned to six-person juries, sworn, and given a
written copy of jury instructions to read while listening to a recording of a judge reciting the
instructions to a “live” jury. All instructions described the charges against the hypothetical
defendant, the presumption of innocense, the burden of proof, and the reasonable doubt standard.
The instructions were manipulated between groups, however, to alter the verdict options
available. One group of participants was informed that they would decide the guilt or innocense
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ofthe defendant (two-choice condition); the second group received instructions on the Model
Penal Code definition of insanity (three-choice condition); and the third group received the
Model Penal Code insanity instruction along with a GBMI instruction (four-choice condition).
The facts of the hypothetical case were also manipulated, such that one set of participants viewed
a 90-minute videotaped trial that included eyewitness testimony that the defendant committed the
charged offense (the “guilt version”), while the remaining participants viewed a videotaped trial
of the same length wherein the eyewitness testified that he merely saw the defendant in the area
when the crime occurred (the “innocent version”). After viewing the trials and receiving final
jury instructions, the participants rendered an individual, pre-deliberation verdict and then
deliberated until a unanimous verdict was reached. The researchers found no significant
differences between the pre-deliberation verdicts reached in the two-, three-, and four-choice
conditions when participants viewed the “guilt version” of the trial. When participants viewed
the “innocent version,” however, there were significant differences in pre-deliberation verdicts,
such that participants in the two- and three-choice conditions were more likely to find the
defendant not guilty than those who were presented with the GBMI option. This same pattern of
results was found when post-deliberation verdicts were analyzed. The researchers noted, “When
the GBMI verdict was not available, the dominant view was that the defendant was innocent, but
when the GBMI verdict did become available then the dominant view was that the defendant was
guilty” (Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986, p.696). This finding–i.e., that the addition of the GBMI
verdict option results in significantly fewer NGRI verdicts–has since been replicated in a number
of studies (e.g., Roberts et al., 1987; Poulson, 1990).
The idea that the GBMI option represents a “compromise verdict” may find even greater
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supportin a more recent study. Poulson et al. (1997) presented a live, simulated trial to 140
undergraduate students. In the simulated trial, the defendant, who had a history of schizophrenia
and suffered from delusions centering on the need to engage in the “religious persecution” of
women, was charged with first degree murder after stabbing a woman to death (pp. 748-49). The
participants viewed the trial, which was 90 minutes in length, in groups of 14 to 20. They then
received an instruction based on the Model Penal Code definition of insanity and the Illinois
pattern instruction defining GBMI. Dependant measures included the participants’ “prediction of
verdict selection”; “attitudinal variables” measuring “attitude about lenient treatment of accused
persons, attitude towards the insanity defense, attitude toward the death penalty, attitude toward
the defense attorneys, and attitude toward the prosecuting attorneys”; and “evaluative variables”
measuring “degree of belief in the expert testimony of the defense experts versus the prosecution
experts, assessment of the defendant’s mental status, and belief regarding whether the defendant
could be rehabilitated” (pp. 749-750). Using verdict choice as the predictor variable and the
remaining dependent measures as the criterion variables, the researchers performed principal
components and discriminant function analyses. Two significant discriminant functions
emerged–the first of which distinguished between participants choosing any of the three verdict
options, and the second of which distinguished between those who chose a GBMI verdict and
those who chose an NGRI or guilty verdict. On the first function, NGRI verdicts were associated
with beliefs that the defendant was mentally ill, the crediting of the defense’s expert testimony
over the prosecution’s, “being receptive to the insanity defense,” opposing the death penalty, and
“leniency,” while guilty verdicts were associated with the opposite orientation on each of these
factors (p. 751). On the second function, GBMI verdicts were associated with distrust of the
85
13TheInsanity Defense Reform Act, or IDRA, instruction employed by Finkel (1991)
stated,
To find the defendant “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI), the
attorneys (particularly the prosecutor), a belief that rehabilitation was likely, opposition to lenient
treatment, resistance to the insanity defense, and favoring the death penalty. Overall, the “mental
status” evaluative variable bore the strongest relationship with verdict choice–which is perhaps
not surprising, as the variable is described as “six Likert-type items” which, when summed,
“indicate that the participant believed the defendant to be insane” (p. 758). Of particular note:
the mean ratings for the GBMI group on nearly every one of the eight dependant measures fell
between the means of the ratings given by jurors who arrived at a guilty or NGRI verdict, though
their ratings were, generally speaking, closer to those who arrived at guilty verdicts. The
researchers concluded that “jurors who vote GBMI may best [be] described as middle-of-the-
road jurors, particularly as they evaluate the defendant’s mental status in relation to the charged
offense” (p. 752).
Finkel (1991) explored what might happen if jurors were given several additional verdict
options. One hundred and seventy-nine undergraduate students received the four hypothetical
insanity cases used by Finkel and Handel (1988) and Finkel and Handel (1989) (which, again,
involved defendants suffering from epilepsy, chronic alcoholism, paranoid schizophrenia, or a
“stress-induced” impairment). After reading the cases, the participants completed a set of
measures that included a “Verdict Form” (Finkel, 1991, p. 542). This Verdict Form varied
between groups: One group of participants received a “two-choice verdict schema,” which
allowed them to find the hypothetical defendants guilty or NGRI based on the IDRA definition of
insanity.13 The second group of participants received a “three-choice-no instructions schema,”
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defendantmust prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of her acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense. (pp. 542-543)
14No NGRI instruction was provided to the participants in this group; however, the term
“diminished responsibility” was defined as “where guilt is lessened because of the defendant’s
mental condition” (p. 543).
15The GBMI instruction stated,
To find the defendant “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI), you must find that
the defendant had a substantial disorder of thought or mood, which affected her at
the time of the offense, and which significantly impaired her judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
The effect of the mental illness, though, is such as to fall short of legal insanity
(NGRI). (Finkel, 1991, p. 543)
which allowed them to find the defendant NGRI, guilty, or of “diminished responsibility” (p.
543).14 The third group received a “three-choice-instructions schema,” which provided the
participants with the same instructions as those received by the first group, along with a GBMI
instruction.15 Finally, the fourth group was given instructions on Finkel’s (1988) “sequential
verdict schema,” which spanned more than four pages. Finkel (1991) explains,
Using this sequential verdict schema, nine different verdicts are possible.
The first three verdicts–not guilty, guilty, or guilty to a lesser offense–do not
involve a mental element traditionally associated with insanity. The other six
possible verdicts, which do involve mental elements traditionally associated with
insanity, are partial disability of mind–culpable, partial disability of
mind–partially culpable, partial disability of mind–not culpable, total disability of
mind–culpable, total disability of mind–partially culpable, and total disability of
mind–not culpable. Only the last three of these verdicts (total disability of
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16Interestingly,Finkel’s (1991) two- and three-choice schemas did not permit findings
that the hypothetical defendants were not guilty; it appears, however, that the nine-factor
sequential verdict schema did permit judgments of acquittal (Finkel, 1991, p. 544).
mind–not culpable) is considered as a complete and true case of insanity, which
exculpates. (p. 540 [footnote omitted])
It should be noted that Finkel (1991) uses the term “culpable” to refer to the defendant’s
culpability “for bringing about her disability of mind,” as opposed to criminal responsibility.
Finkel (1991) found that overall, participants who had been given the sequential verdict
schema concluded that the hypothetical defendants merited punishment 79.2% of the time;
participants who had been given the “GBMI three choice schema” found that the defendants
merited punishment 64% of the time (with 34% returning GBMI verdicts and 30% returning
guilty verdicts); and participants who had been given the “traditional” two-option schema found
that the defendants merited punishment 50% of the time.16 Thus, Finkel (1991) concluded that
altering the verdict options available might significantly alter mock jurors’ verdict decisions.
Finkel (1991) goes further, however, and argues that the “array of verdicts” available to jurors
under the sequential verdict schema not only allows for more frequent impositions of punishment
in cases where mental disorder is at issue, but also appropriately matches the extent of the
community’s condemnation to the culpability of the offender (pp. 552-553). Moreover, he
suggests that the law ought to be modified in order to allow jurors to “register” their complex
grades of the defendant’s culpability.
The studies summarized above indicate that several factors may influence jurors’–and, in
some cases, juries’–decisions in insanity cases. Specifically, there is evidence that pre-existing
attitudes about the insanity defense, the defendant’s diagnosis, the severity of the charged
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offense,jurors’ “commonsense” notions of insanity, and the availability of additional verdict
options (e.g., Guilty but Mentally Ill) can affect judgments about legal insanity. Conversely,
research suggests that insanity case judgments may not be influenced by the version of the
insanity defense presented to the decision-maker, and it is unclear whether jurors’ prototypes of
insanity have a relationship with verdict decisions separate and distinct from their attitudes
toward the insanity defense.
These studies provide a strong foundation from which additional research of decision-
making in insanity cases may be launched. They also illustrate quite clearly that a program of
research based on condemnation can add significantly to this foundation. As explained above,
under Schopp’s (1993) condemnation framework, punishment cannot be imposed in the absence
of an expression of actor condemnation–which in turn flows from a determination that a person
committed an institutionally proscribed act while acting as an accountable (i.e., responsible or
blameworthy) agent. With this in mind, note that several of the foregoing studies incorporate
measures that seem to assess this very concept–though these measures were not conceptualized
as assessments of condemnation.
Recall that in each of the studies in which attitudes toward the insanity defense were
assessed, researchers used items that probed the blameworthiness, culpability, or criminal
responsibility of persons who commit crimes while suffering from some form of psychological
impairment. For instance, Hans’ (1986) survey, which was later used in the experiments
conducted by Bailis et al. (1995) and others, included items asking participants to express their
level of agreement (or disagreement) with such statements as, “Even if people are insane, we
should punish them if they break the law,” and “Insane people should be punished for their
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17Recallthat Bailis et al. (1995) found that participants’ responses to questions of this sort
correlated positively with the frequency of guilty verdicts they returned across nine hypothetical
scenarios (r = .43) (p. 434).
crimes just like everyone else” (Hans, 1986, p. 414).17 Roberts’ and Golding’s (1991) attitude
measure went further, incorporating items that focused specifically on criminal responsibility
(e.g., “People with mental illness, regardless of its severity, are equally blameworthy as non-
mentally-ill persons as far as socially deviant behavior is concerned”; “The issue of insanity is
not relevant to the criminal responsibility of a person but it should be considered at the time of
sentencing”) (pp. 362-364). In addition, recall that Roberts and Golding (1991) found that
insanity defense attitude items loading on the “Strict Liability Orientation” component, which
assessed “the relevance of mental state to the attribution of blame and the imposition of
punishment,” accounted for 16% of the unique variance in verdicts. The insanity defense
attitudes scale developed by Skeem et al. (2004) also incorporated items meant to assess
“opinions that mental disorder implies reduced capacity or that defendants are responsible for
their crimes regardless of whether they are mentally disordered” (p. 628). Moreover, the primary
factor extracted from their data, (i.e., “strict liability”), which reflected “the extent to which
individuals believe that mental illness is associated with reduced capacity for rational decision
making and control . . . and that reduced capacity is relevant to the issue of criminal
responsibility [italics added],” was highly correlated with insanity “likelihood” ratings (Skeem et
al., 2004, pp. 629-630).
Despite their incorporation of items that relate to criminal responsibility, it cannot be said
that these attitude measures amount to assessments of actor condemnation. Chiefly, this is so
because participants in each of these studies completed these attitude measures without
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context–evenin those studies in which participants were also presented with hypothetical
insanity cases. In other words, rather than asking participants whether a particular person
committed an institutionally proscribed act as a criminally responsible actor, the attitude
measures (in essence) ask participants whether they believe that persons in general who suffer
from unspecified mental impairments (or who simply raise the insanity defense) are criminally
responsible actors. This sort of questioning would seem to put a thoughtful respondent in a
difficult position, particularly if he or she realizes that judgments about blameworthiness might
vary depending upon the specific facts of a case, including the nature of the psychological
impairment at issue. And it might be argued that participants who express agreement with
statements such as, “Even if people are insane, we should punish them if they break the law,” and
“Insane people should be punished for their crimes just like everyone else” (Hans, 1986, p. 414),
reveal little more than a lack of understanding about the relationship between the insanity
defense, criminal responsibility, and the justification of punishment. Nevertheless, the strong
relationship between “attitudes” about criminal responsibility and verdict decisions in insanity
cases is well-established, and it leads one to hypothesize that if assessments about the
relationship between insanity and criminal responsibility were made in the context of a
hypothetical case, these assessments would not only begin to approximate an assessment of actor
condemnation, but they would also predict verdicts even more strongly.
Evidence supporting this hypothesis can be found in the study conducted by Roberts and
Golding (1991). As noted above, the researchers found that insanity defense attitude items
loading on the “Strict Liability Orientation” component, which assessed “the relevance of mental
state to the attribution of blame and the imposition of punishment,” accounted for 16% of the
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uniquevariance in verdicts. Recall, however, that a second component, which was labeled
“Perceived Criminal Responsibility” and which consisted of case construal items assessing
“variability among subjects regarding [their] perceptions” of the defendants’ capacities for
criminal responsibility, blameworthiness, and “deservingness of punishment” (p. 367), accounted
for 28% of the between-groups variance separate from the 16% of the variance accounted for by
the Strict Liability (attitude) component. In other words, items assessing judgments about
specific hypothetical defendants’ capacity for criminal responsibility, blameworthiness,
etc.–which seem similar to the normative concept of actor condemnation–were strongly
predictive of verdicts. Note too that, when these “Perceived Criminal Responsibility” case
construal items are taken together with the Strict Liability items, a full 44% of the variability in
verdicts was attributable to measures of criminal responsibility, blameworthiness, and desert.
Although Roberts and Golding (1991) did not relate this finding to the normative framework
underlying the criminal justice system generally, or to condemnation specifically, their results
seem to indicate that an empirical assessment of condemnation might strongly predict verdicts in
insanity cases.
The research summarized above not only provides reason to expect that an empirical
measure of condemnation will relate to verdicts in insanity cases, but also illustrates–in at least
two distinct ways–the importance of relating research findings to the normative framework
underlying the criminal justice system. First, studies suggesting that mock jurors use the GBMI
verdict option as a “compromise verdict” that reflects a lesser degree of “guilt” than a guilty
verdict are not merely interesting from a psychological decision-making perspective: if jurors are
using the verdict in this fashion, there may be reason to worry that they are using it to avoid
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makingthe fundamental (and perhaps difficult) determination that the defendant is a fully
criminally responsible actor, which is necessary to justify a verdict of guilty or GBMI. This, in
turn, provides reason to question whether the GBMI option undermines the normative framework
underlying the criminal justice system. Second, some researchers have argued that the law ought
to be modified to match jurors’ decision-making processes in insanity cases (e.g., Finkel, 1991).
Such arguments, however, are empty in the absence of any explanation as to why it would be
beneficial to jettison the justificatory framework underlying the criminal justice system in favor
of a system adapted to the “commonsense” decisions of mock jurors. If, for example, a
researcher found that a majority of the public would like to see people punished for committing
institutionally proscribed acts even if they lack the capacity for criminal responsibility–a finding
that, incidentally, seems consistent with Hans’ (1986) finding that 55.4% of her respondents felt
that “the insane should be punished just like everyone else when they break the law”–it does not
necessarily follow that the United States ought to strike the retributive requirement of guilt from
the justificatory foundation of the criminal justice system (and perhaps adopt a strictly utilitarian
system of criminal justice).
Thus, the research literature concerning the insanity defense serves to identify variables
for analysis, suggests hypotheses concerning the relationship between condemnation and verdict
decisions in insanity cases, and illustrates the importance of accounting for the normative
framework underlying the criminal justice system when discussing studies’ implications. This
well-developed body of research therefore provides useful guidance for the current project. The
following subsection will illustrate, however, that the empirical literature addressing juvenile
court jurisdiction decisions is not nearly so well-developed and provides much less helpful
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guidance.
2. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Decisions
Psychological research has provided two general insights relevant to juvenile court
jurisdiction decisions. First, research suggests that the basic capacity for criminal responsibility
does not develop consistently by a specific age. Second, researchers have investigated the factors
that influence mental health professionals’ recommendations to legal decision-makers on the
issue of jurisdiction and have found that youths’ accountability is generally not central to these
recommendations. The research supporting these two insights is summarized below.
First, recent psychological research calls into doubt the notion that youths may develop
the capacity for criminal responsibility at ages that match the assumptions underlying the
common law infancy defense–or at any specific age. Cauffman and Steinberg (2000)
investigated specifically “whether there are developmental changes during the adolescent
years”–defined as the period from about age 13 to age 18–“in psychological characteristics
relevant to determinations of culpability” (p. 742). Preliminarily, the researchers noted that
adolescents may differ from adults both cognitively and psychosocially, and that a thorough
assessment of “maturity of judgment” must take into account both of these dimensions (p. 743).
Next, they observed that although there is no “strong evidence of cognitive differences between
adolescents [of approximately age 16] and adults that might account for developmental
differences in decision-making,” “there may well exist psychosocial factors that affect the sorts
of decisions that individuals make, that follow a developmental progression between adolescence
and adulthood, and that bear on the question of adolescent culpability” (p. 744). These
psychosocial factors were grouped into three broad categories for study:
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(1)responsibility, which encompasses such characteristics as self-reliance, clarity
of identity, and independence; (2) perspective, which refers to one’s likelihood of
considering situations from different viewpoints and placing them in broader
social and temporal contexts; and (3) temperance, which refers to tendencies to
limit impulsivity and to evaluate situations before acting. (p. 745)
Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) then investigated youths’ development of these factors
and the factors’ relationship to antisocial decision-making. The researchers presented self-report
questionnaires to more than 1000 participants, including a total of approximately 800 eighth,
tenth, and twelfth grade students and approximately 200 college students (who served as “adult”
comparators). The questionnaires included the following: 1) questions to assess demographic
information; 2) the personal responsibility scale from the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory, which
measures “self-reliance (i.e., feelings of internal control and the ability to make decisions without
extreme reliance on others),” “identity (i.e., self-esteem, clarity of the self, and consideration of
life goals),” and “work orientation (i.e., pride in the successful completion of tasks)”; 3)
measures of perspective that focused on “future orientation” (i.e., the Consideration of Future
Consequences Scale) and “social perspective taking” (i.e., the Consideration of Others subscale
of the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory); 4) a measure of temperance consisting of the “impulse
control” and “suppression of aggression” subscales of the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory; and
5) the Youth Decision-Making Questionnaire, which assesses antisocial decision-making by
presenting “participants with a set of hypothetical situations that involve choosing between
antisocial and socially accepted courses of action” (pp. 747-749). The measures of
responsibility, perspective, and temperance were combined to form a composite measure of
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18Agewas modestly, though significantly, correlated with antisocial decision-making (r =
.15, p < .0001). Responsibility (r = .31), perspective (r = .41), and temperance (r = .47) were
each more strongly correlated with antisocial decision-making.
“psychosocial maturity” (p. 749).
The researchers did indeed find that both antisocial decision-making and psychosocial
maturity differed by age among juveniles. Antisocial decision-making was more strongly
influenced by psychosocial maturity than by age, however. In other words, an assessment of the
psychosocial factors identified above (i.e., responsibility, perspective, and temperance) reveals
more about a juvenile’s maturity of judgment than does his age (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000, p.
756).18 Results also indicated that “the period between [age] 16 and 19 marks an important
transition point in psychosocial development that is potentially relevant to debates about the
drawing of legal boundaries between adolescence and adulthood (p. 756). At the same time,
however, “significant numbers of adolescents” exhibited “below average or above average levels
of maturity of judgment, while among adults there were very few individuals in the most
immature category” (p. 757). In describing the implications of their research for the questions of
juvenile culpability and jurisdiction waiver, Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) noted that, although
the age differences observed in their study “are appreciable enough to warrant drawing a legal
distinction” between age groups, they do not seem to “be consistent enough, since significant
numbers of adolescents exhibit high enough levels of maturity of judgment to outperform less
mature adults” (p. 758). Although the Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) study did not reveal “any
one age that politicians and practitioners should use in formulating transfer policies or practices,”
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19Grisso(1996) reached a similar conclusion, though his was based on theoretical
argument that, at the time, lacked empirical support.
20Because of the juvenile justice system’s civil nature, competence to proceed was not
traditionally required in juvenile court; nevertheless, some juvenile courts now require that
juveniles be competent to proceed to adjudication (Viljoen & Grisso, 2007).
it did suggest that waiver decisions ought to be “offender-based” rather than “offense-based.”19
A relatively new body of research has explored juveniles’ competence to proceed in
criminal court.20 Noting that generally, competence to proceed in criminal court (or “adjudicative
competence”) depends on “a basic comprehension of the purpose and nature of the trial process
(Understanding), the capacity to provide relevant information to counsel and to process
information (Reasoning), and the ability to apply information to one’s own situation in a manner
that is neither distorted nor irrational (Appreciation),” Grisso et al. (2003) sought to determine
whether youths’ abilities relative to these tasks differ from those of young adults (p. 335). They
also sought to determine whether adolescents’ lack of psychosocial maturity, or “maturity of
judgment,” might affect their capacity to participate in the trial process.
Nine hundred and twenty-seven “youths” aged 11-17 (453 of whom were detained in
juvenile detention facilities) and 466 “young adults” aged 18-24 (233 of whom were detained in
“adult” jails) participated in the study. The participants provided demographic information;
completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), which “produces an estimate
of general intellectual ability” that can be obtained in approximately 15 minutes; and the
Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument-Second Version, which is a “mental health screening
inventory that provides indexes of degree of disturbance on six clinical scales (Alcohol/Drug
Use, Angry-Irritable, Depressed-Anxious, Somatic Complaints, Suicide Ideation, Thought
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Disturbance).” (Grisso et al., 2003, pp. 338-339). In addition, the participants completed two
dependent measures. The first of these measures was the MacArthur Competence Assessment
Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), which is “designed to assess criminal defendants’
abilities to participate in their defense,” or “adjudicative competence,” using three subscales
labeled Understanding, Reasoning, and Appreciation (p. 339). The second dependent measure
was the MacArthur Judgment Evaluation (MacJEN), which was developed specifically for this
particular study in order to assess “age-related differences in choices and the psychosocial factors
that might influence those choices” (p. 340). Scores on the MacJEN were “designed to identify
three variables representing aspects of psychosocial maturity: risk appraisal . . . future
orientation, and resistance to peer influence” (p. 341).
Based on differences in scores on the MacCAT-CA, Grisso and his colleagues found that
“juveniles aged 15 and younger are significantly more likely than older adolescents and young
adults to be impaired in ways that compromise their ability to serve as competent defendants in
criminal proceedings” (p. 356). More specifically, it was found that approximately one third of
11- to 13-year-olds and one fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds participating in the study suffered from
impairments to their capacities relevant to adjudicative competence comparable to those of adults
who would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial, but the “competence-relevant
capacities of 16- and 17-year-olds as a group do not differ significantly from those of young
adults” (Grisso et al., 2003, p. 356). In addition, however, differences MacJEN scores suggested
“that psychosocial immaturity may affect the performance of youths as defendants in ways that
extend beyond the elements of understanding and reasoning that are explicitly relevant to
competence to stand trial” (p. 357). More specifically,
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Adolescentsare more likely than young adults to make choices that reflect a
propensity to comply with authority figures, such as confessing to the police rather
than remaining silent or accepting a prosecutor’s offer of a plea agreement. In
addition, when being interrogated by the police, consulting with an attorney, or
evaluating a plea agreement, younger adolescents are less likely, or perhaps less
able, than others to recognize the risks inherent in the various choices they face or
to consider the long-term, and not merely the immediate, consequences of their
legal decisions. (p. 357)
In short, Grisso et al. (2003) found relationships between decisions and psychosocial maturity
similar to those found by Cauffman and Steinberg (2000). Their results also suggest that a
significant proportion of youths under the age of 16 lack the formal capacities relevant to
competence to proceed to trial, which again seems to weigh in favor of “offender-based”
decisions.
As noted above, studies conducted to date have also sought to identify factors that
influence decisions to transfer juveniles to criminal court. Recognizing that psychologists are
frequently consulted to help resolve questions related to the transfer of juveniles to criminal
court–regardless of whether that transfer occurs via a waiver hearing, a prosecutorial filing
decision, or some other procedure–Salekin, Rogers, and Ustad (2001) obtained ratings from two
groups of psychologists in an effort to 1) clarify the constructs that those professionals use to
guide their assessments, and 2) assess the characteristics of juveniles who were transferred to
criminal court. The first sample of participants consisted of 244 psychologists who were
members of the American Psychological Association’s Clinical Child Psychology Division (“the
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clinicalchild sample”). The second sample consisted of 75 psychologists “who were diplomates
in forensic psychology accredited by the American Board of Professional Psychology” (“the
forensic diplomates sample”) (p. 385). Each sample was sent one of two versions of a
“prototypical analysis measure” designed by the researchers. These measures consisted of items
designed to cover three constructs–dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to
treatment–which have long been recognized as the major evaluation criteria for waiver
recommendations (e.g., Kruh & Brodsky, 1997). Participants in the clinical child sample “were
asked to rate each item’s prototypicality within the relevant domain as it related to waiver to
adult court” (Salekin et al, 2001, p. 387). More specifically, with regard to “dangerousness,” the
participants were asked to “rate the importance” of the items “in determining the waiver of a
juvenile to adult court because of dangerousness” (p. 387). “A parallel instruction was provided”
for the “sophistication-maturity” construct, and for the “amenability to treatment” construct, the
participants “were asked ‘to rate the importance of the characteristics [listed in each item] . . . for
a juvenile who is amenable to treatment and should remain in juvenile court’” (p. 387).
Participants in the forensic diplomates sample were given the second version of the measure,
“were asked to think of the most typical case in the past 2 years in which they performed a
juvenile waiver evaluation and recommended transfer,” and were asked to “rate the
characteristics of the juvenile” evaluated in that case using the measure supplied by the
researchers (p. 387).
Salekin et al. (2001) found that, according to clinical child psychologists, many of the
items included in the measure were “highly prototypic,” which indicated that they were “central”
to one of the three relevant constructs as they relate to juvenile waiver. For instance, 22 items
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werefound to be highly prototypic of dangerousness, and these items centered around four
general themes that, “when present, . . . are suggestive of waiver to adult court: (a) extreme
unprovoked violence; (b) severe, aggressive, antisocial personality; (c) lack of remorse/guilt and
empathy; and (d) leadership role in the crime” (p. 397). Only four items were found to be highly
prototypic of sophistication-maturity. These items focused on “(a) criminal sophistication, (b)
[whether the youth was] capable of planned and premeditated crime, (c) understanding of
behavioral norms, and (d) [the youth’s] ability to identify alternative actions” (p. 397). The
researchers noted that these items point “to the importance of accountability in the sophistication-
maturity construct” (p. 397). Finally, 22 items were found to be highly prototypic of amenability
to treatment. The researchers concluded that the data indicate that “keeping juveniles in juvenile
court should be considered when youth (a) are motivated for treatment, (b) are aware of their
difficulties and want to change them, (c) expect that they will benefit from treatment, (d)
demonstrate remorse/guilt and empathy, (e) have knowledge of right from wrong, and (f) have a
family that is stable and supportive” (pp. 397-398).
When the data provided by the two samples of participants were compared, it was found
that “in general, forensic diplomates rated juveniles waived to adult court in accordance with the
core constructs identified by clinical child psychologists”–with one notable exception (Salekin et
al., 2001, p. 399). Interestingly, the forensic diplomates rated the sophistication-maturity items
as having “moderately low prototypicality” (p. 399). The researchers noted, “This finding is
surprising in that this construct most likely aligns with whether a juvenile is adultlike either in
criminal sophistication or emotional and intellectual maturity” (p. 399).
In summary, research indicates that adolescents possess wide ranges of maturity of
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judgment,such that reliance upon a set of presumptions–especially conclusive age-based
presumptions or offense-based statutory waivers–to make jurisdiction determinations may be
difficult to justify. Although adolescents approaching the age of 16 may have similar cognitive
capabilities as adults, there is evidence that they lack adult-like “psychosocial maturity,” which is
said to consist of “responsibility,” “perspective,” and “temperance.” Despite evidence that
adolescents lack the decision-making competence and psychosocial maturity of adults, forensic
psychologists who make jurisdiction recommendations to courts have indicated that juveniles’
“sophistication-maturity” is not central to their recommendations.
To the extent that “psychosocial maturity” and “sophistication-maturity” relate to the
concept of accountability, or the capacity for criminal responsibility, the literature suggests that a
program of research based on condemnation–and actor condemnation in particular–may yield
interesting findings. For example, although there is evidence that forensic psychologists who
make transfer recommendations to courts may not weigh accountability heavily in their reports, it
is not clear whether legal decision-makers (who are ultimately tasked with responsibility for the
jurisdiction determination) will similarly de-emphasize accountability. After the factors that
legal decision-makers use to make their determinations are discovered, they can analyzed in light
of the normative framework underlying the criminal justice system to determine whether the
decisions are based on criteria that promote the harmonious functioning of the relevant legal
institutions.
The foregoing subsections illustrate that the empirical research conducted to date has
identified many factors that influence decision-making in insanity cases and juvenile court
jurisdiction decisions, and these critical factors ought to be accounted for in most future studies.
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Nevertheless,the existing research leaves a number of interesting questions unexplored. Among
these are the chief questions that the present studies seek to address: Are decisions in insanity
cases and juvenile court charging decisions actually made in a manner that coheres with the
normative framework underlying minimally-retributive criminal justice systems? And, more
fundamentally, can jurisprudential theories about the definition and justifications of punishment
be integrated into an empirical model of decision-making–or, in other words, can a prescriptive
concept such as condemnation be translated into a predictive experimental construct? Two
experiments designed to address the former question will be described in the second section of
this dissertation. First, however, prior research based on an empirical conceptualization of
condemnation will be reviewed in order to illustrate that the latter question may be answered
affirmatively.
3. Condemnation and the Empirical Study of Post Insanity Acquittal and Sexually Violent
Predator Commitments
As noted previously, Feinberg (1995a) argues that just legal punishment is defined by the
condemnation it expresses. He argues further that condemnation is an “expression of attitudes of
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part
of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted” (p.
593). He adds that “resentment” refers to “the various vengeful attitudes” that “imprisonment is
universally taken to express,” and “reprobation” refers to a “stern judgment of disapproval”
distinct from the emotionally-rooted resentment (p. 594). Furthermore, Schopp (1993) submits
that condemnation is in fact expressed towards categories of conduct, specific acts, and
criminally responsible actors at various stages within the criminal justice system.
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Feinberg’sand Schopp’s analysis of condemnation is normative; that is, it is based upon
reasoned argument concerning the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, and it
focuses on the manner in which punishment may be justly imposed through that system. Put
another way, Feinberg (1995a) and Schopp (1993) describe the nature of condemnation that
would, in their view, be justifiably expressed following defensible evaluations of the
wrongfulness of an act and the culpability of the actor. Their analysis does not speak to the
degree and form of condemnation that people actually experience and express, however.
Whether people actually experience or express condemnation in various cases presents a set of
empirical questions that are suitable for study using the research methods of social scientists.
Indeed, one might use Feinberg’s (1995a) definition of condemnation as an aid to develop
questions, or scale items, that measure “vengeful attitudes” and “stern judgments of disapproval.”
These items might then be forged into a “condemnation scale” with psychometric properties that
cay be assessed in the same manner as any other scale. If this scale can be shown to measure
what it purports to measure (i.e., decision-makers’ actual expressions of condemnation), it might
them be used to test a number of interesting hypotheses relating to the distinction between civil
and criminal deprivations of liberty.
In fact, an empirical measure based on the normative concept of condemnation has been
designed, tested, and applied in a previous study that sought to compare mock jurors’ decisions
in insanity cases and “sexually violent predator” (SVP) commitment proceedings (Pearce, 1999).
This study will be reviewed below. To establish the context for Pearce’s (1999) study, a brief
description of SVP commitments, a review of courts’ analyses of their civil/criminal nature, and
an analysis of the relationship between SVP commitments, condemnation, and the normative
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frameworkunderlying the criminal justice system will be set forth first. Thereafter, the methods
and results of the study will be summarized.
Historically, states have treated sex offenders as either criminals or “psychological
deviants” depending on whether the prevailing philosophy of the era emphasized punitive or
rehabilitative goals (Fabian, 2005; Weitzel, 2005; Brakel & Cavanaugh, 2000). This suggests
that there exists an inherent flexibility, or ambiguity, in the way that social institutions might
respond to sex offenders. In other words, due to the nature of their offenses, it seems appropriate
to treat sex offenders either as accountable criminals or as unaccountable “deviants” driven by
abnormal psychological urges. However, in the aftermath of heinous sex offenses committed in
the State of Washington, a task force devised a new commitment procedure that, in essence,
allowed certain sex offenders to be treated both as accountable criminals and psychological
deviants. This “sexually violent predator” commitment procedure was designed to permit the
state to continue the confinement of convicted sex offenders nearing the end of their prison terms
by shifting the justification for their incapacitation from a criminal conviction to a civil
commitment (e.g., Boerner, 1992; Community Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 1001-1013, 1990 Wash.
Sess. Laws 13, 97-102; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.09.020(16)). This commitment procedure,
which has since been adopted in Kansas, Nebraska, and several other states (e.g., Parry, 2001;
Pearce, 2007), is controversial in part because these SVPs typically lack the sort of psychological
impairments that would render them eligible for standard civil commitments (e.g., Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 71.09.010). Instead, their commitments are said to be based on “mental
abnormalities or personality disorders” that make them likely to engage in “predatory acts of
sexual violence” if they are not incapacitated (e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.09.020(16)). By
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wayof example, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the “mental abnormality or
personality disorder” criterion can be satisfied by evidence that the offender suffered from a
“long-term pattern of irresponsible and anti-social behavior” or a “residual” mental disorder,
such as “rape as paraphilia” (e.g., In re Young, 1993, pp. 1002-03).
Courts struggled to determine whether this “mental abnormality or personality disorder”
commitment criterion is consistent with the substantive requirements of due process; indeed,
courts that first considered the issue reached opposite conclusions (In re Young, 1993; Young v.
Weston, 1995). The Supreme Court resolved this legal controversy in Kansas v. Hendricks
(1997), holding that SVP commitments do not offend principles of substantive due process
because the commitments require “a finding of future dangerousness, and then link that finding
to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior” (p. 358). In a subsequent decision,
the Court clarified that in order to “distinguish[] a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil
commitment ‘from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings,’” “there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior” (Kansas v. Crane, 2002, pp. 412-13).
Courts also struggled to determine whether SVP commitments are civil or criminal in
nature. To analyze this question, courts have applied the two-part test outlined in United States
v. Ward (1980), and described above. In Young v. Weston (1995), the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington conducted a Ward analysis and found that SVP
commitments “promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,” and are
therefore criminal. But the Washington Supreme Court had reached the opposite conclusion in
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Inre Young (1993). Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court determined that SVP
commitment procedures were not criminal proceedings, stating that the commitments did “not
implicate . . . retribution or deterrence” and that the conditions of sexual predators’ confinement
did “not suggest a punitive purpose on the State’s part” (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997, pp. 361-63).
Although the Supreme Court has resolved the legal controversies surrounding SVP
commitments–at least insofar as the lower courts are concerned–its decisions do not adequately
address the justificatory problems underlying the most controversial varieties of these
commitments. These justificatory problems become salient when the difficult questions raised
by SVP commitments are examined using the condemnation framework (e.g., Pearce, 2007).
Specifically, the condemnation framework (and the concept of actor condemnation in particular)
indicates that the Supreme Court failed to define sufficiently the sort of impairment that could
justify an SVP commitment without undermining the prior determination that the alleged
predator was criminally responsible for his offenses (which follows from his conviction).
Because the type of impairment that could perform this function remains ambiguous, it is
difficult to determine with certainty whether SVP commitments are punitive. The following
points illustrate this difficulty.
First, if a person with prior convictions for sex offenses can be shown to have had (at all
relevant times) a psychological impairment that truly renders him substantially unable to control
his criminal conduct, his commitment as an SVP seems to serve the functions that are
traditionally performed by the institution of civil commitment. In other words, the commitment
would amount to an exercise of the state’s police power to provide treatment for a serious
psychological impairment while protecting the public from danger, and it would be difficult to
107
21Itshould be noted, however, that Washington, Kansas, and Nebraska are not among the
fourteen jurisdictions that employ this version of the insanity defense (LeBlanc, 2007; Gundlach-
Evans, 2006).
argue that the commitment actually performs the expressive function of punishment. At the same
time, however, it is difficult to explain how the findings of criminal accountability that
accompanied the person’s sex offense convictions could stand in the wake of a determination that
those prior offenses were committed by a person who was suffering from a psychological
disorder that seriously impaired his volitional control. This is particularly true in the
jurisdictions that use the Model Penal Code’s version of the insanity defense, which (as noted
previously) provides, “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law [italics added]” (Model Penal Code § 4.01, American Law
Institute (1962)).21 Put succinctly, it does not seem likely that any known psychological
impairment could satisfy the Supreme Court’s “serious difficulty in controlling behavior”
commitment standard without also establishing a compelling mens rea defense.
Alternately, if the psychological impairment that justifies the commitment is based upon
diagnostic criteria that are satisfied whenever a person commits a sex offense or series of sex
offenses–as in Kansas v. Crane (2002) (diagnoses of exhibitionism and antisocial personality
disorder), Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) (diagnosis of pedophilia), and In re Young (1993)
(diagnosis of “rape as paraphilia”)–the commitment would not seem to call into doubt the
person’s criminal responsibility for his prior offenses. Indeed, the commitment would be based
entirely on the person’s prior criminal conduct (which happens to be “diagnosable”). Under
these circumstances, however, the commitment would seem to perform the expressive function
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ofpunishment. In other words, it seems that the commitment is based on a determination that the
person committed an institutionally proscribed act (or, more likely, a series of such acts) as a
criminally responsible actor, which renders it punitive. Thus, to the extent that the Supreme
Court’s “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” standard is meant to authorize civil
commitments based on “crime diagnoses,” its holding that SVP commitments are nonpunitive
appears to be infirm.
The ambiguous nature of the expressive function of SVP commitments indicates that the
institutions of criminal justice and civil commitment—and the separate functions that they are
meant to perform—have been blurred and distorted in order to ensure that the incapacitation of
criminals may continue through civil commitments. Ordinarily, it is clear that the criminal
justice system is the conventional institution for imposing punishment upon criminally
responsible actors, and its dispositions typically serve the goals of retribution and deterrence.
When a person suffering from a psychological impairment that seriously impairs his volitional
control is punished, however, the expressive function of his punishment seems to be diluted.
That is to say, the criminal punishment of a person suffering from a serious impairment of
volition does not seem to express the same sort of resentment and reprobation toward the actor
that would be expressed toward a person who lacks such an impairment. Thus, the basic function
of the criminal justice system, which involves the expression of condemnation through the
imposition of punishment, is distorted or weakened to the extent that the criminal justice system
is used to “punish” persons who seem to lack accountability due to their severe volitional
impairments. To put the matter more simply, the criminal justice system appears to take on a
function more akin to that which is ordinarily performed by the institution of civil commitment
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(i.e.,the protection of society from dangerous mentally ill persons).
Conversely, it is ordinarily clear that civil commitment is the conventional mechanism for
treating the psychologically impaired while protecting the public from danger, and deprivations
of liberty that flow from civil commitment proceedings do not perform the retributive or
deterrent functions of punishment (and are therefore not punitive). SVP commitments purport to
perform the functions of civil commitment, but, as explained above, they may in fact perform the
expressive, retributive, and deterrent functions of punishment. Indeed, there are indications that
the public may believe that persons eligible for SVP commitments are not appropriate candidates
for civil commitment, but instead merit only punishment. Evidence of this belief may be found
in the comments made by the mother of a boy who suffered a brutal assault in the State of
Washington, which in turn led to the formation of the task force that created the SVP procedure
(Filler, 2004; Rideout, 1992; Maleng, 1992; Boerner, 1992). At the conclusion of her tour of the
“ultra-secure Civil Commitment Center” designed to house persons committed under the state’s
SVP law, the boy’s mother reportedly said, “I tried to envision [my son’s assailant] here and
decided no, I’d rather have him behind bars . . . . I don’t think he deserves this opportunity. It’s
nicer than prison” (Harrell, 1990, p. B2). At the same time, however, there are indications that
the public may have come to believe that because the criminal justice system is not performing
its functions properly, civil commitments should be used to perform those functions. In fact, the
Washington task force that proposed the original SVP procedure viewed its mission as
“respond[ing] in a meaningful and responsible way to the public outrage over . . . cases in which
violent sex offenders were released [from prison] to the community only to reoffend” (Maleng,
1992, p. 821). In either case, to the extent that SVP commitments perform the expressive
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functionof punishment, the proper function of the institution of civil commitment (which is
structured to be non-punitive) has been distorted in order to incapacitate violent sex offenders
who seem to merit punishment.
In light of the foregoing, Pearce (1999) hypothesized that if condemnation could be
“translated into a psychometric construct capable of reliable measurement” (p. 15), this construct
could be used 1) to show that SVP commitments perform the expressive function of punishment,
and 2) to explain the dramatic difference between the commitment rates of SVPs (over 90%) and
the frequency of insanity acquittals (less than 0.5%). More generally, Pearce also hypothesized
that, to the extent that condemnation is a defining characteristic of criminal deprivations of
liberty, it may prove to be a useful factor for identifying which actors are appropriately subjected
to criminal punishment and which are not.
To test these hypotheses, Pearce provided ninety-four University of Nebraska-Lincoln
undergraduates with a packet of materials that included an augmented version the Insanity
Defense Attitudes Scale (Hans, 1986), three hypothetical cases, and a condemnation scale. The
Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale was completed by all participants either before or after they
completed the other components of the packet. The three hypothetical cases were “designed to
vary in terms of the condemnation appropriately expressed towards the actors . . . while holding
constant the specific nature of the harm caused by each actor” (Pearce, 1999, p. 44). In the first
experimental condition, each of the three hypotheticals described a sexual assault perpetrated
against a twelve-year-old boy. In hypothetical 1, the assault was committed by a priest who
entered a cathedral and suffered a psychotic delusion that caused him to believe that demons
were flying in and out of an altar boy’s body, centering around his genitals. The priest struck the
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boyin the genitals with a silver cross that he removed from the altar, which knocked the boy to
the ground. “The priest then removed some of the boy’s clothing, placed his hands on the boy’s
genitals, and shouted for the demons to vacate the boy’s body, evidently believing that he was
exorcising the demons he saw” (p. 45). This hypothetical “was designed to describe a relatively
sympathetic character who suffered from a psychotic break” and who would be relatively “likely
to be found ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ in the context of a criminal trial” (p. 45). In
hypothetical 2, a boy was sexually assaulted by a janitor at his school. The janitor had observed
the boy’s route home from school, lied in wait along that route, and waited for the boy to pass by.
He then struck the boy in the genitals, knocking him to the ground; removed some of the boy’s
clothing; placed his hands on the boy’s genitals; and asked the boy if he was afraid before
abruptly running away. This hypothetical was intended to represent the type of offense that
might eventually lead to the offender’s commitment as an SVP. “In the third hypothetical, a
member of the American Neo-Nazi Party arrived at a neighborhood block party to find his
daughter dancing with a Jewish boy. The man struck the boy in the crotch, removed some of the
boy’s clothing, grabbed the boy’s genitals, and told the youth that he would lose his genitals if he
ever danced with the daughter again” (p. 45). This hypothetical “was designed to present an
unsympathetic character without any clear impairment of psychological capacities” characteristic
of insanity acquittees or SVPs, “although he might carry a diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder” (pp. 45-46).
For half of the participants, the hypotheticals represented the factual background of SVP
commitment proceedings for persons nearing the end of their prison sentences. Participants in
this condition received the following instruction, which was based on Washington’s statutory
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definitionof sexually violent predators:
A person is a sexually violent predator if he has a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in crimes of sexual violence.
Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) The defendant had a mental abnormality or personality disorder; AND
(2) This mental abnormality or personality disorder makes the defendant
likely to engage in crimes of sexual violence;
then you must find that the defendant is a sexually violent predator. Otherwise,
you must find that the defendant is not a sexually violent predator. (Pearce, 1999,
Appendix E)
For the other half of the participants, the hypotheticals represented the factual background
of criminal trials, and each hypothetical actor was portrayed as a criminal defendant attempting to
prove that he was legally insane at the time of his actions. The participants in this condition
received the following instruction, which was based on the volitional component of the Model
Penal Code definition of insanity:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disorder he lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law. Therefore, if you find that it is more likely true than not
true that:
(1) The defendant had a mental disorder at the time of the acts charged; AND
(2) As a result of the mental disorder, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law;
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thenyou must find the defendant not responsible by reason of insanity.
Otherwise, you must find him guilty. (Pearce, 1999, Appendix D)
Although no jurisdiction uses a “purely volitional” insanity defense, this instruction was selected
for two important reasons. First–and chiefly–Pearce theorized that by selecting an insanity
defense instruction that closely matched the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the SVP
commitment criteria (i.e., “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior”), the
instructions provided in the criminal trial condition would be similar to those in the SVP
condition. This, in turn, would strengthen the inference that the hypothesized difference between
condemnation scores for the hypothetical actors who were found to be not guilty by reason of
insanity and those who were committed as SVPs would provide some indication that SVP
commitments actually perform the expressive function of punishment. In other words, given
almost identical background facts and similar decision criteria (i.e., jury instructions), if persons
found not guilty by reason of insanity on the basis of a volitional impairment were assigned
significantly lower condemnation scores than persons who were committed as SVPs on the basis
of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that impairs their volitional control, it could be
argued that the decision-makers viewed the SVP commitments as punitive. Second, and as noted
in a preceding subsection, prior research suggests that the particular instruction used in insanity
defense cases has little, if any, effect on verdict decisions (e.g., Finkel & Handel, 1988). Thus,
the insanity defense instruction’s lack of external validity is not particularly concerning.
In addition to the criminal trial/SVP commitment manipulation, one-half of the
participants received hypotheticals involving sexual assaults (as described above), while the
other half of the participants received hypotheticals involving physical, nonsexual assaults. The
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participantsin the SVP commitment condition involving a nonsexual assault made their
decisions in the context of a “violent predator” commitment hearing, “which was identical to the
sexual predator condition with the exception that all references to sexual conduct were replaced
with references to ‘violent’ conduct” (Pearce, 1999, p. 47). “This manipulation was performed in
order to help determine whether there is something unique about sex offenders that renders them
particularly susceptible to high rates of post-sentence commitment, and also to allow for a
comparison of condemnation levels between sexual and nonsexual offenders” (p. 47).
After reading each hypothetical, participants were asked to return a verdict and answer a
number of questions about the defendant. They also completed a condemnation scale for each
hypothetical. The scale included sixteen items measuring, on a seven-point Likert-type scale, the
emotional (twelve items) and judgmental (four items) aspects of condemnation; two additional
items (also based on a seven-point Likert scale) measuring the balancing of emotion and
judgment; and a single item asking participants “whether they equated mental health
commitment with punishment” (Pearce, 1999, p. 46). “The imbalance in the questions in favor
of the emotional aspect of condemnation was not intentional,” but an item analysis revealed that
the responses on several additional judgment items did not follow a normal distribution, “perhaps
due to the consistent high judgments of disapproval towards each of the defendants presented in
the hypotheticals” (p. 46). The scale scores were summed to form a total condemnation score (M
= 76.29,  = 13.83), and “reliability analysis indicated an encouraging association among the
items included in the scale (Cronbach’s  = .88)” (p. 46).
Many, but not all, of Pearce’s hypotheses were supported by his research. First, the
hypothesis that condemnation scores would be significantly higher for sex offenders than for
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22Forthe “priest,” condemnation scores for sex offenses (M = 74.72) differed from those
for nonsexual offenses (M = 66.07) (F(1, 92) = 11.56, p = .001). The same pattern held true for
the “janitor” (F(1, 92) = 6.83, p = .01) and the “Neo-Nazi” (F(1, 92) = 3.94, p = .05).
violent, “non-sex” offenders was confirmed.22 Pearce had also hypothesized that condemnation
scores would be lowest for the relatively “sympathetic” priest and significantly higher for the
other two hypothetical actors, but this hypothesis was only partially confirmed. Although the
expected pattern of scores was confirmed in some instances, it was not observed across all of the
IV conditions. Pearce noted, “Of particular interest is that in the condition involving sexually
violent predator commitment hearings . . . [where] there were no statistically significant mean
differences in condemnation scores between any of the defendants” (p. 49). Pearce suggested
that “one explanation for the failure of condemnation to distinguish between these defendants
could be a generally high level of vengeful attitudes and judgments of disapproval appropriately
expressed towards convicted sex offenders” (p. 54).
This “generally high level” of condemnation scores for hypothetical defendants in the
SVP condition also interfered with the hypothesized predictive utility of the condemnation scale.
In the SVP condition, there was no significant difference in condemnation scores assigned to
those who were committed (M = 81.31) and those who were not committed (M = 75.80)
(F(1,73) = 2.66, p = .107, MSE = 173.23). Therefore, logistic regression analysis did not show
that the condemnation score was a statistically reliable predictor of verdicts above and beyond a
constant-only model (2 (1, 75) = 2.77, p = .096). The condemnation scores did correctly
classify 100% of the commitment verdicts, but it “drastically overpredicted commitments when
the actual verdict was release” (p. 52). Pearce observed,
The uniformly high condemnation scores in the sexually violent predator
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conditionpredict commitment in nearly every case. Interestingly, actual sexual
predator commitment proceedings result in commitments virtually every time,
much in keeping with what the condemnation model predicts[.] However, since
the subjects in the present experiment decided to release the predators more often
than expected, condemnation as measured by our scale did not prove to be a good
predictor of verdicts. (pp. 54-55)
In the criminal trial/sexual assault condition, however, participants did assign
significantly higher levels of condemnation to those defendants found guilty (M = 82.93) than to
those acquitted by reason of insanity (M = 69.35) (F(1, 67) = 24.10, p = .0001, MSE = 111.84, 2
= .265), and logistic regression analysis revealed that the condemnation score was a statistically
reliable predictor of verdicts above and beyond a constant only model, 2 (1, N = 69) = 21.61, p
= .0001. The condemnation measure correctly classified 93.75% of the cases where a verdict of
guilty was reached, and correctly classified 57.14% of the cases where the verdict reached was an
insanity acquittal. Overall, the condemnation measure correctly classified 82.61% of the cases by
verdict. Pearce (1999) opined that the results suggest that the decision-makers’ judgments were
consistent with the normative framework underlying the criminal justice system, which, as
explained above, holds that the same sort of disapproval and resentment that is expressed toward
convicted criminals ought not be expressed toward insanity acquittees (who lack the capacity for
criminal responsibility).
Pearce (1999) also found that, as suggested by previous research, participants’ attitudes
toward the insanity defense were also associated with their verdict decisions. When all of the
independent variable conditions were collapsed together, between-groups ANOVA revealed that
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participantswho returned verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity or who determined that the
predators should be released had more positive attitudes towards the insanity defense (M =
101.35) than those who determined that the defendant should be convicted or committed as a
predator (M= 106.04) (F(1,278) = 9.27, p = .003, MSE = 135.37). Again, “logistic regression
analysis was performed to assess the prediction of verdicts based upon the attitude measure” (p.
48). Although “the attitude score was a statistically reliable predictor of verdicts above and
beyond a constant only model,” the attitude measure “correctly classified only 2.5% of the cases”
where the hypothetical defendant was acquitted by reason of insanity or determined not to be a
predator (p. 49). “Overall, the attitude measure correctly classified 71.79% of the cases by
verdict” (p. 49). Condemnation scores also correctly classified 71.70% of the cases by verdict
when all experimental conditions were collapsed together; however, when attitudes and
condemnation scores were both entered into a logistic regression model, “the attitude measure
ceased to have any predictive value independent of the condemnation measure” (p. 50).
Though Pearce’s experiment has a number of important limitations, it provides
encouraging preliminary evidence that the prescriptive concept of condemnation can be
translated into an empirical construct that is predictive of verdicts in insanity defense cases. The
condemnation construct’s predictive utility will be explored more fully in two new studies that
seek to examine more thoroughly decision-making in insanity cases and juvenile court
jurisdiction determinations. These studies are reported below.
II. INSANITY DEFENSE JUDGMENTS AND JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
DECISIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS
It has been noted above that insanity cases and juvenile court jurisdiction determinations
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mayrequire decision-makers to consider whether a civil or criminal deprivation of liberty is
appropriate for a particular individual, and the foregoing review of the existing psychological
research literature indicates that although psychologists have studied decision-making in insanity
cases and juvenile court jurisdiction determinations, much of their research touches only
tangentially upon the criteria used to distinguish appropriate cases for punishment from cases that
call for nonpunitive dispositions. A program of research based upon Feinberg’s (1995a) concept
of condemnation can bring these criteria directly into focus, and perhaps illustrate the need for “a
resharpening of the criminal-civil distinction” (Robinson & Darley, 1997, p. 479).
The following studies investigate whether the condemnation construct developed by
Pearce (1999) relates to verdicts in a wide variety of insanity defense cases and to juvenile court
jurisdiction determinations. The studies also seek to examine the relationship between the
condemnation construct and other factors that, according to prior empirical research or court
decisions, influence (or should influence) decisions in insanity cases and juvenile court
jurisdiction determinations. In addition, the results of these studies will be used to explore
whether legal institutions are functioning in a manner consistent with the normative framework
underlying the criminal justice system.
A. Study One: Condemnation and Judgments in Insanity Cases
1. Purpose
Study One applies the condemnation construct to criminal trials involving the insanity
defense in order to explore whether the construct maintains the predictive utility observed by
Pearce (1999) when 1) a wider variety of psychological impairments are implicated, 2) a broader
range of additional factors are included in a predictive model, and 3) the “guilty but mentally ill”
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(GBMI)verdict option is made available.
First, it was hypothesized that the condemnation scale developed by Pearce (1999) would
again prove to be a reliable measure of feelings of resentment and indignation, and judgments of
disapproval and reprobation, directed toward hypothetical criminal defendants who commit
institutionally proscribed acts. Note that because the scale measures condemnation expressed
toward the defendants themselves, it is in fact a measure of actor condemnation.
Second, a set of three hypotheses were proposed concerning the relationship between
condemnation scores and the manipulated variables. Specifically, it was hypothesized that
condemnation scores would differ across cases when 1) hypothetical defendants’ insanity
defenses are based on different mental illnesses, such that diagnoses that reflect volitional and
cognitive impairments would be associated with lower condemnation scores, while diagnoses
that seem to merely reflect criminal conduct (e.g., antisocial personality disorder) would be
associated with higher condemnation scores; and when 2) the severity of the hypothetical
defendants’ crimes are manipulated, such that higher condemnation scores would be associated
with more severe crimes; but not when 3) the GBMI verdict option was made available. The first
of these hypotheses stems from prior empirical research indicating that greater frequencies of
NGRI verdicts are observed when defendants in insanity cases suffer from schizophrenia rather
than personality disorders (Roberts et al., 1987), along with the fact that conceptually, NGRI
verdicts should be associated with lower condemnation scores because actor condemnation is
more appropriately expressed toward guilty defendants. The second of these hypotheses is based
upon prior research suggesting that mock jurors return NGRI verdicts less frequently when the
defendant is accused of a severe crime (Bailis et al., 1995). The third of these hypotheses (i.e.,
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thatthere would be no significant main effect for the GBMI manipulation) runs counter to past
research suggesting that the introduction of additional verdict options alters mock jurors’ verdicts
(e.g., Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986). However, condemnation scores were not expected to vary
upon the introduction of the GBMI verdict option because there is simply no reason to expect
that the presence or absence of the GBMI option would affect the condemnation expressed
toward hypothetical defendants.
Next, it was expected that a significant relationship between condemnation scores and
verdicts would emerge across all cases, regardless of the nature of the defendant’s psychological
impairment, such that lower condemnation scores would be associated with insanity acquittals
(NGRI verdicts) and higher scores would be associated with convictions. This hypothesis stems
from the normative theory that condemnation is a part of the core definition of punishment. If
decision-makers’ actual expressions of condemnation track with the conceptual analysis put forth
by Feinberg (1995a), which holds that condemnation is expressed in all instances where
punishment is imposed, higher condemnation scores should be associated with decisions to
punish in all conditions.
Fourth, it was expected that measures of attitudes toward the insanity defense would not
contribute independently to verdict classification models that also include condemnation. At first
blush, this hypothesis seems to run counter to several prior studies that report powerful–and
sometimes overwhelming–associations between insanity defense attitudes and verdicts.
However, because the strength of these associations seems to stem from components of insanity
defense attitudes measures that assess culpability and blameworthiness, it was hypothesized that
the condemnation scale (which, again, focuses on the hypothetical actors specifically) will serve
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asa much better predictor of verdicts than a more general attitude scale.
Finally, it was hypothesized that when condemnation scores associated with verdicts of
guilty, NGRI, and GBMI are compared, condemnation scores associated with NGRI verdicts
would be significantly lower than those associated with guilty verdicts, but condemnation scores
associated with GBMI verdicts would not differ from those associated with guilty verdicts. This
hypothesis is consistent with the conceptual basis of the GBMI verdict: GBMI verdicts are not
intended to reflect diminished capacity, but instead are the practical equivalent of guilty verdicts
(at least insofar as criminal responsibility is concerned). If in fact condemnation scores
associated with GBMI verdicts do differ from condemnation scores associated with guilty
verdicts, there may be reason to believe that the GBMI verdict option is applied in a manner
inconsistent with the normative framework underlying the criminal justice system and that it
blurs the justificatory principles relevant to determinations of criminal responsibility.
2. Method
In order to assess the relationship between condemnation, verdicts, and other factors that
previous research suggests may be associated with decisions in insanity cases, participants were
given a packet of materials that included seven hypothetical case scenarios, a measure of
attitudes toward the insanity defense, and seven sets of dependent measures (one for each of the
hypothetical cases).
a. Participants
Participants were one hundred and fifty University of Nebraska-Lincoln undergraduate
students who received course credit for participating in the study. Most participants identified
themselves as White/Caucasian (90%; 3.3% African American; 0.7% Hispanic; 1.3% Native
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23Participantswho were under the age of nineteen were required to submit a signed
parental consent form before participating in the study.
American; 1.3% Asian) and male (60.7%). Their mean age was 19.89 years.
b. Procedure
The participants appeared in a classroom at a designated time, completed an informed
consent form,23 and received the packet of experimental materials from a proctor. All of the
participants completed the packet of materials in under ninety minutes; most were completed in
approximately one hour. After completing the packet of experimental materials, participants
received a debriefing form that described the experimental design and some of the hypotheses.
c. Materials
The materials provided to the participants included seven hypothetical case vignettes and
a number of measures that captured demographic information, attitudes toward the insanity
defense, and other information about the participants’ insanity case judgments. These materials
are described in detail below.
i. Case Vignettes and Instructions
All participants received seven hypothetical case vignettes that summarized insanity trials
involving defendants suffering from different mental illnesses. Each vignette is reproduced in its
entirety in Appendix A. Four of the vignettes loosely reflected the impairments suffered by the
hypothetical defendants in the research conducted by Finkel (1991). These vignettes involved 1)
a defendant with epilepsy who strikes his victim while suffering an epileptic seizure; 2) a
defendant who commits an assault while intoxicated with alcohol; 3) a defendant suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia who commits an assault while experiencing a delusion that the victim is
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24TheDSM-IV states that intermittent explosive disorder “is characterized by discrete
episodes of failure to resist aggressive impulses resulting in serious assaults or destruction of
property” (p. 609).
his enemy ; and 4) a defendant suffering from “battered child syndrome” and post traumatic
stress disorder who commits an assault while seeming to relive a traumatic incident. The
remaining three vignettes were based upon those used in Pearce’s (1999) study. In these
vignettes, a priest suffering from paranoid schizophrenia experienced a hallucination and
assaulted his altar boy; a Neo-Nazi Party member diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder
assaulted a boy at a block party; and a “predator” diagnosed with intermittent explosive
disorder24 assaulted a victim on the street.
In each vignette, the defendants raised the insanity defense, and participants received an
instruction based on the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA) “definition” of insanity.
Essentially, the IDRA version of the insanity defense provides that a defendant is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. The IDRA insanity instruction is reproduced in
Appendix B.
The hypothetical cases varied between groups in terms of the severity of the harm caused
by the defendant, which allowed for testing of the relationship between severity and verdicts
noted by Bailis, Darley, Waxman, and Robinson (1995). More specifically, half of the
participants read cases in which the victim suffered minor injuries as a result of the defendant’s
assault, while the other participants read about cases in which the victim was killed by the
defendant. The vignettes appearing in Appendix A represent the “assault” condition. An
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exampleof a vignette taken from the “homicide” condition appears in Appendix C.
The hypothetical cases also varied between groups in terms of the verdict options
available: half of the participants were presented with a GBMI verdict option, while the
remainder received only the IDRA insanity defense instruction. The GBMI instruction provided
that the participant may find the defendant “guilty but mentally ill” if he or she finds, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense, the defendant was mentally
ill at the time of the offense, and that the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the
offense. The GMBI instruction is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix D.
Aside from the manipulations described above, each hypothetical case held constant such
details as the nature of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, the characteristics of the
victim, and the nature and extent of the evidence provided to the participants. Also, the
hypothetical cases were each approximately the same length.
In addition to returning verdicts for each vignette and providing demographic
information, the participants completed a number of dependent measures. These measures are
described next.
ii. Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale
All participants completed a modified version of the Hans (1986) Insanity Defense
Attitudes Scale, which appears in its entirety in Appendix E. Each of the sixteen items presented
the participants with statements about the insanity defense, such as “The insane should be treated
rather than punished if they commit a crime,” and “Punishment just does not work on the
insane,” which the participants were asked to rate on a seven-point Likert scale with labels
ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” Ratings were recoded when
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necessaryso that higher scores on the scale reflect negative attitudes toward the insanity defense.
The reliability of the scale is good ( = .794).
iii. Condemnation Scale
For each of the seven hypothetical cases, participants completed a condemnation scale.
The condemnation scale is reproduced in its entirety in Appendices F and G. Originally, twenty-
nine items were intended to be included in the condemnation scale for analysis; however,
separate reliability analyses were run on the condemnation scale for each of the seven
hypothetical cases, and it was determined that several weakly-correlated items would be
excluded. The final version of the condemnation scale (which was identical in all seven
hypothetical cases) included twenty-three items (e.g., “I feel hatred toward [the defendant]”;
“Sentencing [the defendant] to prison would balance society’s need to express any desire for
revenge towards him with rational, disapproving judgment”) which the participants rated on a
seven-point Likert scale with labels ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.”
Items were recoded when necessary so that higher scores reflect more intense expressions of
condemnation. The reliability of the scale, as applied to each hypothetical case, is very good
(epilepsy:  = .936; alcohol intoxication:  = .950; paranoid schizophrenia (delusion):  = .944;
PTSD:  = .950; paranoid schizophrenia (hallucination):  = .941; antisocial personality:  =
.940; intermittent explosive disorder:  = .943).
iv. Construct Dimensions
For each hypothetical case, participants also completed a battery of questions designed to
assess each of the seven construct dimensions identified by Finkel and Handel (1989): capacity,
unimpaired awareness and perceptions, clear thinking, control of impulses and actions, culpable
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actions,premeditation or malice, and others not responsible. Two to four items were associated
with each construct dimension, and once again all of the items presented to the participants were
based on seven-point Likert scales ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.”
When necessary, items were recoded such that higher scores reflect the “insanity” dimension of
each construct, while lower scores reflect the “guilty” dimension of each construct. Appendix F
reproduces these items in the same format that the participants received, and Appendix G
organizes the measures by construct dimension.
Because the individual construct dimension scale scores were highly inter-correlated (and
to facilitate subsequent analyses), the individual scores were summed to create seventeen-item
combined construct scale scores. As noted above, higher scores on the combined construct scale
reflect judgments that the hypothetical actor is not criminally responsible, while lower stores
reflect judgments that the hypothetical actor is guilty. The reliability of the combined scale, as
applied to each diagnosis, is good (epilepsy:  = .852; alcohol intoxication:  = .830; paranoid
schizophrenia (delusion):  = .918; PTSD:  = .931; paranoid schizophrenia (hallucination):  =
.915; antisocial personality:  = .852; intermittent explosive disorder:  = .900). Principle
component (PC) analyses of the combined scales revealed, however, that for each diagnosis
condition, a relatively small number of components explained significant percentages of the
variance. More specifically, in the epilepsy condition, PC analysis yielded a four-component
solution that explained a total of 64% of the variance; in the alcohol intoxication condition, PC
analysis yielded a four-component solution that explained 57% of the variance; in the paranoid
schizophrenia (delusion) condition, PC analysis yielded a three-component solution that
explained 62.5% of the variance; in the PTSD condition, PC analysis yielded a three-component
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solutionthat explained 64% of the variance; in the paranoid schizophrenia (hallucination)
condition, PC analysis yielded a three-component solution that explained 61% of the variance; in
the antisocial personality disorder condition, PC analysis yielded a five-component solution that
explained 64% of the variance; and in the intermittent explosive disorder condition, PC analysis
yielded a four-component solution that explained 67% of the variance. If each of the seven
constructs truly measures a distinct dimension, factor analyses of the combined construct scales
should have yielded seven-component solutions. The implications of the combined construct
scales’ characteristics will be discussed below.
3. Results
To examine the effects of crime severity, the availability of the GBMI verdict option, and
diagnosis on condemnation scores, a mixed groups factorial ANOVA with follow-up analyses
using the LSD procedure (p = .05) was performed. Specifically, a 2 (high/low offense severity)
by 2 (presence/absence of GBMI option) by 7 (diagnosis) design, with diagnosis as a repeated
measure, was used. The mean condemnation scores for each cell of the design are set forth in
Table 1. The four combinations of the between groups factors are represented in the headings
appearing at the top of Table 1, and the seven levels of the repeated measure are represented
inside the left margin of the Table. There were no significant two-way or three-way interactions
among the manipulated variables, and there was no significant main effect for the GBMI
manipulation (F(1, 146) = 1.22, p = .271). There was a main effect for severity (F (1, 146) =
14.67, p < .001, MSE = 1487.22), with significantly higher condemnation scores assigned to
defendants in the homicide condition than in the assault condition across all diagnoses. This
pattern maintained in both the “GBMI instruction available” and “GBMI instruction unavailable”
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conditions. There was also a significant main effect for diagnosis (F(6, 876) = 135.35, p < .001,
MSE = 212.93), such that overall, defendants with antisocial personality disorder received the
highest condemnation scores across all conditions; defendants suffering from epilepsy received
the lowest condemnation scores across all conditions; there was no significant mean differences
between the condemnation scores for defendants diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder
and alcohol intoxication across all conditions; the defendants diagnosed with intermittent
explosive disorder and alcohol intoxication received significantly higher condemnation scores
than the defendants with all other diagnoses except antisocial personality disorder; and the
condemnation scores for defendants diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (based on either
delusions or hallucinations) and post-traumatic stress disorder were similar, but they differed
significantly from one another in some conditions. The mean differences in condemnation scores
that are not significant from one another (based on a LSD minimum mean difference of 3.302)
are marked in each column of Table 1. The relationship between condemnation scores and
diagnosis, crime severity, and the availability of GBMI instructions is depicted in Figure 1.
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84.97a 78.72 73.76 71.03g 80.03xy
PTSD 86.44a 86.11c 77.79e 73.73g 81.03x
Intermittent/
Explosive 103.82




86.28a 83.86c 77.18e 72.65g 77.19y
Epilepsy 69.33 71.11 63.03 62.78 66.55
Alcohol
Intoxication 100.69
b 99.75d 91.34f 89.19h 95.26z
91.85 89.76 83.27 80.1
Note: Means in each column marked with the same superscript are not significantly different
(LSD minimum mean difference = 3.302, p = .05).
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Homicide, No GBMI Option – Assault, No GBMI Option –


























































Beforean attempt was made to determine whether condemnation scores relate to verdicts,
the observed frequencies of each verdict choice for each diagnosis were compared to an
equiprobability model using a goodness-of-fit 2. The results of these 2 tests revealed the
following patterns when only two verdict options (NGRI and guilty) were available: First, when
the defendant was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication (2 = 54.37, p < .01), intermittent
explosive disorder (2 = 54.37, p < .01), or antisocial personality disorder (2 = 65.22, p < .01),
participants returned guilty verdicts significantly more often than would be expected in an
equiprobability model. Second, when the defendant was diagnosed with epilepsy (2 = 50.97, p
< .01), paranoid schizophrenia with delusions (2 = 14.97, p < .01), or paranoid schizophrenia
with hallucinations (2 = 16.78, p < .01), participants returned NGRI verdicts significantly more
often than would be expected in an equiprobability model. Finally, when the defendant was
diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder, the observed frequencies of NGRI verdicts and
guilty verdicts did not differ significantly from an equiprobability model (2 = 2, p > .05). The
observed frequencies of each verdict option for each category of diagnosis are set forth in Table
2.
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Paranoid Schiz. (delusion) 53 20
PTSD 30a 42a




Alcohol Intoxication 5 68
Note: Observed frequencies each row marked with the same superscript are not significantly
different (2 < 3.84, p = .05).
When three verdict options (NGRI, GBMI, and guilty) were available, the observed
frequencies of the participants’ verdict selections differed from an equiprobability model in all
cases, regardless of diagnosis. Pairwise comparisons revealed the following patterns, which are
depicted in Table 3. First, when the defendant was diagnosed with either antisocial personality
disorder or intermittent explosive disorder, participants selected the GBMI verdict option
significantly more often than they selected the NGRI verdict option, and they selected the guilty
verdict option significantly more often than they selected the GBMI verdict option. Second,
when the defendant was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication, there was no difference between
the frequency of NGRI and GBMI verdicts, but both NGRI verdicts and GBMI verdicts were
selected significantly less often than guilty verdicts. Third, when the defendant was diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia with delusions, there was no difference between the frequency of
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NGRIand GBMI verdicts, but both NGRI verdicts and GBMI verdicts were selected
significantly more often than guilty verdicts. Fourth, when the defendant was diagnosed with
post traumatic stress disorder, there was no difference between the frequency of NGRI or guilty
verdicts, but GBMI verdicts were selected significantly more often than either NGRI or guilty
verdicts. Fifth, when the defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia with hallucinations,
participants selected the GBMI verdict option significantly more often than they selected the
NGRI verdict option, and they selected the NGRI verdict option significantly more often than
they selected the guilty verdict option. Finally, when the defendant was diagnosed with epilepsy,
participants selected the GBMI option significantly more often than they selected the guilty
option, and they selected the NGRI verdict option significantly more often than they selected the
GBMI option.
Table 3. Observed Frequencies of Verdict Choices (GBMI Option Available)
Group NGRI GBMI Guilty
Antisocial




PTSD 15b 38 20b
Intermittent/
Explosive 3 17 56
Paranoid Schiz.
(hallucination) 29 41 7
Epilepsy 55 19 1
Alcohol Intoxication 7c 12c 58
Note: Observed frequencies each row marked with the same superscript are not significantly
different (2 < 3.84, p = .05).
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25Thisis reflected in row 1 of Table 2.
Binary logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine whether changes in
condemnation scores would influence the odds that a participant would return a verdict of guilty
as opposed to NGRI, and multinomial logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine
whether condemnation scores would influence the odds that a participant would return a verdict
of guilty as opposed to NGRI and as opposed to GBMI. Due to the wide variety in the verdict
frequency patterns across diagnoses (as described above), separate logistic regression analyses
were conducted for each diagnosis.
When the defendant was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, condemnation
scores did not predict verdicts better than a constant-only model. (2 = 0.834, p = .361.) It
should be noted, however, that 97.3% of the participants found this defendant to be guilty.25
Thus, the constant-only model (that is, simply predicting a verdict of guilty for each participant)
is accurate 97.3% of the time, and the condemnation measure was unable to improve upon that
rate of accuracy. For the same reason, condemnation scores did not predict verdicts better than a
constant-only model when defendants were diagnosed with alcohol intoxication (2 = 2.138, p =
.144) or intermittent explosive disorder (2 = 0.920, p = .338). When the defendants were given
either of these diagnoses, they were found to be guilty 93.2% of the time (as reflected in Table 2).
To determine whether a model could be devised that could predict verdicts in these cases
better than the constant-only model, the logistic regression analyses were re-run with
condemnation scores, the insanity defense attitudes scale score, and the combined construct
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26Forall three “diagnosis” conditions, models that included the condemnation scale scores
and insanity defense scale scores were not better predictors of verdicts than the constant-only
models (antisocial personality disorder: 2 = 1.142, p = .565; alcohol intoxication: 2 = 4.263, p
= .119; intermittent explosive disorder: 2 = 0.928, p = .629).
dimension scale scores entered in a single block.26
When the defendant was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, the model
including condemnation scores, attitude scores, and the combined construct score did not predict
verdicts more effectively than the constant-only model (2 = 1.276, p = .735). However, when
the defendant was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication, the three-variable model predicted
verdicts more effectively than the constant-only model (2 = 25.01, p < .001). The classification
table for the three-variable model appears in Table 4a, and the overall results of the analysis are
depicted in Table 4b. Note that although the model was effective, none of the individual
variables contributed uniquely to the fit of the model when all of the other variables were
controlled.
Table 4a. Classification Table for Verdicts–Alcohol Intoxication (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 3 2 60




27Recallthat the construct scores were coded such that higher scores reflect judgments
consistent with legal insanity; thus, the negative relationship between the combined construct
score and the odds of obtaining guilty verdicts is not unexpected.
Table 4b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Alcohol Intoxication (Full Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
attitudes -.101 .164 .382 1 .536 .904
constructs -.645 .414 2.425 1 .119 .524
condemnation .142 .093 2.307 1 .129 1.152
constant 43.364 30.251 2.055 1 .152 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .290; Nagelkerke R2 = .738
When the defendant was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, the three-
variable model also predicted verdicts more effectively than the constant-only model (2 =
19.090, p < .001). The classification table for the model is presented in Table 5a. Note that the
observed and predicted frequencies of guilty and NGRI verdicts for defendants diagnosed with
intermittent explosive disorder were identical to the frequencies for defendants diagnosed with
alcohol intoxication (as set forth in Table 4a). The results of the logistic regression analysis are
presented in Table 5b. Only the construct score was a uniquely-significant predictor: Scores on
the construct scale were negatively related to the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict such that for
each single-point increase on the construct scale, participants were only 81.4% as likely to return
a guilty verdict when all other variables were controlled.27
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Table5a. Classification Table for Verdicts–Intermittent Explosive Disorder (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 3 2 60
Guilty 1 67 98.5
Total Percentage
Correct 95.9
Table 5b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Intermittent Explosive Disorder (Full Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
attitudes .072 .080 .808 1 .369 1.075
constructs -.283 .109 6.779 1 .009 .754
condemnation -.052 .058 .802 1 .371 .949
constant 18.423 8.329 4.892 1 .027 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .230; Nagelkerke R2 = .585
When the defendant was diagnosed with epilepsy, participants returned verdicts of NGRI
in 91.8% of the cases (see Table 2); thus, a constant-only prediction model is accurate 91.8% of
the time. Nevertheless, condemnation scores predicted verdicts significantly better than the
constant only model (2 = 15.022, p < .001). The classification table for the condemnation
model is set forth in Table 6a, and the results of the logistic regression analysis are set forth in
Table 6b. The model indicates that condemnation scores are positively related with the odds of
obtaining a guilty verdict, such that for each point increase on the condemnation scale, the odds
of obtaining a guilty verdict increase by 14%.
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Table6a. Classification Table for Verdicts–Epilepsy (Condemnation Only Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 67 0 100
Guilty 4 2 33.3
Total Percentage
Correct 94.5
Table 6b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Epilepsy (Condemnation Only Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .131 .048 7.489 1 .006 1.140
constant -12.748 4.073 9.796 1 .002 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .186; Nagelkerke R2 = .429
A model including condemnation scores and insanity defense attitude scores also
predicted verdicts in epilepsy cases significantly better than the constant-only model (2 =
19.494, p < .001). The classification table for the condemnation + attitudes model is presented in
Table 6c, and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 6d. The model indicates that both
condemnation and attitudes significantly predict verdicts when the other variables are controlled.
It also indicates that both condemnation and attitudes are positively related with the odds of
obtaining a guilty verdict: For each one-point increase on the condemnation scale, the odds of
obtaining a guilty verdict increase by 16% when other variables are controlled. For each one-
point increase on the attitudes scale (which reflects more negative attitudes toward the insanity
defense), the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict increase by 14.9% when other variables are
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controlled. Note, however, that the classification accuracy of the condemnation + attitudes
model is not greater than that of the condemnation only model.
Table 6c. Classification Table for Verdicts–Epilepsy (Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 66 1 98.5
Guilty 4 2 33.3
Total Percentage
Correct 93.2
Table 6d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Epilepsy (Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .148 .064 5.332 1 .021 1.160
attitudes .139 .070 3.983 1 .046 1.149
constant -24.007 8.450 8.072 1 .004 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .234; Nagelkerke R2 = .541
The full three-variable model (condemnation + attitudes + constructs) was also a better fit
to the data in “epilepsy” cases than the constant-only model (2 = 24.391, p < .001). The
classification table for the full model appears in Table 6e, and the results of the analysis are
summarized in Table 6f. Only the construct scale had a significant independent relationship with
verdict odds. Scores on the construct scale were negatively related to the odds of obtaining a
guilty verdict, such that for each unit increase on the construct scale, participants were only
140
81.4%as likely to return a guilty verdict when all other variables were controlled.
Table 6e. Classification Table for Verdicts–Epilepsy (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 67 0 100
Guilty 2 4 66.7
Total Percentage
Correct 97.3
Table 6f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Epilepsy (Full Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .121 .089 1.823 1 .177 1.128
attitudes .170 .088 3.774 1 .052 1.186
constructs -.206 .105 3.851 1 .050 .814
constant -8.059 11.983 .452 1 .501 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .284; Nagelkerke R2 = .655
When the defendant was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia with delusions, a
constant-only model predicted verdicts with 72.6% accuracy. Condemnation scores predicted
verdicts significantly better than the constant-only model (2 = 11.201, p = .001), as reflected in
Table 7a. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 7b. Condemnation scores were
positively related to the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that each unit increase on the
condemnation scale increased the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 6.6%.
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Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 51 2 96.2
Guilty 13 7 35
Total Percentage
Correct 79.5
Table 7b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia with Delusions
(Condemnation Only Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .064 .023 7.453 1 .006 1.066
constant -6.234 2.022 9.5 1 .002 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .142; Nagelkerke R2 = .206
A model included condemnation and insanity defense attitudes also performed more
effectively than a constant-only model (2 = 15.462, p < .001) at predicting verdicts in paranoid
schizophrenia-delusions cases. The classification table for this model appears in Table 7c, and
the results of the analysis appear in Table 7d. According to the model, only condemnation had a
significant independent relationship with verdict odds, such that for each unit increase on the
condemnation scale increased the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 5.9%.
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Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 50 3 94.3
Guilty 11 9 45
Total Percentage
Correct 80.8
Table 7d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia with Delusions
(Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .058 .025 5.345 1 .021 1.059
attitudes .076 .039 3.763 1 .052 1.079
constant -10.877 3.395 10.264 1 .001 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .191; Nagelkerke R2 = .276
The full three-variable model performed more effectively than the constant-only model as
well (2 = 19.097, p < .001). Table 7e illustrates that the full model correctly classified 82.2% of
the cases wherein the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions. Table 7f
shows, however, that none of the variables in the model independently and significantly affected
the odds of obtaining guilty verdicts when the other variables were controlled.
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Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 51 2 96.2
Guilty 11 9 45.0
Total Percentage
Correct 82.2
Table 7f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia with Delusions (Full
Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .034 .027 1.578 1 .209 1.034
attitudes .057 .042 1.777 1 .183 1.058
constructs -.056 .032 3.180 1 .075 .945
constant -3.50 5.095 .472 1 .492 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .230; Nagelkerke R2 = .333
When the defendant was diagnoses with paranoid schizophrenia with hallucinations, the
constant-only model was accurate in 74% of the cases. Condemnation scores predicted verdicts
more accurately (2 = 8.264, p = .004), as reflected in Table 8a. According to the model, which
is summarized in Table 8b, condemnation scores were positively related to the odds of obtaining
a guilty verdict, such that for each point increase on the condemnation scale, the odds increased
by 4.7%.
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Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 53 1 98.1
Guilty 17 2 10.5
Total Percentage
Correct 75.3
Table 8b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia with Hallucinations
(Condemnation Only Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .046 .019 6.150 1 .013 1.047
constant -4.707 1.571 8.983 1 .003 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .107; Nagelkerke R2 = .157
A model containing condemnation and insanity defense attitudes also performed more
effectively than the constant-only model (2 = 17.44, p < .001). The classification table appears
in Table 8c, and the model is summarized in Table 8d. Both condemnation scores and insanity
defense attitudes were positively related to the odds of obtaining guilty verdicts. Each point
increase on the condemnation scale increases the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 4% when
the other variables in the model are controlled, and each point increase on the attitude scale
increases the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 12.4% when the other variables are controlled.
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Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 51 3 94.3
Guilty 14 5 45
Total Percentage
Correct 76.7
Table 8d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia with Hallucinations
(Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .039 .020 3.929 1 .047 1.040
attitudes .177 .044 7.046 1 .008 1.124
constant -12.177 3.510 12.037 1 .001 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .213; Nagelkerke R2 = .311
The full three-variable model also predicted verdicts better than the constant only model
when the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with hallucinations (2 = 43.754, p <
.001). The classification table (Table 8e) illustrates that the full model correctly classified 89%
of the verdicts, and the model summary (Table 8f) illustrates that only the insanity defense
attitudes and construct scale scores had significant, independent relationships with the odds ratio:
Insanity defense attitudes were positively related to the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such
that for each point increase on the attitude scale (which reflects increasingly hostile attitudes
toward the defense), the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict increased by 15.4% when the other
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28Putdifferently, for each point increase on the construct scale, the odds of obtaining an
NGRI verdict increased by 15.2% when the other variables in the model were controlled.
variables were controlled. The construct scores were negatively related to the odds of obtaining a
guilty verdict, such that for each point increase on the combined construct scale (which reflects
judgments more consistent with an insanity verdict), participants were only 84.8% as likely to
return a guilty verdict when the other variables were controlled.28




Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 51 3 94.4
Guilty 5 14 73.7
Total Percentage
Correct 89.0
Table 8f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia with Hallucinations
(Full Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .013 .022 .362 1 .548 1.013
attitudes .143 .060 5.703 1 .017 1.154
constructs -.165 .045 13.70 1 .001 .848
constant -.923 4.255 .047 1 .828 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .451; Nagelkerke R2 = .661
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Thefinal diagnosis condition involved a defendant who was diagnosed with battered
child syndrome and post traumatic stress disorder (the PTSD condition). For these defendants,
the constant-only model correctly classified only 58.3% of the cases. A model containing only
condemnation scores fit the data better than the constant only model (2 = 7.926, p = .005), and
correctly classified 61.1% of the cases (see Table 9a). Condemnation scores were positively
related to the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that a one-point increase on the
condemnation scale increased the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 3.7% (see Table 9b).
Table 9a. Classification Table for Verdicts–PTSD (Condemnation Only Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 10 20 33.3
Guilty 8 34 81.0
Total Percentage
Correct 61.1
Table 9b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–PTSD (Condemnation Only Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .037 .014 6.803 1 .009 1.037
constant -2.563 1.135 5.095 1 .024 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .104; Nagelkerke R2 = .140
A model that includes condemnation and insanity defense attitudes scales also performed
better than the constant-only model (2 = 8.321, p = .016) and also correctly classified 61.1% of
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thecases (see Table 9c). The model summary set forth in Table 9d illustrates that only the
condemnation score had a significant, independent relationship to the odds of obtaining a guilty
verdict. More specifically, condemnation scores were once again positively related to the odds of
obtaining a guilty verdict, such that each point increase on the condemnation scale increased the
odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 3.5% when the other variables were controlled.
Table 9c. Classification Table for Verdicts–PTSD (Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 10 20 33.3
Guilty 8 34 81.0
Total Percentage
Correct 61.1
Table 9d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–PTSD (Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .034 .015 5.604 1 .018 1.035
attitudes .018 .029 .389 1 .533 1.018
constant -3.575 2.013 3.152 1 .076 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .109; Nagelkerke R2 = .147
Finally, the full three-variable model also outperformed the constant-only model (2 =
7.926, p = .005), and correctly classified 90.3% of the cases (see Table 9e). According to the
model, which is summarized in Table 9f, only the construct scale score had a significant,
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independentrelationship with the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict. Construct scores were
negatively related with the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that for each point increase on
the construct scale, the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict decreased by 23.3% when the other
variables in the model were controlled.
Table 9e. Classification Table for Verdicts–PTSD (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI Guilty Percentage Correct
NGRI 25 5 83.3
Guilty 2 40 95.2
Total Percentage
Correct 90.3
Table 9f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–PTSD (Full Model)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation -.009 .028 .102 1 .750 .991
attitudes .036 .055 .443 1 .506 1.037
constructs -.265 .067 15.636 1 .001 .767
constant 16.75 5.721 8.571 1 .003 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .557; Nagelkerke R2 = .750
Additional logistic regression analyses were conducted to explore the relationship
between condemnation scores and the odds that a participant would return a verdict of guilty as
opposed to NGRI or GBMI. Once again, separate models were constructed for each level of the
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“diagnosis”manipulation.
When the defendant was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, note that only
two participants in the study returned a verdict of NGRI (see Table 3). Because so few NGRI
verdicts were obtained, those two cases were excluded, and a binomial logistic regression was
performed to determine whether condemnation scores were related to the odds that a participant
would return a verdict of guilty as opposed to GBMI. A model containing only condemnation
scores fit the data better than a constant-only model (2 = 6.48, p = .011), though it should be
noted that the classification table for the model matches that of a constant-only model (see Table
10a). The model is summarized in Table 10b. Condemnation scores were positively related to
the odds that a participant would return a guilty verdict, such that for each point increase on the
condemnation scale, the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict as opposed to a GBMI verdict
increased by 4.9%.




Frequencies GBMI Guilty Percentage Correct
GBMI 0 13 0




Table10b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Antisocial Personality Disorder
(Condemnation Only Model-GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .048 .022 4.771 1 .029 1.049
constant -3.441 2.211 2.421 1 .120 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .084; Nagelkerke R2 = .139
A model containing condemnation scores and the insanity defense attitudes scores also fit
the data better than a constant-only model when defendants were diagnosed with antisocial
personality disorder (2 = 8.318, p = .016). The classification table for the condemnation +
attitudes model appears in Table 10c, and the summary of the model appears in Table 10d. Only
condemnation scores were independently predictive of verdicts: Condemnation scores were
positively associated with the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that each point increase on
the condemnation scale corresponded to a 5.4% increase in the odds that a guilty verdict would
be obtained rather than a GBMI verdict, when all other variables were controlled.




Frequencies GBMI Guilty Percentage Correct
GBMI 1 12 7.7




Table10d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Antisocial Personality Disorder
(Condemnation+Attitudes Model-GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .053 .024 4.995 1 .025 1.054
attitudes .056 .042 1.798 1 .180 1.058
constant -7.616 4.03 3.572 1 .059 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .106; Nagelkerke R2 = .176
The full three-variable model also provided a good fit when the defendant was diagnosed
with antisocial personality disorder (2 = 15.548, p = .001). The classification table appears in
Table 10e, and the model summary is set forth in Table 10f. Construct scores were negatively
associated with the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that for each point increase on the
combined construct scale, the odds of obtaining a GBMI verdict (as opposed to a guilty verdict)
increased by 10%, when all other variables were controlled. Neither the insanity defense
attitudes measure nor the condemnation measure significantly affected the odds of obtaining a
particular verdict once the other variables were controlled.




Frequencies GBMI Guilty Percentage Correct
GBMI 3 10 23.1




Table10f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Antisocial Personality Disorder (Full Model-
GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .035 .029 1.398 1 .237 1.035
attitudes .044 .044 .991 1 .319 1.045
constructs -.105 .047 5.065 1 .024 .900
constant .294 5.104 .003 1 .954 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .190; Nagelkerke R2 = .313
As shown in Table 3, only three participants in the study returned a verdict of NGRI when
the defendant was diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. Once again, because so few
NGRI verdicts were obtained, those three cases were excluded, and binomial logistic regression
analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between condemnation scores and the odds
of obtaining a guilty verdict as opposed to a GBMI verdict. A constant-only model correctly
classified verdicts 76.7% of the time, and although a model containing only condemnation scores
fit the data (2 = 17.274, p < .001), it did not classify verdicts more accurately than the constant-
only model (see Table 11a). The model indicates that condemnation scores are positively
associated with the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict, such that each point
increase on the condemnation scale increases the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict by 7.4% (see
Table 11b).
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Frequencies GBMI Guilty Percentage Correct
GBMI 4 13 23.5
Guilty 4 52 92.9
Total Percentage
Correct 76.7
Table 11b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Intermittent Explosive Disorder
(Condemnation Only Model-GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .071 .022 10.566 1 .001 1.074
constant -5.485 1.99 7.601 1 .006 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .211; Nagelkerke R2 = .318
A model containing both condemnation and insanity defense attitude measures also fit the
data well (2 = 18.458, p < .001) and correctly classified 78.1% of the verdicts when defendants
were diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder (see Table 11c). The model summary,
which is set forth in Table 11d, indicates that only condemnation was independently related to
the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict: For each point increase on the condemnation scale, the
odds of obtaining a guilty verdict rather than a GBMI verdict increased by 8.2%, when the other
variables in the model were controlled.
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Frequencies GBMI Guilty Percentage Correct
GBMI 6 11 35.3
Guilty 5 51 91.1
Total Percentage
Correct 78.1
Table 11d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Intermittent Explosive Disorder
(Condemnation+Attitudes Model-GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .078 .023 11.648 1 .001 1.082
attitudes -.039 .036 1.152 1 .283 .962
constant -3.537 2.564 1.904 1 .168 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .223; Nagelkerke R2 = .337
A model containing condemnation scores, attitude scores, and the combined construct
scores provided a good fit as well (2 = 23.903, p < .001), correctly classifying 87.7% of the
verdicts when the defendants were diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder (see Table
11e). Table 11f summarizes the model, which reveals that only condemnation scores and
construct scores maintained independent relationships with verdict odds. More specifically,
condemnation scores were positively related to the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that
single-point increases on the condemnation scale increased the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict
by 8.1% when all other variables are controlled, and construct scores were negatively related to
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theodds of obtaining a guilty verdict, such that each single-point increase on the construct scale
increased the odds of obtaining a GBMI verdict by 6.4% when all other variables were
controlled.




Frequencies GBMI Guilty Percentage Correct
GBMI 9 8 52.9
Guilty 1 55 98.2
Total Percentage
Correct 87.7
Table 11f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Intermittent Explosive Disorder (Full Model-
GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .078 .027 8.143 1 .004 1.081
attitudes -.051 .041 1.574 1 .210 .950
constructs -.067 .031 4.551 1 .033 .936
constant .446 3.413 .017 1 .896 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .279; Nagelkerke R2 = .422
When the defendant was diagnosed with epilepsy, only one guilty verdict was obtained
(see Table 3). This case was excluded, and binomial logistic regression analyses were performed
to explore the relationship between condemnation scores and the odds of obtaining a GBMI
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verdictrather than an NGRI verdict. A constant-only model that predicts NGRI verdicts in all
cases is accurate 74.3% of the time. A model containing only condemnation scores fit the data
(2 = 5.795, p = .016), and correctly classified 75.7% of the cases (see Table 12a). According to
the model, condemnation scores are positively associated with the odds of obtaining a GBMI
verdict rather than an NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase on the condemnation scale,
the odds of obtaining a GBMI verdict increased by 3.8% (see Table 12b).




Frequencies NGRI GBMI Percentage Correct
NGRI 55 0 100
GBMI 18 1 5.3
Total Percentage
Correct 75.7
Table 12b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Epilepsy (Condemnation Only Model-NGRI
vs. GBMI Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .037 .017 4.915 1 .027 1.038
constant -3.612 1.231 8.610 1 .003 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .075; Nagelkerke R2 = .111
The model containing condemnation and insanity defense attitude scores also fit the data
in the epilepsy condition (2 = 6.626, p = .036), though it did not classify verdicts more
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accuratelythan the constant-only model (see Table 12c). According to the model, neither
condemnation nor attitudes maintained a unique relationship to verdict odds when the other
variables were controlled (see Table 12d).




Frequencies NGRI GBMI Percentage Correct
NGRI 53 2 96.4
GBMI 17 2 10.5
Total Percentage
Correct 74.3
Table 12d. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Epilepsy (Condemnation+Attitudes Model-
NGRI vs. GBMI Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .033 .017 3.59 1 .058 1.033
attitudes .029 .033 .810 1 .368 1.030
constant -5.310 2.308 5.294 1 .021 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .086; Nagelkerke R2 = .126
The full three-variable model fit the data as well (2 = 10.546, p = .014); interestingly,
however, the full model correctly classified verdicts only 73% of the time–which means that it
was less accurate than the constant-only model (see Table 12e). None of the variables in the full
model maintained a significant relationship to verdict odds when the other variables in the model
159
werecontrolled (see Table 12f).
Table 12e. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI Verdicts–Epilepsy (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Percentage Correct
NGRI 50 5 90.9
GBMI 15 4 21.1
Total Percentage
Correct 73.0
Table 12f. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Epilepsy (Full Model-NGRI vs. GBMI
Verdicts)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .002 .023 .006 1 .940 1.002
attitudes .031 .035 .782 1 .376 1.031
constructs -.078 .041 3.552 1 .059 .925
constant 3.29 5.034 .427 1 .513 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .133; Nagelkerke R2 = .195
For the remaining conditions of the diagnosis variable (i.e., alcohol intoxication, paranoid
schizophrenia (delusions), paranoid schizophrenia (hallucinations), and post traumatic stress
disorder), each of the three verdict options (i.e., NGRI, GBMI, and Guilty) were observed with
sufficient frequency to permit multinomial logistic regression analyses of the relationship
between condemnation scores and the odds that a participant would return a verdict of guilty
rather than NGRI or GBMI. When the defendant was diagnosed with alcohol intoxication, the
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observedfrequencies of the various verdict options, which are set forth in Table 3, were as
follows: NGRI = 7 (9.1% frequency); GBMI = 12 (15.6% frequency); and Guilty = 58 (73.5%
frequency). Thus, by merely predicting guilty verdicts in each case, an accuracy rate of 73.5%
can be achieved. A multinomial logistic regression model including condemnation as the sole
independent variable fit the data (model 2 = 6.627, p = .036) and predicted verdicts with 75.3%
accuracy (see Table 13a). According to the model, which is summarized in Table 13b, in the
comparison between participants who found the defendant to be NGRI and participants who
found the defendant to be guilty, condemnation had a statistically significant, negative
relationship with the odds of selecting an NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase in the
condemnation score, the participants were 4.8% more likely to return a guilty verdict. However,
condemnation did not have a statistically significant relationship with the odds that a participant
would select a GBMI verdict over a guilty verdict.




Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 1 0 6 14.3
GBMI 0 0 12 0




Table13b. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Alcohol Intoxication (Condemnation
Only Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept 2.164 1.691 1.638 1 .201 --




intercept -.879 1.511 .338 1 .561 --
condemnation -.007 .015 .217 1 .641 .993
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .082; Nagelkerke = .108
For defendants diagnosed with alcohol intoxication, a model containing condemnation
scores and insanity defense attitude scores did not fit the data (model 2 = 7.357, p = .118).
However, the existence of a significant relationship between condemnation, attitudes, constructs,
and verdict selection emerged (model 2 = 23.913, p = .001), and the full model correctly
classified 79.2% of the verdicts (see Table 13c). Although the likelihood ratio tests indicated
that neither condemnation (2 = 1.499, p = .473) nor attitudes (2 = .597, p = .742) maintained
independent significant relationships with verdicts, a significant relationship between construct
scores and verdicts was found (2 = 16.556, p < .001). According to the model (see Table 13d),
in the comparison between participants who found the defendant to be NGRI as opposed to
guilty, the construct score had a positive relationship with the odds of obtaining an NGRI verdict,
such that for each point increase on the construct scale, participants were 36.6% more likely to
return a verdict of NGRI. However, the construct scores did not have a significant relationship
with the odds that a participant would select a GBMI verdict over a guilty verdict.
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Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 4 0 3 57.1
GBMI 1 0 11 0
Guilty 1 0 57 98.3
Total Percentage
Correct 79.2
Table 13d. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Alcohol Intoxication (Full Model-
NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept -22.0 9.308 5.586 1 .018 --
condemnation -.037 .030 1.514 1 .219 .963
attitudes .035 .052 .468 1 .494 1.036




intercept -4.981 4.458 1.248 1 .264 --
condemnation 0 .017 0 1 .997 1.0
attitudes -.007 .036 .039 1 .843 .993
constructs .064 .044 2.077 1 .150 1.066
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .267; Nagelkerke = .350
When the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions, the observed
frequencies of the verdict options were as follows: NGRI = 30 (40% frequency); GBMI = 36
(48% frequency); and Guilty = 9 (12% frequency) (see Table 3). Thus, predicting GBMI verdicts
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inall cases yields a 48% accuracy rate. A multinomial logistic regression model that included
condemnation as the sole independent variable fit the data (model 2 = 15.238, p = .002) and
classified verdicts with a 49.3% accuracy rate (see Table 14a). The model is summarized in
Table 14b. According to the model, in the comparison between participants who found the
defendant to be NGRI and those who found the defendant to be guilty, condemnation had a
statistically significant, negative relationship with the odds of selecting an NGRI verdict, such
that for each point increase in the condemnation score, the participants were 8.8% more likely to
return a guilty verdict. In the comparison between participants who found the defendant to be
GBMI and those who found the defendant to be guilty, condemnation had a significant negative
relationship with the odds of selecting a GBMI verdict, such that for each point increase in the
condemnation score, participants were 6.2% more likely to return a guilty verdict.
Table 14a. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–Paranoid
Schizophrenia (Delusions) (Condemnation Only Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 11 19 0 36.7
GBMI 9 25 2 69.4




Table14b. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia (Delusions)
(Condemnation Only Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept 9.318 2.687 12.022 1 .001 --




intercept 7.303 2.563 8.12 1 .004 --
condemnation -.064 .026 5.920 1 .015 .938
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .184; Nagelkerke = .214
A multinomial logistic regression model that included condemnation and attitudes toward
the insanity defense also fit the data (model 2 = 18.045, p = .001) and classified verdicts with
52.0% accuracy (see Table 14c). Likelihood ratio tests revealed that there was a significant
relationship between condemnation and verdict selection (2 = 11.489, p = .003), but no
significant relationship between attitudes and verdict selection (2 = 2.807, p = .246). According
to the model, which is summarized in Table 14d, in the comparison between participants who
found the defendant to be NGRI and those who found the defendant to be guilty, condemnation
had a significant negative relationship with the odds of selecting an NGRI verdict, such that for
each point increase on the condemnation scale, participants were 8.6% more likely to return a
guilty verdict. In the comparison between participants who found the defendant to be GBMI and
those who found the defendant to be guilty, condemnation had a significant negative relationship
with the odds of selecting a GBMI verdict, such that for each point increase in condemnation, the
odds of selecting a guilty verdict increased by 6.9%.
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Table14c. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–Paranoid
Schizophrenia (Delusions) (Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 13 17 0 43.3
GBMI 8 25 3 69.4
Guilty 0 8 1 11.1
Total Percentage
Correct 52.0
Table 14d. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia (Delusions)
(Condemnation+Attitudes Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept 10.517 3.788 7.710 1 .005 --
condemnation -.090 .030 8.783 1 .003 .914




intercept 5.640 3.482 2.624 1 .105 --
condemnation -.071 .028 6.211 1 .013 .931
attitudes .032 .048 .464 1 .496 1.033
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .214; Nagelkerke = .249
In addition, a multinomial logistic regression model that included all three predictor
variables (condemnation, attitudes, and constructs) fit the data (model 2 = 47.6, p < .001) and,
as shown in Table 14e, correctly classified 65.3% of the verdicts when the defendant was
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia with delusions. Likelihood ratio tests revealed that there
was a significant relationship between constructs and verdict selection (2 = 29.015, p < .001),
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butno significant relationship between attitudes and verdict selection (2 = 2.94, p = .230) or
between condemnation and verdict selection (2 = 4.996, p = .082). The model summary, which
is set forth in Table 14f, illustrates that in the comparison between participants who found the
defendant to be NGRI and those who found the defendant to be guilty, the construct score had a
significant positive relationship with the odds of selecting an NGRI verdict, such that for each
point increase on the construct scale, the odds of selecting an NGRI verdict increased by 33.8%.
In the comparison between participants who found the defendant to be GBMI and those who
found the defendant to be guilty, the construct score had a significant positive relationship with
the odds of selecting a GBMI verdict, such that for each point increase in the construct scale, the
odds of selecting a GBMI verdict increased by 18.8%.
Table 14e. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–Paranoid
Schizophrenia (Delusions) (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 22 8 0 73.3
GBMI 8 23 5 63.9




Table14f. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia (Delusions)
(Full Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept -15.809 7.172 4.859 1 .028 --
condemnation -.054 .031 3.067 1 .080 .948
attitudes .030 .068 .190 1 .663 1.030




intercept -10.025 6.259 2.566 1 .109 --
condemnation -.049 .024 4.152 1 .042 .952
attitudes .075 .060 1.592 1 .207 1.078
constructs .172 .068 6.44 1 .011 1.188
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .466; Nagelkerke = .544
When the defendant was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia with hallucinations, the
observed frequencies of the verdicts were as follows: NGRI = 29 (37.7%); GBMI = 41 (53.2%);
Guilty = 7 (9.1%). By predicting GBMI verdicts in all cases, 53.2% of the verdicts can be
correctly classified. Multinomial logistic regression analysis revealed a significant relationship
between condemnation and verdicts (2 = 13.376, p = .001), and a model that included
condemnation as the sole predictor correctly classified 58.4% of the verdicts (see Table 15a).
According to the model, in the comparison between participants who found the defendant to be
NGRI and those who found the defendant to be guilty, there was a negative relationship between
condemnation and the likelihood of obtaining an NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase
on the condemnation scale, the odds of selecting a guilty verdict increased by 8.4%.
Condemnation did not have a statistically significant relationship with the odds that a participant
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wouldselect a GBMI verdict over a guilty verdict (see Table 15b).
Table 15a. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–Paranoid
Schizophrenia (Hallucinations) (Condemnation Only Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 10 19 0 34.5
GBMI 6 35 0 85.4
Guilty 0 7 0 0
Total Percentage
Correct 58.4
Table 15b. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia
(Hallucinations) (Condemnation Only Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept 8.769 2.995 8.573 1 .003 --




intercept 5.987 2.885 4.308 1 .038 --
condemnation -.048 .031 2.357 1 .125 .953
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .159; Nagelkerke = .189
Multinomial logistic regression analysis also revealed a significant relationship between
condemnation, insanity defense attitudes, and verdicts (model 2 = 13.448, p = .009). However,
likelihood ratio tests indicate that in the model containing condemnation and insanity defense
attitudes, a significant relationship emerged between condemnation and verdicts (2 = 11.884, p
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=.003), but not between insanity defense attitudes and verdicts (2 = .072, p = .965). The
model, which correctly classified only 57.1% of the verdicts when the defendant was diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia-delusions (see Table 15c), is summarized in Table 15d. In the
comparison between participants who found the defendant to be NGRI and those who found the
defendant to be guilty, there was a negative relationship between condemnation and the
likelihood of obtaining an NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase on the condemnation
scale, the odds of selecting a guilty verdict increased by 8.5%. Condemnation did not have a
statistically significant relationship with the odds that a participant would select a GBMI verdict
over a guilty verdict.
Table 15c. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–Paranoid
Schizophrenia (Hallucionations) (Condemnation+Attitudes Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 9 20 0 31.0
GBMI 6 35 0 85.4




Table15d. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia
(Hallucinations) (Condemnation+Attitudes Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty
Verdicts)




intercept 8.738 3.936 4.929 1 .026 --
condemnation -.089 .035 6.531 1 .011 .915




intercept 5.593 3.706 2.278 1 .131 --
condemnation -.049 .033 2.255 1 .133 .952
attitudes .008 .047 .028 1 .867 1.008
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .160; Nagelkerke = .190
A model including all three predictor variables also fit the data in cases involving
paranoid schizophrenia with delusions (model 2 = 43.798, p < .001). The full model, which
correctly classifies 70.1% of the cases (see Table 15e), is summarized in Table 15f. Likelihood
ratio tests indicate that neither condemnation scores (2 = .199, p = .905) nor attitudes (2 =
.589, p = .745) contributed significantly to the model. There was a relationship between
construct scores and verdicts, however (2 = 30.351, p < .001). With respect to the comparison
between participants who found the defendant to be NGRI and those who found the defendant to
be guilty, there was a positive relationship between construct scores and the odds of obtaining an
NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase on the construct scale, the odds of obtaining an
NGRI verdict increased by 43%. With respect to the comparison between participants who
found the defendant to be GBMI and those who found the defendant to be guilty, there was a
positive relationship between construct scores and the odds of obtaining a GBMI verdict such
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thatfor each point increase on the construct scale, the odds of obtaining a GBMI verdict
increased by 23.8%.
Table 15e. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–Paranoid
Schizophrenia (Hallucinations) (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 18 11 0 62.1
GBMI 5 35 1 85.4
Guilty 0 6 1 14.3
Total Percentage
Correct 70.1
Table 15f. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–Paranoid Schizophrenia
(Hallucinations) (Full Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept -27.436 10.222 7.204 1 .007 --
condemnation .019 .043 .199 1 .656 1.020
attitudes .044 .065 .469 1 .494 1.045




intercept -16.022 9.299 2.969 1 .085 --
condemnation .016 .039 .166 1 .683 1.016
attitudes .044 .058 .576 1 .448 1.045
constructs .214 .090 5.642 1 .018 1.238
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .434; Nagelkerke = .515
In the post traumatic stress disorder condition, the observed verdict frequencies were:
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NGRI= 15 (20.5%); GBMI = 38 (52.1%); and Guilty = 20 (27.4%). Thus, predicting GBMI
verdicts in all cases correctly classifies 52.1% of the cases. Multinomial logistic regression
analysis revealed a significant relationship between condemnation and verdicts (model 2 =
27.484, p < .001), and the model containing condemnation as the sole predictor correctly
classified 57.5% of the cases (see Table 16a). According to the model, in the comparison
between participants who found the defendant NGRI and those who found the defendant guilty,
there was a negative relationship between condemnation and the odds of obtaining an NGRI
verdict, such that for each single point increase on the condemnation scale, the odds of obtaining
a guilty verdict increased by 12.4%. With respect to the comparison between participants who
found the defendant GBMI and those who found the defendant guilty, there was a negative
relationship between condemnation and the likelihood of obtaining a GBMI verdict, such that for
each point increase in condemnation, the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict increased by 4.5%
(see Table 16b).




Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 7 8 0 46.7
GBMI 2 33 3 86.8




Table16b. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–PTSD (Condemnation Only Model-
NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept 10.324 2.745 14.144 1 .001 --




intercept 4.727 1.989 5.647 1 .017 --
condemnation -.046 .022 4.378 1 .036 .955
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .314; Nagelkerke = .361
A model containing condemnation and attitudes toward the insanity defense also fit the
data in the post traumatic stress disorder condition (model 2 = 30.03, p < .001). Likelihood
ratio tests revealed that there was a relationship between condemnation and verdicts (2 =
24.401, p < .001), but insanity defense attitudes did not contribute significantly to the model (2
= 2.546, p = .280). The classification table, which is presented in Table 16c, indicates that this
model also correctly classified 57.5% of the verdicts. According to the model, in the comparison
between study participants who found the defendant NGRI and those who found the defendant
guilty, there was a negative relationship between condemnation and the odds of obtaining an
NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase on the condemnation scale, the likelihood of
obtaining a guilty verdict (as opposed to an NGRI verdict) increased by 12.4%. However, in this
model, condemnation did not have a statistically significant relationship with the odds that a
participant would return a GBMI verdict as opposed to a guilty verdict (see Table 16d).
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Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 7 8 0 46.7
GBMI 3 32 3 84.2
Guilty 0 17 3 15.0
Total Percentage
Correct 57.5
Table 16d. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–PTSD (Condemnation+Attitudes
Model-NGRI vs. Guilty and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept 15.191 4.419 11.817 1 .001 --
condemnation -.132 .036 13.557 1 .001 .876




intercept 5.761 2.730 4.452 1 .035 --
condemnation -.042 .022 3.555 1 .059 .959
attitudes -.021 .035 .337 1 .561 .980
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .337; Nagelkerke = .388
A model that included all three predictors also provided a good fit to the data (model 2 =
76.123, p < .001) and correctly classified 72.6% of the cases in the post traumatic stress disorder
condition (see Table 16e). Likelihood ratio tests indicate the existence of a relationship between
condemnation and verdicts (2 = 10.123, p = .006) and between constructs and verdicts (2 =
46.093, p < .001), but not between attitudes and verdicts (2 = 4.086, p = .130). The model
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indicatesthat for the comparison between participants who returned NGRI verdicts and those
who returned guilty verdicts, there was a negative relationship between condemnation and the
odds of obtaining an NGRI verdict, such that for each point increase on the condemnation scale,
the odds of obtaining a guilty verdict increased by 10.4% (see Table 16f). There was also a
positive relationship between construct scores and the odds of obtaining an NGRI verdict, such
that for each point increase on the combined construct scale, the odds of obtaining an NGRI
verdict increased by 40.6%. For the comparison between participants who returned GBMI
verdicts and those who returned guilty verdicts, there was a positive relationship between
construct scores and the odds of obtaining a GBMI verdict, such that for each point increase in
the construct scale, the odds of returning a GBMI verdict increased by 32.1%. Condemnation did
not have a significant relationship with the odds that a participant would return a GBMI verdict
as opposed to a guilty verdict.
Table 16e. Classification Table for NGRI vs. GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts–PTSD (Full Model)
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies NGRI GBMI Guilty
Percentage
Correct
NGRI 7 8 0 46.7
GBMI 5 30 3 78.9




Table16f. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis–PTSD (Full Model-NGRI vs. Guilty
and GBMI vs. Guilty Verdicts)




intercept -16.627 8.984 3.425 1 .064 --
condemnation -.109 .047 5.419 1 .020 .896
attitudes .045 .073 .383 1 .536 1.046




intercept -20.643 7.822 6.965 1 .008 --
condemnation -.024 .038 .403 1 .526 .976
attitudes .097 .061 2.563 1 .109 1.102
constructs .278 .082 11.537 1 .001 1.321
Pseudo R2: Cox and Snell = .648; Nagelkerke = .744
4. Discussion
As hypothesized, the condemnation scale is a reliable measure of feelings of resentment
and judgments of disapproval directed toward actors who violate institutional proscriptions.
Also as hypothesized, condemnation scores differed significantly across diagnoses. It is
noteworthy that diagnoses that seem merely to reflect criminal behavior–i.e., antisocial
personality disorder and intermittent explosive disorder–were associated with the highest
condemnation scores, along with defendants diagnosed with voluntary alcohol intoxication. It is
also noteworthy that the lowest condemnation scores were associated with defendants who
committed their offenses involuntarily (i.e., during an epileptic seizure). The findings provide
reason to believe that the condemnation scale scores correlate with judgments about actors’
capacities for criminal responsibility, which would be expected given Schopp’s (1993)
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discussionof the interrelationship between actor condemnation and the capacity for criminal
responsibility.
The hypothesis that higher condemnation scores would be associated with more severe
institutionally proscribed acts was also confirmed, as was the hypothesis that the introduction of
the GBMI verdict option would not significantly affect condemnation scores. A relationship
between condemnation scores and GBMI verdicts did emerge in certain logistic regression
models, and these findings will be discussed below.
It was hypothesized that a significant relationship between condemnation scores and
verdicts would emerge across all cases regardless of the defendant’s diagnosis, such that lower
condemnation scores would be associated with NGRI verdicts and higher condemnation scores
would be associated with guilty verdicts. This hypothesis was not fully supported. When
condemnation was entered as a single predictor in binary and multinomial logistic regression
models, a significant relationship between condemnation and NGRI vs. guilty decisions was
found in all but three cases. Specifically, when participants were not given the GBMI verdict
option, binary logistic regression models for defendants diagnoses with antisocial personality
disorder, alcohol intoxication, and intermittent explosive disorder did not reveal a significant
relationship between condemnation scores and verdict choices. There are at least two plausible
explanations for this unexpected finding, however. First, as Table 2 reflects, these three
conditions were associated with the least variability in verdicts. Because of the small number of
NGRI verdicts in these conditions, it was difficult for any model to improve upon the
classification accuracy of the constant only model. Second, it should be noted that these three
conditions were associated with the highest condemnation scores (see Figure 1). The high
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frequencyof guilty verdicts observed in cases where the defendants were diagnosed with
antisocial personality disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and alcohol intoxication, coupled
with the finding that defendants with these diagnoses were assigned condemnation scores that
were significantly higher than those assigned to defendants with other diagnoses, suggests that
the hypothesized relationship may in fact exist, though it is not registered in the logistic
regression analyses.
The fourth main hypothesis was that the insanity defense attitude measure would not
contribute independently to classification models that also include condemnation. As noted
previously, this hypothesis was based on an observation that, although attitudes toward the
insanity defense have been shown to be highly predictive of verdicts in previous studies–indeed,
they were found to overwhelm prototypes in the study conducted by Louden and Skeem
(2007)–it appears that the most predictive factors incorporated into insanity defense attitude
measures actually measure something akin to condemnation. This hypothesis was nearly, though
not entirely, supported. Whenever condemnation and insanity defense attitudes were entered into
logistic regression models together (without any additional variables), there were no instances
where insanity defense attitudes maintained a unique association with verdicts while
condemnation did not. Moreover, in all but two cases, whenever the two-variable models
including condemnation and insanity defense attitudes related significantly to verdicts, the
insanity defense measure ceased to maintain an independent relationship with verdicts. The two
exceptions may be found in Tables 6d and 8d. Note that in these two instances, condemnation
did not cease to maintain an independent relationship with verdicts; however, because the
insanity defense attitude measure did maintain an independent predictive relationship with
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verdictsin these two instances, the hypothesis was not fully supported. It is also important to
recognize that the condemnation scale was found to be a considerably more reliable instrument
than the attitudes scale. It is possible that a more reliable measure of insanity defense attitudes
would maintain an independent predictive relationship with verdicts in a model that includes the
condemnation scale. This seems unlikely, however, given that the condemnation measure
assesses feelings of resentment and judgments of disapproval directed toward specific
hypothetical defendants, while the attitude measure focuses on attitudes about the insanity
defense generally, not about its application in each hypothetical defendant’s specific case.
The final hypothesis was that in the three-verdict option condition, condemnation scores
can be used to distinguish NGRI verdicts from guilty verdicts, but they would not serve to
distinguish GBMI from guilty verdicts. The basis for this hypothesis is that defendants found to
be GBMI are convicted; in other words, they do not lack criminal responsibility, and they are
subject to punishment just as are defendants who are found to be guilty. Because the
condemnation scale is designed to distinguish actors toward whom expressions of condemnation
are directed from those who are not condemned, the scale should not be expected to distinguish
between guilty and GBMI verdict selections. As noted above, however, this hypothesis
conflicted with previous findings suggesting that jurors view the GBMI verdict option as a sort of
“compromise verdict” that reflects some diminishment of criminal responsibility (e.g., Poulson et
al., 1997).
The hypothesis was untestable in the three-verdict option/epilepsy diagnosis condition
due to the extremely low frequency of guilty verdicts. In the remaining six diagnosis conditions,
the hypothesis was supported in only two instances. In single-predictor models that included
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onlycondemnation, condemnation maintained no statistically significant relationship with GBMI
vs. Guilty verdict selections when the defendants were diagnosed with alcohol intoxication or
paranoid schizophrenia with hallucinations (see Tables 13b & 15b). However, when the
defendants were diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, intermittent explosive disorder,
paranoid schizophrenia with delusions, or post traumatic stress disorder, single-predictor models
based on condemnation scores were predictive of verdict decisions when participants chose
between GBMI or guilty verdicts. This finding suggests that participants may in fact use the
GBMI verdict option to reflect “diminished guilt” in some way, which could call into question
the participant’s understanding of the retributive requirement of accountability that, according to
the normative framework, is a necessary precondition to just punishment. Alternately, however,
it may be that the participants viewed the defendants’ mental illnesses in these conditions as
affecting the defendants’ blameworthiness in general as opposed to their criminal responsibility,
and it may be that the condemnation scale is sensitive to that judgment of blameworthiness. Put
another way, the defendants’ mental illnesses might have been viewed as a factor that does not
undermine criminal responsibility, but ought to be taken into account at sentencing. If this is so,
the participants’ use of the GBMI verdict option is not necessarily in tension with the normative
framework underlying the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the current findings suggest
that mock jurors’ use of the GBMI verdict option merits further study.
The predictive utility of the combined construct scale was unexpected, mainly because
the seven individual construct scales were joined to form the combined scale out of necessity
during the course of analysis. This scale, which has its roots in the work of Finkel and Handel
(1989), seems to be quite predictive of verdicts in insanity cases. It is possible, however, that the
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scale’spower results merely from mathematical distortion. This possibility is suggested by the
fact that in all diagnosis conditions, principle component analysis failed to yield a seven-factor
solution. In other words, it does not seem that the combined scale truly measures seven
independent constructs. In any event, the construct scales certainly merit further study.
B. Study Two: Condemnation and Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Decisions
1. Purpose
Study Two applied the condemnation construct developed by Pearce (1999) in the context
of juvenile court jurisdiction decisions. The predictive utility of the scale was assessed in a range
of cases; specifically, the severity of the juvenile’s offense and the presence of premeditation was
manipulated in order to vary the apparent dangerousness of hypothetical young offenders–which,
according to previous research, is one of the most important evaluation criteria used by
psychologists to develop jurisdiction recommendations (e.g., Kruh & Brodsky, 1997; Salekin et
al., 2001). In addition, participants were asked to rate the importance of several factors that may
have influenced their decision-making, such as their judgments about the offender’s maturity, his
rehabilitative potential, and the need to protect the public.
It was hypothesized that, once again, the construct developed by Pearce (1999) would
prove to be a reliable measure of the condemnation that decision-makers assign to hypothetical
juvenile offenders. Because research has shown that offense severity and premeditation are
associated with recommendations to transfer juveniles to criminal court (e.g., Salekin et al.,
2001), condemnation scores were expected to be significantly higher when the youth’s offense
was relatively severe and when the youth’s offense was premeditated. Further, it was
hypothesized that there would be a significant interaction between the severity and premeditation
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manipulations. It was also hypothesized that a significant relationship between condemnation
and charging decisions would emerge, such that higher condemnation scores would be associated
with decisions to charge youths in criminal court. This hypothesis stems from Feinberg’s
(1995a) core theory that condemnation defines criminal punishment and from the basic
jurisprudential notion (argued above) that the juvenile justice system is the appropriate institution
to address cases involving youths who seem to be less responsible for their institutional
violations than adults. Finally, analyses would be conducted to determine which factors are seen
by decision-makers to be most important to their charging decisions.
2. Methods
To assess the relationship between condemnation and charging decisions involving
youthful offenders, participants received a small packet of materials that included a hypothetical
case scenario, a condemnation scale, and a number of additional dependent measures.
a. Participants
Participants were 235 attorneys who volunteered to participate in the study. The
participants were each experienced with juvenile court jurisdiction cases (mean = 73 cases;
median = 15 cases), and at the time of their participation in the study, they practiced law in one
of fourteen states that used the concurrent jurisdiction model of juvenile justice (wherein the
prosecuting attorney determines whether to charge a youth in juvenile or criminal court). Ninety
of the participants described their profession as “defense attorney,” 134 participants described
their profession as “prosecuting attorney,” five described their profession as “judge,” and 6 failed
to indicate their profession. The majority of the participants were male (65.5%).
b. Procedure
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Internetsearches were conducted to generate a list of defense attorneys with juvenile
court experience in the targeted jurisdictions. The experimental materials were mailed to
approximately 560 defense attorneys and were followed by email or telephone contacts to
encourage participation. The 90 defense attorneys who returned completed materials represented
a 16.1% response rate.
The experimental materials were also mailed to approximately 440 prosecutors whose
contact information appeared in the National Directory of Prosecuting Attorneys (National
District Attorneys Association, 2000). The 134 prosecutors who returned completed materials
represented a 30.5% response rate.
Although no special effort was made to solicit participation from judges, five of the
participants indicated that they were currently on the bench. Overall, the response rate for
participants who indicated their profession was 22.9%.
c. Materials
Each participant received one of four hypothetical case vignettes describing an assault
committed by a juvenile. The vignettes varied in terms of the seriousness of the assault
perpetrated by the juvenile: In one condition, the juvenile struck his victim on the back of the
neck and on the head with a pipe before taking his wallet, and the victim required six weeks of
hospitalization and rehabilitation to recover from his injuries (Severe). In the other condition, the
juvenile struck his victim once on the knees with a pipe before taking his wallet; participants
were not told that the victim required any hospitalization for his injuries (Less Severe). The
vignettes also varied in terms of the extent of the youth’s premeditation: In one condition, the
youth committed an opportunistic assault upon only a moment’s reflection (No Premeditation),
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whilein the other condition, the juvenile had been searching for someone to rob at the time of the
assault (Premeditation). The vignettes were designed such that all four hypothetical youths
would be eligible to proceed to trial as an adult or for adjudication as a juvenile in each of the
surveyed states. Each of the four hypothetical cases is reproduced in Appendix H.
The participants were asked to read the assigned vignette and decide whether the youth
ought to be tried in juvenile court or criminal court. Participants also indicated whether the youth
ought to be detained or returned to the community and responded to a number of questions about
the youth and his offense. In addition, the participants were asked to weigh the importance of
nine factors that might have influenced their “charging” decision. The factors, which are listed
(along with all of the other dependent measures) in Appendix I, are based on the items that
appeared in the policy memorandum cited in Kent v. United States (1966):
1. The fact that the offense was against a person or property
2. The seriousness of the offense committed by the juvenile
3. The severity of the harm caused by the juvenile
4. Whether the offense was premeditated or not
5. The number of prior offenses on the juvenile’s record
6. The aggressiveness of the juvenile’s offense
7. The violence of the juvenile’s offense
8. The maturity of the juvenile
9. The juvenile’s rehabilitation probability
Participants were asked to rate the influence that of each of the foregoing factors had on their
jurisdiction determination using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Non-Influential” to
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29Theseitems appear as the last twenty-seven items on the last two pages of Appendix I,
beginning with the item, “I feel hatred toward the juvenile because of what he did,” and ending
with the item, “It is more important that society’s disapproval towards the juvenile finds
expression than it is for the juvenile to avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction.”
“Very Influential.”
Each participant also completed a condemnation scale. Originally, the scale included 27
items designed to measure the degree of resentment and disapproval that were directed toward
the hypothetical juvenile by the participant.29 After conducting a reliability analysis and
principal components factor analysis of the items, however, it was determined that only 14 of the
items would be included in the condemnation scale for purposes of the study. The included
items were as follows:
1. I feel hatred towards the juvenile because of what he did
2. I feel contempt towards the juvenile
3. I feel anger towards the juvenile
4. I feel resentment towards the juvenile
5. I would like to see a vengeful response towards the juvenile because of
what he did
6. It is important that the juvenile is not punished too severely
7. It does not seem appropriate to want revenge against this juvenile
8. Members of society or the public in general probably feels hatred towards
this juvenile
9. The juvenile should be sent to prison because society needs to express its
disapproval towards him
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10. Thelaw cannot punish the juvenile enough for what he did
11. The juvenile should be sent to prison because society needs to express its
desire for revenge towards him (if any)
12. If society fails to punish the juvenile by sending him to prison, it would be
as if society approves of what he did
13. Sending the juvenile to a state school is not really punishment
14. It is more important that society’s disapproval towards the juvenile finds
expression than it is for the juvenile to avoid the stigma of a criminal
conviction
Each item was rated on a seven-point Likert scale with labels ranging from “completely disagree”
to “completely agree.” The responses were recoded when necessary so that higher scores would
reflect more intense expressions of condemnation. The reliability of the scale was good ( =
.794).
3. Results
To explore the relationship between offense severity, premeditation, charging decisions,
and condemnation, a 2 (high/low offense severity) by 2 (presence/absence of premeditation)
between-groups design was used. Condemnation scores under the four conditions of the study
are summarized in Table 17. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no interaction between
offense severity and premeditation as they relate to condemnation scores (F(1, 205) = 0.01, p =
.984). Nor was there a main effect for severity (F(1, 205) = 3.315, p = .078) or for premeditation
(F(1, 205) = 3.287, p = .071). Checks of the severity manipulation revealed that although most
participants found that the offense was relatively serious (M = 6.0, SD = 0.86) and that the harm
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causedby the youth was relatively severe (M = 5.4, SD = 1.15), participants in the Less Severe
condition found that the offense was significantly less serious (M = 5.84, SD = 0.93) than did
participants in the Severe condition (M = 6.17, SD = 0.75) (F(1, 231) = 8.681, p = .004, MSE =
.716). Similarly, participants in the Less Severe condition found that the harm caused by the
youth was less severe (M = 4.88, SD = 1.17) than did participants in the Severe condition (M =
5.91, SD = 0.86) (F(1, 229) = 57.329, p < .001, MSE = 1.055). However, while 99% of the
respondents who received the “Premeditation” scenario reported that the offense was
premeditated, 63.5% of the respondents who received the “No Premeditation” scenario reported
that the offense was premeditated. Thus, there is reason to suspect that the failure to obtain a
significant main effect for premeditation may be attributable to the weakness of the
manipulation.
Table 17. Condemnation Score Means for Study Two
No Premeditation Premeditation
Less Severe 33.93 37.02
Severe 36.95 40.11
Note: No statistically significant differences appear among the means
A binary logistic regression analysis was performed to determine whether condemnation
scores were predictive of charging decisions. When all participants and conditions were
combined for analysis, 135 participants concluded that the youth should be tried in juvenile
court, and 69 concluded that the youth should be tried in criminal court. Thus, a constant-only
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model(i.e., predicting that the youth would be tried in juvenile court in call instances) correctly
classifies 66.2% of the charging decisions. Condemnation scores fit the data better than the
constant-only model (2 = 22.87, p < .001) and correctly classified 69.6% of the charging
decisions (see Table 18a). Condemnation scores were positively related to the odds of a criminal
court charging decision, such that for each single point increase on the condemnation scale, the
odds that the juvenile would be tried as an adult increase by 6.1% (see Table 18b).




Frequencies Juvenile Criminal Percentage Correct
Juvenile 123 12 91.1
Criminal 50 19 27.5
Total Percentage
Correct 69.6
Table 18b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Charging Decisions (All Participants)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .059 .013 19.621 1 .001 1.061
constant -2.924 .539 29.452 1 .001 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .106; Nagelkerke R2 = .147
The analysis was repeated using the responses from prosecutors only. Fifty three of the
prosecutors concluded that the youth should be tried in juvenile court, and 57 concluded that the
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youthshould be tried as an adult. Therefore, a constant-only model can correctly classify 51.8%
of the charging decisions. Logistic regression analysis indicates that condemnation scores are
predictive of prosecutors’ charging decisions (2 = 9.115, p = .003) and can correctly classify
62.7% of the decisions (see Table 19a). According to the model, which is summarized in Table
19b, condemnation scores are positively related to the odds that a prosecutor would charge the
youth in criminal court, such that for each point increase on the condemnation scale, the odds of
obtaining a criminal court charging decision increase by 5.5%.
Table 19a. Classification Table for Charging Decisions (Prosecutors)-Condemnation Model
Predicted Frequencies
Observed
Frequencies Juvenile Criminal Percentage Correct
Juvenile 34 19 64.2
Criminal 22 35 61.4
Total Percentage
Correct 62.7
Table 19b. Binary Logistic Regression Analysis–Charging Decisions (Prosecutors)
Predictor  S.E.  Wald’s 2 df p e (odds ratio)
condemnation .054 .019 7.78 1 .005 1.055
constant -1.986 .755 6.912 1 .009 --
Cox and Snell R2 = .080; Nagelkerke R2 = .106
To determine whether participants found any of the nine “Kent” factors to be more
influential to their decisions than others, a nine-factor dependent groups ANOVA was
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performed. The mean influence ratings for each of the nine factors are set forth in Table 20.
Table 20. Kent Factor Means and Standard Deviations
Factor Mean Standard Deviation
Person vs. Property Offense 6.135a,b 1.137
Seriousness of Offense 6.230a .9448
Severity of Harm 5.780c 1.277
Premeditation 5.394 1.495
Prior Offense Record 4.890d 1.878
Aggressiveness of Offense 5.910b,c 1.060
Violence of Offense 6.140a 1.017
Maturity of Juvenile 5.010d 1.592
Rehabilitation Potential 4.894d 7.737
Note: Means marked with the same superscript are not significantly different (LSD minimum
mean difference = 0.243, p = .05).
There was a significant difference among the influence ratings for the various factors
(F(8, 1768) = 40.41, p < .001, MSE = 1.72). Pairwise comparisons using LSD with a minimum
mean difference of 0.243 revealed that in this particular study, the three most influential factors
in charging decisions were the fact that the offense was against a person rather than property, the
seriousness of the offense, and the violence of the offense. The aggressiveness of the offense and
the severity of the harm were the next most influential factors. Premeditation was the sixth most
influential factor. The maturity of the juvenile, the juvenile’s rehabilitative potential, and prior
offense record were rated as the least influential factors in the charging decision.
4. Discussion
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InStudy Two, the condemnation scale was again found to be a reliable measure of
feelings of retribution and judgments of disapproval expressed toward hypothetical actors. The
lack of a statistically significant relationship between condemnation scores and offense severity
and between condemnation scores and premeditation was unexpected; however, it may well be
that the severity and premeditation manipulations were simply too week to adequately test the
hypothesis. The manipulation check for premeditation supports this notion, and although the
manipulation checks for severity indicate that participants were sensitive to the manipulation, it
is noteworthy that the “Less Severe” condition included no information about the victim’s need
for treatment or rehabilitation due to his injuries, while the “Severe” condition included specific
information on this point. This confound may have interfered with the intended manipulation by
leaving participants in the “Less Severe” condition with less information upon which to base
their judgments than participants in the other condition. It is also noteworthy that the main
effects for severity and premeditation approached statistical significance, and were in the
hypothesized direction. Further research is necessary before one can confidently claim that
condemnation scores are not sensitive to manipulations of severity and premeditation in juvenile
justice charging decisions.
The hypothesis that condemnation scores would relate positively to decisions to charge
the hypothetical youths in criminal court was supported. In particular, a predictive model based
on condemnation appears to significantly improve classification accuracy over a constant-only
model when prosecutors’ charging decisions are analyzed.
Finally, it is noteworthy that assessments about the youth’s maturity were rated among the
least influential factors when participants made charging decisions in this study, while offense
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seriousnessand offense violence, along with the fact that the offense was perpetrated against a
person rather than property, were rated to be most influential. This finding is consistent with
Gardner’s observation that “[w]aiver [to criminal court] is generally reserved for those youths
whose highly visible, serious, or repetitive criminality raises legitimate concern for . . .
community outrage” (1997, p. 182 n.18). However, to the extent that “maturity” is understood to
relate to the development of the capacity for criminal responsibility, its relative lack of influence
in charging decisions suggests that further research should be conducted to determine whether
charging decisions are made in a manner that frustrates the basic functions of the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. As argued previously, the normative framework underlying the
criminal justice system suggests that the development of the capacity for criminal responsibility
should be a central factor in charging decisions. If it is not, charging decisions may lead to one
of two undesirable results: First, criminally responsible actors may be adjudicated as juveniles
when they are eligible for the benefits (including the right to a jury trial and, perhaps, less severe
punishment) and burdens (including, perhaps, harder treatment and undesirable collateral
consequences) that flow from the criminal justice system. Alternately, and actors who lack the
capacity for criminal responsibility may be tried in the adversarial criminal justice system, which
presumes accountability (and places upon the defendant the burden of establishing its absence).
Although the present study does not establish that the participants’ charging decisions conflict
with the normative framework underlying the criminal justice system, the results do suggest that
a more thorough inquiry may be in order.
C. Conclusion
Condemnation is a key component of generally accepted jurisprudential theories about
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thedefinition of punishment, and it arguably provides a useful normative framework for the
study of the distinction between the deprivations of liberty that flow from criminal and civil
institutions. Moreover, this condemnation framework enables one to consider whether legal
institutions function in a manner that coheres with their justificatory foundations. This
dissertation illustrates that the prescriptive concept of condemnation can be translated into a
predictive concept that facilitates the empirical study of the distinction between sanctions that
flow from criminal and civil institutions. In other words, a normative concept that provides a
framework for analyzing whether punishment is justly imposed has been used to develop
empirical constructs that appear to predict instances when punishment is in fact imposed.
It should be understood that the empirical condemnation scale developed in these studies
does not purport to “measure” the normative concept of condemnation. Feinberg’s (1995a) and
Schopp’s (1993) argument that condemnation is part of the core meaning of punishment is based
on a conceptual analysis, and empirical findings that decision-makers judgments about the
appropriateness of punishment are associated with expressions of “retributive revenge” do not
insulate the conceptual analysis from criticism based on logical counterarguments or
counterexamples. Conversely, if empirical research were to reveal that actual decisions to punish
are not associated with expressions of condemnation, it would not necessarily follow that there
should not be any such association. Nor would it necessarily follow that the conceptual analysis
is lacking in merit.
Despite the fundamental distinction between the normative and empirical concepts of
condemnation, the empirical concept has been designed to be as consistent as possible with the
underlying normative framework. This correspondence provides at least two advantages that are
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manifestedin the present studies–assuming one accepts Feinberg’s (1995a) core condemnation
theory. The first advantage is versatility. Because the normative concept of condemnation
arguably helps to define just punishment in a broad, general sense, one would expect that an
empirical measure of condemnation might predict actual impositions of punishment in a wide
variety of contexts. The studies presented here illustrate that the empirical condemnation
construct has predictive utility in two contexts, but future research might explore whether this
refined condemnation instrument is predictive in still others. For example, studies could be
designed to test whether the empirical condemnation construct can predict judgments involving
the imposition of fines or decisions to refer a defendant to a pretrial diversion program in lieu of
criminal proceedings. Also, because juvenile court dispositions may be punitive or nonpunitive,
one might investigate whether condemnation can serve to distinguish various types of
dispositions that flow from a single juvenile court.
Although the condemnation scales used in the reported studies focus on expressions of
condemnation toward hypothetical defendants (i.e., actor condemnation), one might design new
scales to assess expressions of institutional, general act, and specific act condemnation.
Programs of research that expand into these areas might lead to interesting findings concerning
the correspondence (or lack thereof) between conventional notions of justice, fairness, or
criminal conduct on the one hand and the criminal justice system on the other. General and
specific act condemnation might also provide a new framework for studying jury nullification. In
addition, Schopp’s (1993) condemnation framework addresses a fifth type of condemnation that
concerns actors’ blameworthiness–which might provide a starting point for extending
condemnation to the study of sentencing decisions. In short, Feinberg’s (1995a) and Schopp’s
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(1993)well-developed condemnation framework may provide conceptual fodder for a wide range
of empirical studies addressing a variety of punishment-related judgments.
The second advantage that flows from the correspondence between the empirical
condemnation construct and the conceptual condemnation theory relates to research implications
and calls for reform. The present studies indicate that the empirical condemnation measure can
be used not only to predict decisions to impose punishment, but can also help identify
discrepancies between actual expressions of condemnation and justified expressions of
condemnation. In this fashion, the condemnation measure can call attention to issues that require
further study, or perhaps even frame well-founded arguments for changes in the law. For
example, in Study One it was found that condemnation scores can, in some cases, distinguish
guilty verdicts from “guilty but mentally ill” verdicts. This finding seems consistent with
arguments that the GBMI verdict option is used inappropriately to punish persons who lack the
capacity for criminal responsibility. Put differently, this particular aspect of Study One provides
reason to believe that decision-makers might not expect that GBMI verdicts will lead to the same
punitive dispositions that flow from ordinary “guilty” verdicts, which suggests in turn that new
studies should be conducted to determine whether decision-makers are applying the GBMI
option in a manner that departs from the justificatory framework of the criminal justice system.
Conversely, the results of the present studies largely indicate that actual decisions to
punish are consistent with the justificatory and conceptual principles that underlie the criminal
justice system, even in difficult cases that probe the areas of overlap between the criminal justice
system and other social institutions (i.e., civil commitment and the juvenile justice system).
Legal policymakers may be interested to know that legal institutions seem to function as they are
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intended.
The current studies have important implications not only for legal practitioners, but also
psychological researchers. Most basically, the studies suggest that verdicts in insanity cases and
charging decisions affecting juveniles are associated with feelings of vengefulness and rational,
disapproving judgment that, when combined, may be defined as “condemnation” or “retributive
revenge.” Moreover, expressions of this condemnation seem to increase in intensity when
decision-makers decide that a particular defendant is appropriately dealt with through the
criminal justice system. Even if one utterly rejects the normative condemnation framework as a
means of distinguishing punishment from noncriminal sanctions, the empirical findings
concerning the relationship between condemnation preferences for criminal treatment are
consistent and relatively strong, and they represent a new factor that should be used to model
judgments regarding punishment.
Study One suggests that previous findings concerning the relationship between insanity
defense attitudes and verdicts in insanity cases may be attributable to researchers’ conflation of
attitudes and culpability judgments. The implications of this finding are significant, particularly
given insanity defense attitudes’ twenty-year reign as a powerful predictor of judgments in
insanity cases. Study Two is significant not only insofar as it reaffirms the predictive utility of
condemnation in a context wholly separate from insanity cases, but also insofar as it reports the
factors that prosecutors view as most important to their charging decisions in juvenile cases.
Future research might explore whether decision-makers prioritize different factors in different
types of cases.
There are, of course, significant limitations in the studies presented here. Although
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StudiesOne and Two show that condemnation can be measured reliably, and even though the
condemnation scales used in these studies overlap considerably, no single, “universal”
condemnation scale has yet been developed. Additional work must be performed to refine the
scale and examine its psychometric properties so that the scale may be applied in various
contexts with minimal adaptation. The effects of the combined “construct scales” in the logistic
regression models reported in Study One call out for a detailed investigation. In addition, the
variables of interest seem not to have been manipulated effectively in Study Two, which suggests
that further research is needed to explore the relationship between condemnation and charging
decisions involving juveniles. Also, more realistic stimulus materials and more sophisticated
designs may lead to results that differ significantly from those obtained here. Nevertheless, these
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APPENDIXA (Hypothetical Cases Involving Assaults)
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(Hypothetical1 - Epilepsy)
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Henry Grant, has been charged with assaulting
a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the criminal trial.
Henry Grant is an auto mechanic. One evening several months ago, Henry stopped at the
local grocery store to pick up some hamburger buns and a mop. David, a twelve year old boy
who was out shopping for groceries with his mother, as standing in line behind Henry. Suddenly,
Henry began to shake violently. He appeared to be suffering from an epileptic seizure. Henry
began to swing the mop around violently. Henry shouted something that no one could quite
understand, just before he struck David in the head with the mop. He then pushed the boy to the
ground. As he was restrained by the store’s security officer, Henry settled down. He was
arrested approximately half an hour later by police. David suffered only minor physical injuries
as a result of the assault.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Henry should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed psychiatrist testified that
Henry had a Personality Change due to epilepsy at the time of the incident, which is a mental
disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume IV. The
psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was related to
Henry’s assault upon the boy. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder, Henry could
not appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he assaulted
David, and therefore Henry should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that Henry should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Henry has a mental disorder that is related to his
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assaultupon David, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
assault and he should therefore be found guilty.
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(Hypothetical2 - Alcohol Intoxication)
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Gary Driver, has been charged with assaulting
a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the criminal trial.
Gary Driver is a groundskeeper at the university. One evening several months ago, Gary
was at a bar having drinks. Gary lived close to the bar and decided to walk home, as he usually
does. Meanwhile, Douglas, a twelve year old boy who lived a few blocks from Gary, was
outside playing with a basketball in his front driveway. Gary staggered up to the driveway where
Douglas was playing. Gary picked up a trashcan lid on a can near the driveway and walked over
to where Douglas was standing. Gary struck Douglas in the head with the lid. He shouted,
“Let’s play frisbee for a while!” and pushed Douglas to the ground. Gary then continued home
and quickly fell asleep. He was arrested at home a half hour later. Douglas suffered only minor
physical injuries as a result of the assault.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Gary should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed psychiatrist testified that
Gary had Alcohol Intoxication Delirium at the time of the incident, which is a mental disorder
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume IV. The
psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was related to
Gary’s assault upon the boy. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder, Gary could not
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he assaulted Douglas,
and therefore Gary should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that Gary should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Gary has a mental disorder that is related to his
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assaultupon Douglas, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
assault and he should therefore be found guilty.
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(Hypothetical3 - Paranoid Schizophrenia (delusion))
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, John Hanks, has been charged with assaulting
a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the criminal trial.
John Hanks is a taxi driver. One evening several months ago, John was driving through a
residential neighborhood to pick up a fare. Meanwhile, Jimmy, a twelve year old boy who lived
in that neighborhood, was walking home from a friend’s house. John’s cab passed Jimmy on the
sidewalk. Suddenly John stopped the cab, jumped out, and ran over to where Jimmy was
walking. John shouted, “I have got you now, Catwoman!” and punched Jimmy in the head. John
then pushed Jimmy to the ground, shouted “to the Batmobile!” and ran back to the cab. John
drove off, and was arrested at home after he got off work. Jimmy suffered only minor physical
injuries as a result of the assault.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that John should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed psychiatrist testified that
John had Paranoid Schizophrenia at the time of the incident, which is a mental disorder listed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume IV. The psychiatrist
testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was related to John’s assault
upon the boy. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder, John could not appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he assaulted Jimmy, and therefore
John should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that John should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if John has a mental disorder that is related to his
assault upon Jimmy, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
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assaultand he should therefore be found guilty.
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(Hypothetical4 - PTSD)
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Joseph Kraft, has been charged with assaulting
a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the criminal trial.
Joseph Kraft is a young middle school teacher. One afternoon several months ago,
Joseph was working after school grading his class’s papers. Meanwhile, Thomas, a twelve year
old boy who was a student in his class, returned to the classroom to retrieve a scarf he had left
under his desk earlier that day. Joseph was facing away from the door, and Thomas walked up
behind him, placing a hand on his shoulder to get his attention. Suddenly Joseph jumped up and
swung around. He shouted, “Don’t touch me you bastard!” and punched Thomas in the head.
Joseph then pushed Thomas to the ground and ran out of the classroom. Thomas suffered only
minor physical injuries as a result of the assault.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Joseph
should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” Joseph was allegedly physically abused
by his father for his whole life. The court appointed psychiatrist testified that Joseph had
Battered Child Syndrome and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder at the time of the incident, which is
a mental disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume
IV. The psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was
related to Joseph’s assault upon the boy. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder,
Joseph could not appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he
assaulted Thomas, and therefore Joseph should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
Joseph stated that he thought Thomas was his father.
In response to the defense’s claim that Joseph should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Joseph has a mental disorder that is related to his
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assaultupon Thomas, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
assault and he should therefore be found guilty.
215
(Hypothetical5 - Paranoid Schizophrenia (hallucinations))
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Father Morning, has been charged with
assaulting a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the
criminal trial.
Father Morning is a priest at St. Paul’s Catholic Church. One evening several months
ago, Father Morning was working in his office, writing his sermon for the following Sunday.
Meanwhile, Michael, a twelve year old altar boy at the church, was arranging hymnals in the
cathedral. Father Morning came out of his office and saw Michael working in the cathedral.
Father Morning suddenly grabbed a large, silver cross from the altar and rushed over to where
Michael was standing. Father Morning believed that Michael was being “possessed” by demons,
and he believed he saw demons flying in and out of Michael’s body. Father Morning then
shouted something in Latin, struck Michael in the head with the silver cross, and pushed the boy
to the ground. Father Morning then placed his hands on the boy, and shouted, “Begone, evil
spirits. I cast thee out, foul demons!” Two other altar boys restrained Father Morning until the
police arrived and arrested him. Michael suffered only minor physical injuries as a result of the
assault.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Father
Morning should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed
psychiatrist testified that Father Morning had Paranoid Schizophrenia at the time of the incident,
which is a mental disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Volume IV. The psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental
disorder was related to Father Morning’s assault upon the boy. The defense argued that due to
this mental disorder, Father Morning could not appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts at the time he assaulted Michael, and therefore Father Morning should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that Father Morning should be found “not responsible
by reason of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Father Morning has a mental disorder
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thatis related to his assault upon Michael, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions
when he committed the assault and he should therefore be found guilty.
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(Hypothetical6 - Antisocial Personality Disorder)
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Victor Schultz, has been charged with
assaulting a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the
criminal trial.
Victor is active in the American Neo-Nazi Party, and he has strong anti-Jewish
prejudices. Last fall, Victor’s ten year old daughter, Anna, went to the neighborhood block party
with some friends. Victor came to the block party sometime later. When Victor arrived at the
party, he saw his daughter dancing with Jerry, a twelve year old boy whom Victor knew to be
Jewish. Victor became extremely angry and rushed over to where his daughter and the boy were
dancing. Victor pulled his daughter away from Jerry and told her to go home. Victor then turned
back to Jerry and shouted at him to stay away from his daughter. At that moment, just as Jerry
began to back away, Victor shouted some anti-Jewish insults and struck Jerry in the head. Victor
then pushed Jerry to the ground and said, “Never come near my family again!” Victor then went
home, where he was arrested half an hour later. Jerry suffered only minor injuries as a result of
the attack.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Victor should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed psychiatrist testified that
Victor had Antisocial Personality Disorder at the time of the incident, which is a mental disorder
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume IV. The
psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was related to
Victor’s assault upon the boy. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder, Victor could
not appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he assaulted
Jerry, and therefore Victor should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that Victor should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Victor has a mental disorder that is related to his
assault upon Jerry, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
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assaultand he should therefore be found guilty.
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(Hypothetical7 - Intermittent Explosive Disorder)
You are a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Leroy Jones, has been charged with assaulting
a twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the criminal trial.
Leroy worked as a janitor at a local school. While working at the school, Leroy noticed
that Brian, a twelve year old student, stayed late after school on Tuesdays. Leroy discovered that
Brian had band practice on Tuesdays, and that Brian walked home from school alone on those
days. Leroy also observed the route that Brian used when walking home. On Tuesday,
November 3, 1998, Leroy took the afternoon off from work. He hid behind some bushes along
the sidewalk where Brian walked every Tuesday, and waited for Brian to come along. When
Brian passed by, Leroy jumped out from behind the bushes. Leroy struck Brian in the head and
pushed him to the ground. Leroy shouted at Brian, “I’ve got you now!” and then ran away.
Leroy was arrested at his home a half-hour later. Brian suffered only minor physical injuries as a
result of the attack.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Leroy should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed psychiatrist testified that
Leroy had Intermittent Explosive Disorder at the time of the incident, which is a mental disorder
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume IV. The
psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was related to
Leroy’s assault upon the boy. When Leroy gets stressed out, he feels like attacking people
weaker than himself. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder, Leroy could not
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he assaulted Brian,
and therefore Leroy should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that Leroy should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Leroy has a mental disorder that is related to his
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assaultupon Brian, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
assault and he should therefore be found guilty.
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APPENDIXB (Insanity Instruction-No GBMI Option)
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MARKYOUR VERDICT USING THE BUBBLES AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE.
The Judge has provided you with the following instructions to help you decide this case.
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the commission of
the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect,
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. Therefore, of you find by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(1) The defendant had a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the acts charged;
AND
(2) As a result of the severe mental disease or defect, the defendant was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts;
then you must find the defendant not responsible by reason of insanity. Otherwise, you must find
him guilty.
Please provide the following information by filling in the oval corresponding to your answer.
This is an example of a correct response: I live in Nebraska Yes  No 0
What is your verdict in this case?
0 Not responsible by reason of insanity
0 Guilty
223
APPENDIXC (Sample Hypothetical Case Involving Homicide)
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Youare a juror in a criminal trial. The defendant, Henry Grant, has been charged with killing a
twelve year old boy. These are the facts that were presented to you during the criminal trial.
Henry Grant is an auto mechanic. One evening several months ago, Henry stopped at the
local grocery store to pick up some hamburger buns and a mop. David, a twelve year old boy
who was out shopping for groceries with his mother, as standing in line behind Henry. Suddenly,
Henry began to shake violently. He appeared to be suffering from an epileptic seizure. Henry
began to swing the mop around violently. Henry shouted something that no one could quite
understand, just before he struck David in the head with the mop. He then pushed the boy to the
ground. As he was restrained by the store’s security officer, Henry settled down. He was
arrested approximately half an hour later by police. David suffered major physical injuries and
died as a result of the attack.
After the prosecuting attorney presented these facts, the defense argued that Henry should
be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.” The court appointed psychiatrist testified that
Henry had a Personality Change due to epilepsy at the time of the incident, which is a mental
disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Volume IV. The
psychiatrist testified that, judging from the facts of the case, this mental disorder was related to
Henry’s attack on the boy. The defense argued that due to this mental disorder, Henry could not
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts at the time he killed David, and
therefore Henry should be found “not responsible by reason of insanity.”
In response to the defense’s claim that Henry should be found “not responsible by reason
of insanity,” the prosecution argued that even if Henry has a mental disorder that is related to his
attack on David, he was able to appreciate the nature of his actions when he committed the
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murderand he should therefore be found guilty.
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APPENDIXD (Insanity Instruction with GBMI Option)
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MARKYOUR VERDICT USING THE BUBBLES AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE.
The Judge has provided you with the following instructions to help you decide this case.
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the commission of
the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect,
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. Therefore, of you find by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(1) The defendant had a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the acts charged;
AND
(2) As a result of the severe mental disease or defect, the defendant was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts;
then you must find the defendant not responsible by reason of insanity.
You may find the defendant “guilty but mentally ill” if you find the following beyond a
reasonable doubt:
(1) The defendant is guilty of an offense; AND
(2) The defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense; AND
(3) The defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
If you do not find the defendant not responsible by reason of insanity and you do not find that he
is guilty but mentally ill, then you must find him guilty.
Please provide the following information by filling in the oval corresponding to your answer.
This is an example of a correct response: I live in Nebraska Yes  No 0
What is your verdict in this case?
0 Not responsible by reason of insanity
0 Guilty but mentally ill
0 Guilty
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APPENDIXE (Modified Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale)
*Note: The materials presented in this appendix have been reformatted slightly for ease of
reference, but are identical in substance to the materials submitted to participants
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Pleaseprovide the following information by filling in the oval corresponding to your answer.
This is an example of a correct response: I live in Nebraska Yes  No 0
Gender:
0 Female Age:__________
0 Male Ethnicity: ________________
The following items use a rating scale. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the
statements:
Completely Disagree = 1, Strongly Disagree =2, Disagree =3, Neither Agree Nor Disagree =4,
Agree =5, Strongly Agree =6, Completely Agree =7.
1.The insanity defense should be abolished.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.The insanity defense needs a lot of
reform.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.The insanity defense is sometimes
justified.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4. The insane should be treated rather than
punished if they commit a crime.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5. Punishment just does not work on the
insane.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. The insanity plea is a loophole that
allows too many guilty people to go free.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. Even if people are insane, we should
punish them if they break the law.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8. The insanity defense sends a message to
criminals that they can get away with crime.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9. Judges and juries have a hard time telling
whether defendants are really sane or
insane.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10. If psychiatrists are paid enough, they
will say anything about a defendants sanity.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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11.The insanity plea is mainly a rich
persons defense.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12. Insane people should be punished for
their crimes just like everyone else.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13. The insanity defense allows dangerous
people out on the streets.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. The insanity defense is a necessary part
of our legal system.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15. It is wrong to punish insane people who
break the law.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16. Insane defendants are entitled to
treatment.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17. Im confident that people found Not
Guilty By Reason of Insanity are only
released when it is safe to do so.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18. Psychiatrists should testify about a
defendants mental condition in insanity
trials.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19. The insanity defense doesn’t affect the
crime rate.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20. Mental health facilities can be helpful
for patients with mental disorders.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21. Mental health facilities are a good place
to house dangerous people to keep them out
of society.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22. People who are sent to mental health
facilities instead of prisons are still being
punished.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23. People sent to mental health facilities
should not be thought of as criminals.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24. Commitment to a mental health facility
should not be viewed as punishment for
doing something against the law.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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25.Most people found Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity are really insane. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Please write in your answer to the following:
First of all, when defendants are charged with a crime, they can decide to plead Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity. Out of 100 defendants who are charged with crimes, how many do you think
plead Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity?
When defendants plead Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity at their trials, a judge or jury has to
decide whether or not the defendants are indeed Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity. Out of every
100 defendants who plead insanity, how many do you think are actually found Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity by judges or juries?
Out of every 100 defendants found Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, how many do you think go
free immediately?
How many do you think are sent to a mental hospital?
If defendants are sent to a mental hospital, how long do you think they stay there, on the average?
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APPENDIXF (Dependent Measures Presented to Participants)
*Note: The materials presented in this appendix have been reformatted slightly for ease of
reference, but are identical in substance to the materials submitted to participants
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[Note:Participants were asked to rate their agreement with the following statements using this
scale: Completely Disagree = 1, Strongly Disagree =2, Disagree =3, Neither Agree Nor Disagree
=4, Agree =5, Strongly Agree =6, Completely Agree =7.]
Henry Grant could not make rational
decisions at the time of the act
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant should not be held
responsible for his actions
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
At the time of the act, Henry Grant had no
awareness of what was going on
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant could not think clearly at the
time of the act
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant did not have the ability to
make responsible choices at the time of
the act
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
It seems that Henry Grant may have
planned his act ahead of time
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant does not seem blameworthy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
At the time of the act, Henry Grant could
perceive his surroundings accurately
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant could control himself at the
time of the act
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant should have known that he
was going to cause some harm
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant, and Henry Grant alone, is
responsible for what happened
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant was completely out of touch
with reality when he committed the act
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant did the act because of an
irresistible impulse that he could not
control
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
It is unlikely that Henry Grant really
wanted to hurt anybody
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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HenryGrant knew what he was doing at
the time of the act
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other people are partly responsible for
what happened
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant's mental impairment
influenced the verdict
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Considering all of the facts in the case,
Henry Grant's mental impairment was
very important in choosing the right
verdict
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant is less guilty because of his
mental impairment
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant would definitely be guilty of
committing the crime if he had no mental
impairment
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
If the same crime were committed by
someone without a mental impairment,
that person should be found guilty
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
If Henry Grant was impaired at the time
of the act, it was his own fault
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Just because Henry Grant was mentally
impaired does not mean that he is not
guilty by reason of insanity
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant's mental impairment makes
him not criminally responsible
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant is criminally responsible
even though he has a mental impairment
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant deserves to be punished
for what he did.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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HenryGrant should receive some sort
of psychological treatment in order to help
him with his mental disorder.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant should be sent to a
mental health facility of some kind, not to
prison.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant deserves to go to prison
for his actions.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
If Henry Grant serves a prison
sentence for his act, he will have paid his
debt to society.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I disapprove of Henry Grant. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I feel hatred toward Henry Grant. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I would like to see a vengeful response
towards Henry Grant.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
It is important that Henry Grant is not
punished too severely.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I would like to see Henry Grant get what he
deserves.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I feel contempt towards Henry Grant. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I feel sympathy for Henry Grant. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I forgive Henry Grant for his actions. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I feel anger towards Henry Grant. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I feel resentment towards Henry Grant. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I would like revenge against Henry Grant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
It doesn’t seem right to want revenge
against Henry Grant for what he did.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The law cannot punish Henry Grant
enough for what he did to the boy.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant’s condition is treatable. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Iam outraged at Henry Grant for his
actions.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant is dangerous to society. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Society should want revenge against
Henry Grant for his actions against the
boy.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Society in general probably feels hatred
towards Henry Grant.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Society in general probably feels sympathy
for Henry Grant.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Society should want to express its
disapproval of Henry Grant for his
actions against the boy.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sentencing Henry Grant to prison
would balance society’s need to express any
desire for revenge towards him with
rational, disapproving judgment.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sending Henry Grant to a mental
health facility would be more like
punishment for his actions than to help treat
any mental disorder.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
If Henry Grant were punished
appropriately under the law by being
sentenced to prison, it would satisfy any
desire for revenge I might feel towards
him.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
If Henry Grant were punished
appropriately under the law by being
sentenced to prison, it would satisfy any
disapproval I may have towards him.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sending Henry Grant to a mental
hospital for treatment instead of to prison
would satisfy any desire for revenge I may
have towards him.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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SendingHenry Grant to a mental
hospital for treatment instead of to prison
would satisfy any disapproval I may have
towards him.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Society should want to express its
disapproval of Henry Grant for his actions.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant should be sent to prison
because society needs to express its
disapproval towards him.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Grant should be sent to prison
because society needs to express its desire
for revenge towards him.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A prison sentence would appropriately
express society’s disapproval towards
Henry Grant.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
It is more important that society’s
disapproval towards Henry Grant finds
expression than it is for Henry Grant to go
to a mental health facility instead of prison.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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APPENDIXG (Dependent Measures Organized by Category)
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I. “Capacity/incapacity”items
[incapacity to make responsible choices]
X could not make rational decisions at the time of the act
X did not have the ability to make responsible choices at the time of the act
II. “Unimpaired awareness and perceptions/impaired awareness and perceptions” items
[wild beast test] [mens rea]
At the time of the act, X had no awareness of what was going on
At the time of the act, X could perceive his surroundings accurately
X was completely out of touch with reality when he committed the act
III. “Clear thinking/distorted thinking” items
[M’Naughten] [cognitive]
X could not think clearly at the time of the act
X knew what he was doing at the time of the act
IV. “Could control impulses and actions/could not control impulses and actions” items
[volitional] [irresistible impulse]
X could control himself at the time of the act
X did the act because of an irresistible impulse that he could not control
V. “Culpable actions/nonculpable actions” items
[culpable for bringing about the impairment][defendant was either reckless or negligent in
her actions and should be held responsible]
If X was impaired at the time of the act, it was his own fault
X should not be held responsible for his actions
X should have known that he was going to cause some harm
X does not seem blameworthy
VI. “Premeditation or malice/no evil motive” items
It seems that X may have planned his act ahead of time
It is unlikely that X really wanted to hurt anybody
VII. “Others not responsible/others at fault” items
X, and X alone, is responsible for what happened
Other people are partly responsible for what happened
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VIII. CondemnationScale Items
I disapprove of X.
I feel hatred toward X.
I would like to see a vengeful response towards X.
It is important that X is not punished too severely.
I would like to see X get what he deserves.
I feel contempt towards X.
I feel sympathy for X.
I forgive X for his actions.
I feel anger towards X.
I feel resentment towards X.
I would like revenge against X
It doesn’t seem right to want revenge against X for what he did.
The law cannot punish X enough for what he did to the boy.
I am outraged at X for his actions.
Society should want revenge against X for his actions against the boy.
Society in general probably feels hatred towards X.
Society in general probably feels sympathy for X.
Society should want to express its disapproval of X for his actions against the boy.
Sentencing X to prison would balance society’s need to express any desire for revenge towards
him with rational, disapproving judgment.
Sending X to a mental health facility would be more like punishment for his actions than to help
treat any mental disorder.
If X were punished appropriately under the law by being sentenced to prison, it would satisfy any
desire for revenge I might feel towards him.
If X were punished appropriately under the law by being sentenced to prison, it would satisfy any
disapproval I may have towards him.
Sending X to a mental hospital for treatment instead of to prison would satisfy any desire for
revenge I may have towards him.
Sending X to a mental hospital for treatment instead of to prison would satisfy any disapproval I
may have towards him.
Society should want to express its disapproval of X for his actions.
X should be sent to prison because society needs to express its disapproval towards him.
X should be sent to prison because society needs to express its desire for revenge towards him.
A prison sentence would appropriately express society’s disapproval towards X.
It is more important that society’s disapproval towards X finds expression than it is for X to go to




Hypothetical1: Severe Assault, No Premeditation
Timothy B. is a sixteen-year-old male who was recently walking home from a friend's house
when he noticed a piece of metal pipe. He began swinging it around and throwing it into the air.
Timothy continued to swing the pipe pretending it was a baseball bat. A neighbor who saw him
on that day indicated that he was running up the sidewalk yelling like he was an announcer for a
baseball game. Timothy says that he continued walking toward his house playing with the pipe
until he got to a bus stop near a convenience store that was on his way home. At this point,
Timothy says that he saw a man who was struggling to get a large bag over to the stop. Timothy
approached the man thinking he could help him with the bag. However, as Timothy got closer he
noticed how nicely the man was dressed and decided that he would threaten the man and ask for
his wallet. When the man resisted, Timothy hit the man on the back of his neck with the pipe he
had found. As the man struggled to keep his wallet, Timothy hit the man’s head with the pipe.
The man recovered from his injuries after six weeks of hospitalization and rehabilitation. A
woman saw the entire incident and called the police from a pay phone while it was occurring.
An officer from inside the nearby convenience store apprehended Timothy as he ran away, still
holding the pipe and the man’s wallet in his hands.
Timothy's father describes Timothy as an independent child who usually keeps to himself.
Timothy recently moved into a room over the family’s garage. The room is much like an
apartment. The room has a small kitchen that Timothy uses about half of the time, and he eats
with his parents the other half. The garage is connected to the house so Timothy still must walk
through the house to come and leave. Timothy still has a curfew, but once he is in his room, his
parents say that he is able to do whatever he wants. Both of his parents are quite shocked that
Timothy would ever hurt anyone.
Two years prior to the current incident, Timothy stole a car and took it for a high-speed ride on
the interstate. The car was a 1978 Chevrolet Camaro that was recovered undamaged. As a
result, Timothy was adjudicated in juvenile court and found to be delinquent. This was
Timothy’s only prior offense.
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Hypothetical2: Severe Assault with Premeditation
Timothy B. is a sixteen year old male who took a piece of metal pipe from his house so that he
could mug someone. He needed to get money for some clothes he wanted to buy. Walking
toward a bus stop near a convenience store in town, he began swinging the pipe around and
throwing into the air. Timothy continued to swing the pipe pretending it was a baseball bat. A
neighbor who saw him on that day indicated that he was running up the sidewalk yelling like he
was an announcer for a baseball game. Timothy says that he continued walking toward the bus
stop playing with the pipe. At this point, Timothy says that he put the pipe down his pant leg and
walked as though he had a brace on his leg. He approached a well-dressed man at the bus stop
and asked if the man would help him bring a bag over to the stop because he was unable to carry
it with his leg in the brace. Once they were away from the bus stop and convenience store,
Timothy grabbed the pipe out of his pant leg and hit the man on the back of his neck. As the man
struggled to keep his wallet, Timothy hit the man’s head with the pipe. The man recovered from
his injuries after six weeks of hospitalization and rehabilitation. A woman saw the entire
incident and called the police from a pay phone while it was occurring. An officer from inside
the nearby convenience store apprehended Timothy as he ran away still holding the pipe and the
man’s wallet in his hands.
Timothy's father describes Timothy as an independent child who usually keeps to himself.
Timothy recently moved into a room over the family’s garage. The room is much like an
apartment. The room does have a small kitchen that Timothy uses about half of the time, and he
eats with his parents the other half. The garage is connected to the house so Timothy still must
walk through the house to come and leave. Timothy has a curfew, but once he is in his room, his
parents say that he is able to do whatever he wants. Both of his parents are quite shocked that
Timothy would ever hurt anyone.
Two years prior to the current incident, Timothy stole a car and took it for a high-speed ride on
the interstate. The car was a 1978 Chevrolet Camaro that was recovered undamaged. As a




Hypothetical3: Less Severe Assault, No premeditation
Timothy B. is a sixteen-year-old male who was walking home from a friend's house when he
noticed a piece of metal pipe. He picked up the pipe and began swinging it around and throwing
it into the air. Timothy continued to swing the pipe pretending it was a baseball bat. A neighbor
who saw him on that day indicated that he was running up the sidewalk yelling like he was an
announcer for a baseball game. Timothy says that he continued walking toward his house playing
with the pipe until he got to a bus stop near a convenience store that was on his way home. At
this point, Timothy says that he saw a man who was struggling to get a large bag over to the stop.
Timothy approached the man thinking he could help him with the bag. However, as Timothy got
closer he noticed how nicely the man was dressed and decided that he would threaten the man
and ask for his wallet. When the man resisted, Timothy hit the man’s knees with the pipe he had
found causing the man to fall to the ground. The man gave Timothy his wallet when Timothy
threatened to hit him again. A woman saw the entire incident and called the police from a pay
phone while it was occurring. An officer from inside the nearby convenience store apprehended
Timothy as he ran away still holding the pipe and the man’s wallet in his hands.
Timothy's father describes Timothy as an independent child who usually keeps to himself.
Timothy recently moved into a room over the family’s garage. The room is much like an
apartment. The room does have a small kitchen that Timothy uses about half of the time, and he
eats with his parents the other half. The garage is connected to the house so Timothy still must
walk through the house to come and leave. Timothy has a curfew, but once he is in his room, his
parents say that he is able to do whatever he wants. Both of his parents are quite shocked that
Timothy would ever hurt anyone.
Two years prior to the current incident, Timothy stole a car and took it for a high-speed ride on
the interstate. The car was a 1978 Chevrolet Camaro that was recovered undamaged. As a
result, Timothy was adjudicated in juvenile court and found to be delinquent. This was
Timothy's only prior offense.
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Hypothetical4: Less Severe Assault with Premeditation
Timothy B. is a sixteen-year-old male who took a piece of metal pipe from his house so that he
could mug someone. He needed to get money for some clothes he wanted to buy. Walking
toward a bus stop near a convenience store in town, he began swinging the pipe around and
throwing it into the air. Timothy continued to swing the pipe pretending it was a baseball bat. A
neighbor who saw him that day indicated that he was running up the sidewalk yelling like he was
an announcer for a baseball game. Timothy says that he continued walking toward the bus stop
playing with the pipe. At this point, Timothy says that he put the pipe down his pant leg and
walked as though he had a brace on his leg. He approached a well-dressed man at the bus stop
and asked if the man would help him bring a bag over to the stop because he was unable to carry
it with his leg in the brace. Once they were away from the bus stop and the convenience store,
Timothy asked for the man’s wallet. When the man resisted, Timothy grabbed the pipe out of his
pants leg and hit the man’s knees causing the man to fall to the ground. The man gave Timothy
his wallet when Timothy threatened to hit him again. A woman saw the entire incident and called
the police from a pay phone while it was occurring. An officer from inside the nearby
convenience store apprehended Timothy as he ran away, still holding the pipe and the man’s
wallet in his hands.
Timothy's father describes Timothy as being an independent child who usually keeps to himself.
Timothy recently moved into a room over the family’s garage. The room is much like an
apartment. The room does have a small kitchen that Timothy uses about half of the time, and he
eats with his parents the other half. The garage is connected to the house so Timothy still must
walk through the house to come and leave. Timothy has a curfew, but once he is in his room, his
parents say that he is able to do whatever he wants. Both of his parents are quite shocked that
Timothy would ever hurt anyone.
Two years prior to the current incident, Timothy stole a car and took it for a high-speed ride on
the interstate. The car was a 1978 Chevrolet Camaro that was recovered undamaged. As a




APPENDIXI (Dependent Measures/Condemnation Scale)
*Note: The materials presented in this appendix have been reformatted for ease of
reference, but are identical in substance to the materials submitted to participants
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Pleaseanswer the following questions carefully. Feel free to look back at the scenario at
any time.
1. In the case described, was the offense against a person or against property?
Person Property
2. How serious was the offense committed by the juvenile?
Not serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely serious
3. How severe was the harm caused by the juvenile?
Not severe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely severe
4. Was the offense premeditated?
Yes No
5. How many prior offenses were on the juvenile’s record?
__________
6. How strong is the need to protect the community from this juvenile?
Not strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very strong
7. Can this juvenile be safely returned to the community at this time?
Yes No
8. Does this juvenile require detention?
Yes No
9. How aggressive was this juvenile’s offense?
Not aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very aggressive
10. How violent was this juvenile’s offense?
Not violent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very violent
11. How mature was this juvenile?
Not mature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very mature
12. How much do you believe this juvenile could benefit from rehabilitative programs?
Very little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much
13. In your opinion, how likely is it that this juvenile would cooperate with efforts to
rehabilitate him?
Very unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very likely
14. How successful do you believe rehabilitation would be for this juvenile?
Very unsuccessful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very successful
15. Should this person be tried in juvenile or criminal court?
Juvenile Criminal




Pleaserate the influence that the following characteristics had on your waiver decision using the
scale below:
Non-Influential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Influential
Characteristics of the case Rating
The fact that the offense was against a person / property
The seriousness of the offense committed by the juvenile
The severity of the harm caused by the juvenile
Whether the offense was premeditated or not
The number of prior offenses on the juvenile’s record
The aggressiveness of this juvenile’s offense
The violence of this juvenile’s offense
The maturity of this juvenile
The juvenile’s rehabilitation probability
1. In general, what punishment(s) would be appropriate for parents of juveniles who commit
crimes? (Circle all that apply)
No punishment Monetary Fine Prison sentence Victim restitution
Other(specify)_______
2. Which punishment is most appropriate for Timothy’s parents in the current case?
No punishment Monetary Fine Prison sentence Victim restitution
Other(specify)_______
3. Does your jurisdiction allow parents to be criminally punished for the crimes that their child
commits? Yes No
4. If no, would you approve of such a criminal liability law for parents in your jurisdiction?
Yes No N/A
5. Are you a(n)___________? (circle all that apply)
biological parent step parent adoptive parent foster parent not a parent
6. Please indicate your profession Defense Attorney Prosecuting Attorney Judge
7. How many years have you been in your current profession? __________________
8. Please indicate your gender Male Female
9. How many cases have you been the counsel of record or presiding judge on a juvenile waiver
case?__________





Pleaserate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below:
Completely disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely agree
Agreement
1-7
Timothy’s parents should have known that he was likely to commit the
present crime.
Timothy’s parents are responsible for his criminal activity.
Timothy’s parents contributed to his delinquency.
Timothy’s parents be punished in some way for the crimes he committed.
In my judgment, the juvenile needs to be appropriately punished.
In my judgment, the juvenile needs to be supported and educated
I feel hatred towards the juvenile because of what he did
I feel sympathy for the juvenile
I forgive the juvenile for his actions
I feel contempt towards the juvenile
I feel anger towards the juvenile
I feel resentment towards the juvenile
I would like to see a vengeful response towards the juvenile because of
what he did
It is important that the juvenile is not punished too severely
It does not seem appropriate to want revenge against this juvenile
Members of society or the public in general probably feels hatred towards
this juvenile
The public in general probably feels sympathy for this juvenile
The juvenile should be sent to prison because society needs to express its
disapproval towards him
The law cannot punish the juvenile enough for what he did
The juvenile should be sent to prison because society needs to express its




Thereis no need to send the juvenile to prison, because there should not
be any desire for revenge towards him that need to be expressed on behalf
of society
Sending the juvenile to a state school would be more like punishment for
his actions than to help rehabilitate him
Sending the juvenile to a state school would appropriately express
society’s disapproval towards the juvenile
Sending the juvenile to a state school would appropriately express
society’s desire for revenge towards the juvenile (if any)
If society fails to punish the juvenile by sending him to prison, it would be
as if society approves of what he did
Ordering the juvenile to perform community service would appropriately
express society’s disapproval of the juvenile’s actions
Ordering the juvenile to perform community service would appropriately
express society’s desire for revenge of the juvenile’s actions (if any)
Ordering the juvenile to pay restitution would appropriately express
society’s disapproval of the juvenile’s actions
Ordering the juvenile to pay restitution would appropriately express
society’s desire for revenge of the juvenile’s actions (if any)
Ordering the juvenile to perform community service is not really
punishment
Ordering the juvenile to pay restitution is not really punishment
Sending the juvenile to a state school is not really punishment
It is more important that society’s disapproval towards the juvenile finds
expression than it is for the juvenile to avoid the stigma of a criminal
conviction
